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ABSTRACT
The three chapters of this dissertation investigate two policy issues faced by
water utilities: infrastructure investment and water budget programs. Water
utilities have infrastructure that is deteriorating at an increasing rate, necessitating higher rates of investment from ratepayers. At the same time utilities
must improve their management of existing water supplies in order to postpone the need to procure water supplies with a higher marginal cost. Water
budgets are a way to manage scarce water resources more efficiently.
The first chapter focuses on customer preferences for infrastructure investments. Individuals are willing-to-pay to have fewer outages at home, shorter
average outage lengths, greater advance notification, more urban greenspace

vi

irrigated with reuse water, and greater use of renewable energy. The correlated attributes model indicates evidence of adaptive behavior towards longer
outages and that individuals who prefer high levels of reuse infrastructure
investment also prefer high levels of investment in renewable energy. These
results are useful to policymakers who need to raise rates to fund the infrastructure investment gap.
The second chapter studies the impact of model assumptions about the
marginal utility of income (MUI) by comparing MWTP distributions from
preference-space and WTP-space mixed logit models. In preference-space models, the MUI, whether heterogeneous or fixed, is the denominator of the MWTP
ratio. WTP-space models estimate the MUI separately from the attribute coefficients that represent the MWTP. The resulting MWTP distribution using
WTP-space estimates has a tighter distribution and no extreme outliers. From
a behavioral standpoint, the distribution closely resembles a preference-space
fixed cost model.
The third chapter examines the water budget program for irrigation-only
customers. Water budgets are a new conservation tool that combine aspects of
quantity restrictions with increasing price blocks to encourage efficient water
consumption. Excess consumption receives a per-unit surcharge. Private and
public sector accounts have significantly different consumption behavior. Price
elasticity of demand is estimated as ´0.845. Accounts in the 85th and 95th
percentiles of water budget use, parks, and multi-family accounts are among
the most inelastic. Commercial and home owner associations are the most
price responsive. Policy recommendations include focusing on accounts in the
middle use tier between 100 and 150% of water budget use and raising the
highest surcharge rate.
These papers contribute to the literature by examining new infrastructure

vii

investments to increase the use of reuse water irrigating greenspace and renewable energy use. The studies also examine the differences between correlated and uncorrelated attributes models. The final paper contributes by focusing on non-residential water consumption and estimates elasticity of demand
for a customer class that only has outdoor water use.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 Overview
Infrastructure investment and optimal management of water resources are issues for urban water utilities nationwide. Water utilities are facing declining
revenue due to conservation at a time when they need greater investment in
failing drinking water distribution infrastructure, to comply with environmental regulations, find new sources of water supply and invest in new technologies
to optimally use the water they do have. As a natural monopoly industry, water
utilities are regulated and cannot set prices in response to market conditions or
investment needs. Private water utilities are regulated by state commissions
and public or municipal water utilities are self-regulated by a water board.
Regulators or rate boards, who set water prices, are typically elected officials
who have different incentives than water utility managers. Regulated rate increases have not always kept pace with inflation. As a result, water utility
managers cannot reliably use water rates as a tool to encourage optimal water
use behaviors or to adequately fund current infrastructure investment needs.

1

Chapter 1. Introduction
This has been referred to as the infrastructure gap (EPA, 2002).
Federal agencies and industry organizations have been sounding the alarm
for the past fifteen years about the state of the nation’s infrastructure and
the dangers in delaying investment. The American Society of Civil Engineers
(ASCE) graded the state of drinking water infrastructure nationwide as a ’D’
in the 2013 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure (ASCE, 2013). The American Water Works Association warns that delaying infrastructure investment
is one possibility, but will result in pipes being stressed beyond their useful
lifecycle, more frequent and unplanned breakages, and a repair cost that exceeds the replacement cost. This will be an unsustainable use of water utility
resources and could have an adverse impact on public health (AWWA, 2011).
The Environmental Protection Agency estimates $385 billion is needed in infrastructure investments through 2030 (EPA, 2013). Investment needs will be
sharply higher in the future. Annual investment needed is projected to double
from $30 billion to $50 billion by the mid-2040s (AWWA, 2011).
There seems to be little disagreement that ratepayers will pay for the majority of investment costs. According to the ASCE, congressional appropriations
to the EPA for infrastructure declined from 2008 through 2012 to an annual
average of $1.38 billion (ASCE, 2013). Assuming this is the annual appropriations over the next 20 years, this would only cover 8% of the infrastructure
needs identified by the Environmental Protection Agency. Water rates have
typically been low in most communities and reflect the average cost instead
of the marginal cost of treatment and transport; thus rates do not incorporate
the opportunity cost of finding new resources. This has negative implications
for both infrastructure investment and optimal resource use. Utilities now will
have to impose higher rates or taxes on their customers to pay for the majority
of their infrastructure gap.

2

Chapter 1. Introduction
Optimal management of water supply resources, especially in the face of
drought conditions and population growth is an issue for water utility managers. Water utility managers can either procure additional water supplies
or maximize the use of their current supply. For water utilities that have already procured all their least costly supplies, accessing new supplies may have
a much higher marginal cost. It is less costly to sustainably manage current
supplies and reduce water waste.
Demand-side management programs are one tool water utilities use to
stretch scarce water supplies, employing both price and non-price conservation programs to achieve their demand reduction goals. Quantity restrictions
that mandate a percentage reduction in demand are an example of a non-price
conservation policy, while pricing policing work to reduce demand by charging
higher rates for higher volumes of use. Water budgets are a new demand-side
conservation policy that combine aspects of both types of programs.
This dissertation examines infrastructure investment and water budget
programs in the context of the water utility (ABCWUA) serving Albuquerque,
New Mexico which is a major metropolitan city in the southwestern United
States. Albuquerque is located in the high desert region of central New Mexico
where annual precipitation is only nine to ten inches. An underground aquifer
was the primary source of water supply for ABCWUA until 2008 when the San
Juan Chama (SJC) project was completed. Water is transported through a series of tunnels, diversions, and dams from southern Colorado’s San Juan River
(part of the Colorado River Basin system) to the Chama River in New Mexico,
which is a tributary of the Rio Grande River. Now surface water comprises 8090% of ABCWUA’s water supply. ABCWUA instituted a series of conservation
programs to reduce daily per capita water demand to 155 gallons per day as
a part of the permit requirements for the SJC project. As a condition of tak-
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ing surface water from the Rio Grande, ABCWUA must return fifty percent to
the river downstream after treating it to environmental standards. This emphasizes the need to account for the consumptive use in their service area to
sustainably manage their water supply.
Albuquerque is a representative city in terms of facing failing infrastructure, an infrastructure investment gap, rapid population growth, and changing weather patterns. Between 1990 and 2010 the population increased by
40% to approximately 550,000, although population growth is currently flat.1
and there have been recurring years of drought in 2006, 2011, and 2013 where
large percentages of New Mexico were classified as experiencing extreme to
exceptional drought.2
In their 2011 Asset Management Plan, ABCWUA acknowledged a backlog
of infrastructure repairs and an annual infrastructure gap of approximately
$35 million. They projected an annual infrastructure investment need of $76
million over the next century to fully address deteriorating water and wastewater infrastructure (ABCWUA, 2011). There were no operational rate increases
between 2004 and 2012 when the governing board of the utility voted for a
series of rate increases over the next six years, intending to help with the infrastructure backlog. However, inflationary rates outstripped rate increases.3
The three main chapters of this dissertation will use various econometric models to address these two issues of infrastructure investment and optimal water
resource management using a water budget.

1

U.S. Census Bureau, American FactFinder website, accessed on April 30, 2015 at
http:factfinder.census.gov
2
Data from U.S. Drought Monitor maintained by the National Drought Mitigation Center
at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. Available at http:droughtmonitor.unl.edu
3
Between 2000 and 2011, Inflation was approximately 64% while rate increases were
around 16%.
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1.2 Chapter Two
Chapter 2 focuses on customer’s willingness-to-pay for infrastructure investments by estimating a six multinomial and random parameters logit (RPL)
models. In particular, this chapter compares the impact on preferences and
MWTP from using uncorrelated and correlated attributes RPL models. The
study contributes to the water utilities literature by examining preferences
for reuse water distribution infrastructure and renewable energy use in addition to drinking water distribution infrastructure. Chapter 2 updates a previous similar study but allows cost to be random and analyzes the differences
between estimating uncorrelated and correlated RPL models. From a policy
standpoint, practitioners should estimate both models for a complete understanding of preferences while understanding the cause of possible differences
in MWTP estimates.
Data used in the analysis are from a choice experiment survey done with
a random sample of residential customers of ABCWUA. Water utility infrastructure has very high investment costs and a long planning horizon. Choice
experiments present individuals with hypothetical infrastructure investments
presented as a choice between alternative investment packages whose descriptive characteristics vary. By choosing one alternative over another, the individual is indicating their preference for that combination of characteristics. As
long as cost is one of the alternative’s varying characteristics, willingness-topay can be estimated, which utilities can use in a benefit-cost analysis during
their planning process.
Choice experiments (CE) are a popular method for environmental valuation. The theoretical basis for analysis is the random utility model, which assumes that individuals choose the alternative with attribute levels that max-
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imizes their well-being. Early adopters of CE surveys focused on the benefits from estimating trade-offs between attributes, the marginal utility from a
small change in attribute level, and valuing complex scenarios (Adamowicz et
al., 1994; Hanley et al., 1998). A basic multinomial logit model was used and
heterogeneity was often modeled either through interaction terms between demographic characteristics and attributes or by estimating models for different
subgroups and testing for equality of coefficients.
As choice experiments have become more commonly used, econometric
methods used for analysis have increased in sophistication. RPL models allow latent preference heterogeneity for attributes, which is indicated through
the significance of the standard deviation parameter. Often researchers have
assumed that an individual’s preferences for attributes were independent. Estimating a correlated attributes structure allows preferences for one attribute
to be influenced by preferences for another. Various economists recommend
this estimation strategy as more theoretically sound (Scarpa et al., 2008; Hole
& Kolstad, 2012). A correlated attributes structure has been shown to improve fit and provide more conservative mean and median estimated MWTP
(Colombo et al., 2007; Hess & Rose, 2012; Hole & Kolstad, 2012).
I compare RPL model specifications with correlated and uncorrelated attributes using a normal distribution for the random attributes. Consistent with
the literature we find more conservative mean and median MWTP estimates.
Results indicate that the correlated attributes models have a greater variance
in the MWTP distribution and a greater number of individuals display negative preferences, which causes the more conservative mean and median MWTP
estimates. Estimated MWTP values are not significantly different between the
two models. Of interest to water utility managers and policymakers are the aggregated MWTP values. When median figures from the uncorrelated model are
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used to calculate aggregated WTP, the estimated additional monthly amount
on the water bill for infrastructure investment is higher in comparison to using
median figures from the uncorrelated model. The monthly amounts using estimates from both models are within range of respondents’ self-reported level of
hardship they would experience in the event of extra monthly amounts charged
to a dedicated Infrastructure Fund.

1.3 Chapter Three
Chapter 3 estimates four preference-space and WTP-space mixed logit models to compare each model’s assumptions of the marginal utility of income on
the resulting MWTP distributions. The marginal utility of income represents
the value of an extra dollar to an individual. It is an essential component
of marginal willingness-to-pay estimates. In standard preference-space mixed
logit models, it is estimated as the coefficient on the cost attribute and then
used in the denominator when the MWTP ratio is calculated. In WTP-space
models, the MWTP are estimated directly as the coefficients on the non-cost
attributes, while the marginal utility of income is estimated separately.
This chapter contributes to the discussion in the growing WTP-space literature about model fit versus preference-space models. An income-validity test
is used to compare the characteristics of the distribution of MWTP to MWTP
distributions derived under different MUI assumptions in preference-space.
Findings indicate that the MWTP distribution from the WTP-space model is
notably similar to the distribution from the preference-space model with a fixed
cost. Under fixed cost assumptions, heterogeneity of MWTP is reduced. A basic weighting scheme is tested to examine the distribution of social benefits of
infrastructure investment.
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Preference-space models refer to the standard mixed logit method where
estimated coefficients represent an individual’s preferences for an attribute.
WTP-space models are a re-parameterization of the underlying utility equation
in the preference-space model. The two types of models are considered formally
equivalent (Train & Weeks, 2005). However, due to the difference in how the
marginal utility of income is included, there may be an impact on the resulting
MWTP distribution. This has not been investigated.

WTP-space models are a more recent econometric development. Several researchers consider them an improvement because the resulting MWTP distribution does not exhibit the extreme outliers common to MWTP distributions estimated in preference-space. The standard deviations are tighter. Researchers
suggest that as a result, the MWTP estimates are more realistic. However,
the model fit is typically worse for WTP-space models than preference-space
models (Train & Weeks, 2005; Sonnier et al., 2007; Scarpa et al., 2008; Hole
& Kolstad, 2012; Scarpa et al., 2012). There is not a clear consensus that one
method is preferred.

Three mixed logit preference-space models are estimated under different
distributional assumptions for the cost parameter and compared with a mixed
logit WTP-space model to understand the behavioral implications of the WTPspace model. Results follow previous studies and find that model fit is better
for the preference-space models in comparison to the WTP-space model. However, the distribution from the WTP-space model has no extreme outliers and
is much tighter with more conservative MWTP estimates. Findings show that
the WTP-space model fails an income validity test; there is little difference in
MWTP between low and high income individuals.
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1.4 Chapter Four
Chapter 4 addresses the issue of optimal management of water supply resources through ABCWUA’s water budget program for irrigation-only customers. The primary contribution to the literature is estimating elasticity of
demand and the characteristics that impact the water consumption decision
for a non-residential customer class. In addition, water budgets are a relatively new long term conservation program. Baerenklau et al. (2014) studied
the impact of a residential water budget program. That paper is the only one
focusing on water budgets, to my knowledge.
Water budgets combine aspects of quantity restriction and increasing block
rates conservation policies yet preserve customer ability to allocate their water demand to their highest use (Mayer et al., 2008). Quantity restriction and
pricing policies by themselves demonstrate equity issues with regards to which
customer classes are more affected by conservation requirements. Low income
customers are forced to conserve under pricing policies as they cannot afford
high marginal rates, while high use customers can bear a greater burden under
quantity restrictions Renwick & Archibald (1998); Duke & Ehemann (2004);
Duke et al. (2002); S. Olmstead & Stavins (2008). Water budgets allot a specific amount of water to each customer based on their specific characteristics.
Water consumption that exceeds the allotted budget amount, is charged at an
increasingly higher amount depending on the number of surcharge blocks.
A percentage of water utilities use or are switching to using surface water as
a primary or supplemental water supply.4 With surface water, a utility diverts
water from a river, treats it to potable quality, distributes it and then cleans it
in a treatment plant before returning the water to the river downstream. In
4

Examples include the water utilities that service Albuquerque (NM), Fresno (CA), Chicago
(IL).
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arid regions, legal requirements often specify how much water a utility must
return to the river at the end of the service cycle. The difference between what
the utility diverts and what it returns at the end of the service cycle is consumptive water use. Irrigation and other outdoor water demands are a part of
consumptive use. Optimal management of sustainable consumptive water demand is one aspect of managing scarce water supplies. Conservation policies
often target outdoor water demand because its consumptive use nature. Literature has focused primarily on conservation policies for residential demand. I
am aware of only one study that addresses water budget conservation policies
and it focuses on the residential water budget (Baerenklau et al., 2014).
Data are an unbalanced panel from 2008 through 2013 on 1,107 irrigationonly accounts. ABCWUA and SmartUse provided information on annual water
consumption, water budget allotments, account types, location coordinates, and
landscape details. Additional data for analysis were gathered from outside
sources and mapped to account locations using GIS-techniques.
I address two research questions in this chapter: what characteristics affect
water consumption levels and what is the elasticity of demand? For the first
research question, I estimate a random effects and an ordered logit model. The
random effects model looks at the impact of the past year’s water budget use
on this year’s water budget use. The ordered logit model examines the characteristics that impact the probability of being in a particular consumption level
and receiving a surcharge. Findings show that past water consumption has
a partial impact on current consumption, implying the ability for accounts to
change their irrigating behavior. Of the accounts that exceed the water budget and receive a surcharge, the accounts who only exceed up to 150% of their
budget are the most likely to change their behavior. Public/private sector and
landscape size impact different consumption decisions.
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To address the second research question, I estimate a 2SLS instrumental
variables model. I find that overall demand is inelastic, ´0.845. When I examine the elasticity for different account groups, parks/golf courses, multi-family,
and education accounts emerge as having the most inelastic demand, while
commercial, HOA, and government accounts have the most elastic demand. If
elasticity is estimated based on the accounts’ percentile of water budget use,
accounts in the highest percentiles have very inelastic demand. These are the
accounts in the 95th percentile or higher. Accounts in the 85th to 95th percentiles also have very inelastic demand but not quite like the 95th percentile
group.

1.5 Summary
To summarize, this dissertation examines two issues faced by water utilities
today: infrastructure investment spending and optimal management of water supplies. Chapter 2 estimates utility customers’ MWTP for three types
of investments using a correlated attributes random parameters logit model
to more completely understand ratepayers’ preferences. Findings show that
while this econometric specification fits the data better, it comes at the cost of a
larger variance in the MWTP distribution and an increase the the percentage
of ratepayers with negative preferences. There are not significant differences
between the correlated and uncorrelated MWTP values.
Chapter 3 examines the impact on MWTP estimates of estimating a WTPspace mixed logit model and compares the results with a standard preferencespace mixed logit model. WTP-space models are regarded as being an improvement over preference-space models because of smaller standard deviations and
a lack of MWTP outliers. However, findings suggest that this might be a result
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of the separate estimation of the marginal utility of income coefficient. MWTP
distributions from the WTP-space model and preference-space model with fixed
cost are quite similar.
Finally, Chapter 4 analyzes the water budget program for ABCWUA’s
irrigation-only customers. Results indicate that there are significant differences between the average water consumption behavior of public and private
sector accounts over time. Accounts that have water consumption behavior either within their water budget (efficient) or greater than 150% of their water
budget (extreme) are highly likely to repeat the same behavior the following
year. Those accounts that have excess water consumption between 100% and
150% of their water budget are more likely to change their consumption pattern. Various elasticities of demand are calculated. Chapter 5 summarizes the
dissertation, noting the gaps in the literature, contributions, policy recommendations, and make suggestions for future research.
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Chapter 2
Preferences for water utility
infrastructure investment using
correlated and uncorrelated
random parameters logit models

2.1 Introduction
U.S. water utilities face many challenges, but a key one is inadequate investment levels for pipe infrastructure; this could lead to an unreliable water supply (ASCE, 2013). As a result, many water utilities in the U.S. face rapidly
deteriorating infrastructure. In 2013, the national state of drinking water
infrastructure was rated as a ‘D’ by the American Society of Civil Engineers
(ASCE, 2013). In 1999, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimated $225 billion to repair drinking water infrastructure nationwide through
2030; in 2011 the estimate was revised upwards to $384 billion (EPA, 2013).

13

Chapter 2. Preferences for water utility infrastructure investment
Challenges in infrastructure funding are partially a result of declining federal funding. Today’s drinking water pipe infrastructure was installed 60 to
120 years ago at a time when the federal government largely subsidized installation costs. However, congressional appropriations to the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) for infrastructure declined from 2008 through 2012 to
an annual average of $1.38 billion (ASCE, 2013). If this trend continues over
the next 20 years, annual appropriations would cover approximately 8% of the
EPA’s revised estimate. Future infrastructure projects will likely be paid for by
ratepayers through a combination of higher water rates and/or taxes.
The goal of this study is to compare preferences and estimated MWTP for
water utility infrastructure investments between correlated and uncorrelated
random parameters logit models. Data are from a choice experiment survey
conducted with ratepayers in a large southwestern U.S. metropolitan area.
Specifically I compare any econometric improvement from estimating a random parameters logit (RPL) model with correlated attributes to the impact on
the estimated MWTP distribution necessary to policymakers and water utility
managers.
Previous CE surveys in the water utility literature have focused on service
levels (Hensher et al., 2005; Willis et al., 2005), water quality (Scarpa et al.,
2012; Tarfasa & Brouwer, 2013), drought restrictions (Hensher et al., 2006),
and future water supply policy options (Blamey et al., 1999). Blamey et al.
(1999) used their survey attributes to refer to possible infrastructure projects.
However, to my knowledge, this study is the first to describe the CE scenario in
terms of the increased investment in water utility infrastructure projects due
to deteriorating pipes and environmental concerns.
Researchers incorporate heterogeneity in water utility studies to allow for
possible variation in customer preferences over service levels and to improve
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the precision of MWTP estimates.1 Most water utility studies use classical
heterogeneity (Blamey et al., 1999; Willis et al., 2005). More recent water utility studies have allowed for unobservable heterogeneity (Hatton MacDonald et
al., 2003; Lanz & Provins, 2012; Tarfasa & Brouwer, 2013). Only Scarpa et
al. (2012) have incorporated correlated attributes in their study of tap water
quality.
Many studies have shown correlated attributes to be an econometric improvement with regards to data fit (Colombo et al., 2007; Scarpa et al., 2008;
Hess & Rose, 2012). However, estimated MWTP values are not always significantly different from uncorrelated specifications (Colombo et al., 2007; Scarpa
et al., 2012).
This paper provides two contributions to the literature. First, it adds to
the water utility literature by looking at preferences for water utility infrastructure investment using a RPL model with correlated attributes. I use a
unique dataset from a southwestern U.S. city facing a $35 million annual gap
in infrastructure investment. MWTP values are estimated for investment scenarios to consider the investment amount that could be gathered through a
five-year Investment Fund charge on ratepayers’ monthly water bills. Second,
this study adds to the body of literature using correlated attributes models by
examining the effect of a correlated attribute specification on the entire MWTP
distribution, including extreme outliers and the determinants of MWTP.
Results are robust across all models and indicate that consumers would
rather invest in drinking water distribution infrastructure over reuse water
distribution infrastructure or renewable energy. Income, education, outage experience and water conservation attitudes strongly influence preferences; how1

This is important since water utility customers are not able to reveal their preference for
service levels through their purchasing patterns or selection of a water provider.
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ever, latent influences more strongly influence preference heterogeneity for all
attributes as seen in the magnitude of the standard deviation. The greatest preference variation exists around investing in renewable energy use by
the water utility. The correlated attributes model shows that customers who
prefer greater investment in reuse water infrastructure also strongly prefer
greater investment in renewable energy use by the utility. The correlated RPL
increases the heterogeneity in MWTP through a greater variation in the distribution, including more extreme MWTP outliers with a greater percentage of
negative preferences. As a result, the correlated model gives more conservative
median MWTP values.

My findings indicate that MWTP estimates from the specification allowing
for correlation of attributes are not significantly different from MWTP estimates from an uncorrelated attributes specification due to the increased variance across the MWTP distribution. In my study, median MWTP from a correlated attributes model are between 11-42% less than the median MWTPs
from the uncorrelated model. One potential investment scenario indicates that
customers are willing-to-pay a monthly amount between $4.95 and $6.50 as
an additional charge on their monthly water bill into a dedicated Water Infrastructure Fund for a period of five years to avoid deteriorating distribution
infrastructure. These amounts represent aggregated scenario totals using median MWTP values from correlated and uncorrelated models, respectively. The
issue of extreme outliers from the correlated attributes model can be avoided
yet similar insight towards preferences can be gained from estimating an uncorrelated attributes model with a second stage regression to look at the determinants of MWTP. However, correlated and uncorrelated attributes models are
found to be complementary and estimating both can enhance understanding of
preferences.
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2.2 Literature Review
2.2.1 Water utility literature
Australia, New Zealand, and England lead the United States in using consumer preferences in their water utility regulation processes. In both countries, stated preference methods are used to value water utility attributes in
order to justify rate requests to the appropriate regulatory agencies or for costbenefit analyses of investment projects.
In the mid-1990s, the Council of Australian Governments initiated a series
of water utility reforms that changed decision-making regarding levels of customer service and how they are reflected in the price (Hatton MacDonald et
al., 2003). As a result, Australian regulatory process requires regulated water utilities to support rate increase requests by demonstrating cost-effective
investment decisions that result in improved customer service and are an appropriate level of customer service that reflects consumers’ willingness-to-pay
(Hatton MacDonald et al., 2003; Hensher et al., 2005). Due to Australia’s severe drought of 2003-2012, many choice experiment (CE) and contingent valuation (CV) surveys investigated issues of drought restrictions and water supply
(Cooper, Burton, & Crase, 2011).
In the United Kingdom private, regional monopolies provide water and
sewage services under public regulation. Various governmental organizations2
regulate water service standards, drinking water quality, and other water supply issues. Every 5 years, the Office of Water Services (OFWAT) sets prices
based on a business plan submitted by the regional suppliers. Water utilities that indicate they will exceed the minimum standards must justify addi2

The Office of Water Services, European Union, UK Drinking Water Inspectorate, and the
Environment Agency (Willis et al., 2005)
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tional investments using information on customers’ preferences (Willis et al.,
2005). Specifically, Yorkshire Water utilized CV and CE surveys to conduct
a cost-benefit analysis of investment options 40 years out. Their goal was to
understand their customers’ values of aspects of drinking water quality, drinking water supply, sewerage factors, and additional factors such as renewable
energy and meter reading services (Ltd., 2009).
In this literature CE and CV surveys have been used to calculate
willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates for attributes that describe characteristics
of urban water supply security, disruptions to water service (Hatton MacDonald et al., 2003; Willis et al., 2005; EFTEC, 2007; Ltd., 2009), source of municipal water supply (Haider & Rasid, 2002), appropriate levels of water utility
service (Hatton MacDonald et al., 2003; Willis et al., 2005), water supply options under a population growth scenario (Blamey et al., 1999), and avoiding
drought or water restrictions (Hensher et al., 2006; Cooper, Burton, & Crase,
2011).

2.2.2 Preference heterogeneity
Within the water utility literature, classical heterogeneity has most often been
used to identify influential characteristics in valuing service level improvements.3

Various studies have shown income, age, household size, gender,

household characteristics, and ethnicity are influential (Hatton MacDonald et
al., 2003; Willis et al., 2005; Scarpa et al., 2012; Tarfasa & Brouwer, 2013). This
information can be incorporated into business plans, educational campaigns, or
to design subsidies. Unobservable heterogeneity as modeled in the RPL is less
useful in this context; it provides information on the magnitude of variation in
3

The infrastructure investment required to achieve various service levels is not explicitly
discussed.
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preferences but not the underlying cause.
However, in the larger environmental valuation literature the RPL model
has become the more common analysis method for choice experiments.4 Observable characteristics can be interacted with random attributes, which can
result in a better statistical fit (Greene & Hensher, 2007). Several water utility studies that have used an RPL model have also included interaction terms
to model observed heterogeneity (Hatton MacDonald et al., 2003; Tarfasa &
Brouwer, 2013).
Researchers often estimate uncorrelated RPL models that assume individuals’ choices and, specifically, the descriptive attributes of an alternative are
independent (Balcombe et al., 2009). Uncorrelated models are easier to estimate and model identification is less problematic than with correlated models.5
However, some researchers have challenged the assumption of independent attributes as unrealistic to decision-making.6 Scarpa et al. (2008) notes that a
correlated attributes structure should be estimated because the confounding,
non-constant scale parameter across individuals leads to correlation. The covariance matrix incorporates both scale and standard deviation terms as the
off-diagonal terms are a product of the variance of attribute k and the interaction of the two attributes, k and m (Hensher & Greene, 2003). Estimating a correlated attributes specification (‘correlated attributes’) improves understanding
of relationships between individuals’ preferences for attributes (Colombo et al.,
4

Examples include health (Hole, 2008; Hole & Kolstad, 2012), recreation (Scarpa et al.,
2008) and transportation (Hess, 2010) economics.
5
Including a correlation structure increases the number of estimated parameters and introduces issues of model identification and parameter restrictions. The likelihood function can fail
to converge due to a flat region at the maximum (Ruud, 1996) or it may converge but have large
standard errors or a nearly-singular Hessian matrix, indicating fragile identification (Keane,
1992).
6
Correlated error structures can be estimated to consider the issue of non-independence
across alternative choices, however that is a separate model type that is not discussed in this
paper.
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2007; Scarpa et al., 2012).
The consensus is that correlated attributes represent an improvement over
the uncorrelated attributes with regards to the data fit (Colombo et al., 2007;
Scarpa et al., 2008; Hess & Rose, 2012). Hole & Kolstad (2012) consider specifying a random cost parameter and a correlated covariance matrix to be more
influential in improving model fit than the difference between WTP-space and
preference-space models and Hess & Rose (2012) advocates for a correlated
attributes model as a better way to jointly estimate scale and preference heterogeneity.
However, results vary regarding the impact of correlated attributes on estimated coefficients or the statistical moments of the MWTP distribution. Several studies find that models that allow correlated attributes result in a larger
magnitude of the estimated mean and standard deviation coefficients compared to those that don’t (Colombo et al., 2007), although Scarpa et al. (2008)
find only a slight increase. Conversely, Hole & Kolstad (2012) find the correlated attributes result in more conservative estimated mean WTP values.
Even when the correlated attributes fit the data better, there are other impacts such as changing significance levels of influential socio-economic characteristics (Colombo et al., 2007) and estimated welfare measures from both
models are not always significantly different (Colombo et al., 2007; Scarpa et
al., 2012).7 Finally, the benefit of specifying correlated versus uncorrelated
attributes could be situational. An uncorrelated attributes model performed
better in a benefit transfer situation when results were compared against a
benefit transfer using MNL estimates (Colombo et al., 2007).
This paper will contribute to the discussion over the benefits of estimating
7

Distributional assumptions for the random parameters can affect the significance of estimated covariance terms (Hole, 2008).
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a correlated attributes structure. I compare the impact of specifying correlated and uncorrelated attributes on preferences for water utility infrastructure projects, on MWTP heterogeneity, and on aggregated MWTP for infrastructure investment scenarios. Central statistical moments such as the median MWTP estimates are often used to measure policy benefits because they
are often more robust to outliers than mean MWTP. However this minimizes
the information contained in the MWTP distribution. Strong outliers at either end of the distribution can influence the median upwards or downwards,
possibly over- or under-estimating aggregate policy benefits in the absence of
significantly different MWTP values between models.

2.3 Econometric Theory
Both multinomial and random parameters logit models are based on the random utility maximization described by (McFadden, 1974). When individuals
make a choice between alternatives of a good, they choose the one that maximizes their utility, Uin , represented as Uin “ Vin ` εin . The alternatives are
described by a deterministic component, Vin , made up of observable attributes,
Xin , and a stochastic term, εin , that includes the latent influences on decisionmaking. The random element is assumed to follow a Type I extreme value
distribution; logistic regression is used. The conditional likelihood, Lin , of individual n making the choice, yin of alternative i out of all possible choices j
is:

ř

exp βXin
ř
ř
Pin pβq “
βXjn
exp
jPC

(2.1)

The conditional likelihood of a choice is a function of the βs, which represent the impact on utility of a marginal change in the attribute. For the basic
multinomial logit (MNL) model, maximum likelihood methods are used to ana-
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lytically solve Lin “

ś

nPN

ś

iPI

yin
which gives the likelihood of all the choices
Pin

I made by survey respondents N . Taking the log gives the unconditional likelihood of choices given the estimated values of β, which are homogeneous across
the survey population.
The RPL model decomposes the error term from the MNL model term into
εin “ ηn ` ǫin .8 The error term, ǫin , is still assumed to follow a Type I extreme
value distribution. Individual preferences for an attribute follow a population
distribution βn pθq; the distribution θ „ pb, Σq is described by the parameters
b and Σ. These parameters describe the population mean and variance, respectively. An individual’s unique preference is written βn “ b ` ηn , where ηn
represents the individual’s standard deviation. Now the conditional likelihood
of an individual’s choice as seen in Equation 2.1 is a function of the parameters of the population distribution: Pin pβn |θq “

expβn Xin
βn Xjn .
jPC exp

ř

This expression is

integrated across all possible values of the parameters of the population distribution.9 The unconditional likelihood of the random parameters model is:
Ln pθq “

ż

P pyn |βqf pβ|θqdβ

(2.2)

2.3.1 Independent vs. correlated attributes in RPL models
Specifying a correlated attributes structure involves the variance parameter of
the population distribution, θpb, Σq. If independence is assumed, zeros are in
the off-diagonal spaces of the variance-covariance matrix, Σ. Assuming a simple model with independent random attributes, the variance-covariance ma8

This decomposition shows how unobservable heterogeneity might be missed in a classical
heterogeneity MNL model (Hensher & Greene, 2003).
9
This integral does not have a mathematical solution; simulation is used.
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trix, Σ, appears:
»

Σ“–

Σ1
0

.
Σ2

ﬁ
ﬂ

An individual’s standard deviation term, ηn “ Σµn , is a product of the standard deviation from the variance matrix, σ, and a draw from the standard normal deviation, µn . In a correlated attributes structure the variance-covariance
matrix is Ω. A lower-triangular Cholesky matrix with non-zero off-diagonal
elements is estimated such that Ω “ T T 1 .
ﬁ
»
ω1 .
ﬂ
T “–
ω12 ω2
The individual’s standard deviation term is still written ηn “ T µn , but now
incorporates the effect of the off-diagonal term ω12 as well.

2.3.2 Including the impact of observable attitudes and
characteristics
To incorporate preference variation into the MNL model, classical heterogeneity methods are used. Observable characteristics are included through interactions with the attributes, Vin “ β 1 Xin ` ϕ1 pzin q. Here zin represents the vector of
attribute socio-economic interactions and ϕ is the vector of coefficients.

2.3.3 Marginal willingness-to-pay (MWTP) estimates
In the MNL model, MWTP for attribute k is calculated as the ratio of the coefficients for attribute k and the Cost attribute:
„

ˆ
˙
BUi {Bxk
βk
M W T Pk “ ´
“´
BUi {BxCost
βCost
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Observable socio-economic and demographic characteristics are additively included in the equation for MWTP.10 Confidence intervals around the MWTP are
simulated for the MNL estimates using the Krinsky-Robb method (Krinsky &
Robb, 1986).

From the RPL model, individual-specific coefficients are estimated conditional on their observed chosen alternatives from the choice questions they
faced. Coefficients represent the mean and standard deviation for the percentage of individuals from the overall population who would choose the same. The
procedure is described in Train (2009) and coded into Stata 13 for the RPL
model by Hole (2007). Greene et al. (2005) consider estimating conditional
parameters to more realistically approximate underlying individual preferences.11 Individual MWTP values can be calculated using Equation 2.3.

Reported confidence intervals for the MNL models use the mean and standard deviation coefficients from the entire population as the point estimates
for the Krinsky-Robb simulation over 1000 draws, in this case. The values
are ordered and 95% MWTP confidence intervals are reported as the 26th and
975th values. This represents the interval within which I am 95% certain the
the true mean MWTP value lies. In contrast, the confidence intervals reported
in the RPL model represent the individual-specific conditional MWTP for the
individuals at the 5th and 95th percentiles.
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They find approximately 12% of the estimated MWTP values from overall population parameters are outside of the MWTP distribution estimated using individual parameters and
suggest estimating individual-level parameters may resolve the issue of unrealistically large
MWTP values.
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2.4 Survey and Sample
2.4.1 Survey Instrument
The survey application was done with the Albuquerque Bernalillo County Water Utility Authority (‘the water utility’), which serves approximately 550,000
customers living in metropolitan Albuquerque, New Mexico. In its recent asset
management plan, the water utility acknowledged a $35 million infrastructure
funding gap between current investment levels and annual investment needed
to address deteriorating infrastructure over the next century. The status quo
level of capital infrastructure investment is $41 million annually. Without increased investment, the water utility projects a $300 million backlog in infrastructure projects by 2025, reaching $850 million backlog by 2041 (ABCWUA,
2011). The CE survey was designed to understand customer preferences for
infrastructure projects and incorporate them in to the planning process.
The water utility provided a random sample of 1,900 residential water customers.12 Residential customers were surveyed because they directly receive
and pay the water bill; they were primarily homeowners.13 The survey was
extensively tested in 8 focus groups and 18 debriefing interviews with the final
survey consisting of 30 questions divided into in four sections.
The first section described the six attributes; the attributes are described in
Table 2.1. For each attribute except Frequency, the status quo level for all utility customers was presented. For the Frequency attribute, respondents were
asked how many outages they had experienced at home in the past five years.
12

An additional 200 residential customers received a mailed pre-test prior to mailing the
first survey packet.
13
Hensher et al. (2005) did not find any significant distinction between renter and owner
preferences in single-family housing.
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That resulted in an individual status quo.14 There were six levels for the Cost
attribute ranging from $0 to $15 per month. Each attribute description also
included a relevant question that engaged respondents to relate the attribute
to their personal experience.
The second section consisted of four CE questions. Each choice question consisted of a choice between two water utility infrastructure investment packages
(See Figure 2.1).15 A generic choice design was used that allowed for possible
attribute interactions between three attributes: Frequency, Length, and Notify.
The Choiceff macro was used to generate an efficient design (Kuhfeld, 2010).
Each non-cost attribute had three levels to allow for possible non-linearity
in the attributes (Kuhfeld, 2010). The full design of 32 choice questions was
blocked into 8 survey versions of 4 choice questions each.
The third section involved questions about attitudes towards water conservation, wastewater contaminants, and distribution pipe maintenance on private property. The final section asked demographic questions, including ones
about the number of children, percent of property watered in an average summer month, and presence of sensitive populations at home so that I could test
if these characteristics were influencing preferences.
Survey administration followed best practices where each survey respondent received up to five contacts (Dillman, 2007).16 Surveys were available in
English and Spanish as well as on-line; eleven percent of recipients responded
on-line.
14

The median of all respondents’ outage experience was used as the overall status quo level
for analysis.
15
Respondents were not given a status quo or ‘no choice’ alternative because the state of
distribution infrastructure is not static and a choice of investing zero extra dollars leads to
deteriorating distribution infrastructure and lower service levels.
16
Contacts include a pre-notice letter, an initial survey packet, a reminder postcard and two
replacement packets.
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2.4.2 Survey Respondents
The response rate was calculated conservatively at 45.8%, according to guidelines set out by the American Association of Public Opinion Research (AAPOR),
by assuming all survey addresses were eligible respondents even if their surveys were returned as undeliverable or unclaimed by the post office (AAPOR,
2009).17 Responses were spread evenly across the eight survey versions.
Table 2.2 provides descriptive statistics. A percentage of survey respondents did not answer various demographic questions used in the analysis; their
observations were dropped, leaving 770 households with complete demographic
information.18 The average age of respondents was 53 and 54% were female.
The average respondent was more likely to be non-Hispanic (67%). Twentynine percent of respondents had a Bachelor’s degree, with a few years of college the second most prevalent education level (21%). Respondents had lived
at their current address an average of 14 years and had lived in New Mexico
an average of 32 years. An overwhelming majority of respondents watered less
than half of their property in an average summer month (82%), while three percent didn’t water their property at all. Thirty-one percent had children living
at home.
Water infrastructure is deteriorating quicker in central Albuquerque as
seen in Figure 2.2. Darker colors represent tracts with more pipe breaks reported by the water utility. In the five years prior to the survey, the average
respondent lived in a Census tract that experienced 13.4 pipe breaks. Twentynine percent lived in Census tracts with zero to five pipe breaks, while fifteen
percent lived in Census tracts that experienced 25 breaks or more. Approx17

If I had considered that unknown recipients were not, in fact, eligible responses then the
calculated response rate was 48.2% according to AAPOR.
18
I estimated simpler models that did not use any respondent characteristics. Results were
not measurably different.
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imately 32% self-reported having experienced at least one outage at home in
that time period.
A water conservation support index was created to measure towards four
methods of encouraging water conservation: rebates, education, higher rates
for higher use, and watering restrictions.

Thirty-nine percent had strong

water conservation attitudes.19 Demographics of the survey respondents are
compared for two Census populations: owner-occupied housing units only and
all residents within the Albuquerque/ Bernalillo County metropolitan area.20
Overall, the ABCWUA survey homeowners were representative geographically,
by age, and by income to Albuquerque/ Bernalillo County homeowners. However, the average survey respondent was more likely to be female, more educated, and non-Hispanic than the average Albuquerque homeowner.21

2.5 Empirical model specifications
Empirically I estimate six models.22 Model 1 is a baseline model that estimates
attribute main effects. I estimate three specifications of Model 1: a multinomial
logit (MNL1) and two random parameters logit (RPL), one with uncorrelated
attributes (RPL-N1u) and one with correlated attributes (RPL-N1c). Model 2
incorporates observable and stated heterogeneity through socio-economic characteristics and attitudinal responses. The same three specifications are es19

The index ranged from 3 to 12. Strong water conservation attitudes meant an index score
of 11 or 12 and that at least three methods were considered very acceptable.
20
Comparison across several Census products is necessary because geographically, while
ABCWUA’s service area encompasses most of the City of Albuquerque, it excludes parts of
the city while including parts of unincorporated Bernalillo County.
21
Statistical tests were done in comparison with the metropolitan population as well. Results
were similar except that age and income were also rejected. Survey respondents were also
wealthier and older than the average Albuquerque resident.
22
All models were estimated in Stata 13.0.
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timated: a multinomial logit (MNL2), an RPL with uncorrelated attributes
(RPL-N2u) an RPL with correlated attributes (RPL-N2c).
The baseline model (MNL1) reflects the tastes of a representative water
utility customer. Despite the limitations and restrictive assumptions of the
MNL, it remains a good starting point in estimation and for comparison with
subsequent, more complicated models. Estimates can easily be aggregated
across the utility service population. The RPL models assume a normal distribution for the five random attributes and a full covariance matrix is estimated for the correlated attributes specification. I am interested in the effects
of including correlated attributes and observable heterogeneity.
MNL1 is linear-in-parameters, as is standard in the literature. I estimate
main effects for each attribute in the survey and one interaction term between
the frequency and length of outages, F[
˚ L.23 The deterministic portion of the
utility equation for individual n choosing alternative i is:
VinM N L1 “ β1 F reqi `β2 Lengthi `β3 N otif yi `β4 Reusei `β5 Greeni `β6 Costi `β7 F[
˚L
(2.4)
I expect the following signs for the attributes: negative for F req, Length,
and Cost, but positive for N otif y, Reuse, and Green. Consistent with the literature, this implies that the average customer prefers to avoid additional outages, longer outages, and a higher water bill, but prefers increased use of renewable energy by the water utility, increased use of reuse water to irrigate
green spaces, and additional advance notification of planned outages.
Classical heterogeneity includes interactions between individual character23

Often an alternative-specific constant (ASC) term is included to capture latent preferences
towards non-status quo alternatives. A significant ASC would be unexpected in a generic
model, as it would indicate a preference for Alt A or B, all else equal. I did estimate a specification with an ASC but as expected, the term was insignificant, similar to (Hole, 2008).
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istics and attributes. MNL2, RPL-N2U, and RPL-N2C include four characteristics interacted with attributes: Income, NoCollege, OutExper, Conserve. Income level is interacted with infrastructure costs (Cost ˚ Income)24 , a strong
water conservation attitude is interacted with irrigation with reuse water
(Reuse ˚ Conserve) and renewable energy use by the utility (Green ˚ Conserve),
past experience with outages at home is interacted with outage frequency in
the future (F req ˚ OutExp), and educational attainment is interacted with outage length (Length ˚ N oCollege). These terms are included linearly with the
indirect utility equation from Equation 2.4. Observable characteristics were
selected based on the literature and an iterative process with this data.25
The RPL specifications were based on MNL1 and MNL2 with all of the
attributes specified as random except N otif y and the F req ˚ Len interaction
term.26 I assume a normal distribution for the five random attributes to minimize the issue of unrealistic MWTP estimates, while acknowledging the potential issue with incorrect sign for the attributes F req, Length, and Cost.27
For the two correlated RPL specifications, I consider the trade-off between
an increased number of parameters to estimate, model identification issues,
and the potential information gained with regards to preferences from estimating a full covariance matrix. Various researchers have estimated a restricted
24

Similar to (Greene & Hensher, 2007).
I divided the full dataset into sub-datasets and estimated the model given in Equation 2.4.
I tested for differences in scale using the test described by Swait & Louviere (1993). Potential
characteristics were tested further. During this process I also considered various interactions
for N otif y; none were found to be significant.
26
There were convergence issues for specifications with all random attributes or a lognormal
cost attribute. This is consistent with previous literature Ruud (1996); Revelt & Train (1998).
27
Choosing which variables to specify as random and the appropriate distribution is an issue
with RPL models. The normal is popular due to its tractability but the assumption of symmetry
can lead to theoretically incorrect signs for variables where preferences should be all positive or
negative (Hensher & Greene, 2003; Hess, 2010). The lognormal can have difficulty converging
but results in the correct signs for variables such as cost (Hess, 2010), although some studies
do use assume a normal distribution for cost (Hole, 2008). Balcombe et al. (2009) argues that
the normal distribution does not make assumptions about the sign on individuals’ preferences.
25
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covariance matrix because the full matrix is too computationally demanding
(Train, 1998; Hole & Kolstad, 2012; Scarpa et al., 2012). I estimate a full covariance matrix for the five random attributes while keeping N otif y and the
demographic interactions fixed; this approach adds an additional 10 parameters to be estimated but provides information on relationships between individuals’ preferences over investment combinations.28

2.6 Results
Parameter estimates from MLE for the three models in model specification 1
are reported in Table 2.3. The estimates for the three models in model specification 2 are reported in Table 2.4 I first examine preferences for infrastructure
investment and secondly, look at how a correlated attributes structure impacts
both preferences and the MWTP distribution. In general, preferences are robust across all specifications and substantial heterogeneity, both observable
and unobservable, exists. Signs are as expected and coefficients are all statistically significant at the 1% level. Overall the magnitude and order preferences
between models is consistent. As measured by the magnitude of the coefficients
and estimated MWTP of Length and F requency compared to Reuse and Green,
the average customer has stronger preferences for improvements to drinking
water distribution infrastructure. She has approximately equal preferences towards investing in reuse water infrastructure to irrigate urban greenspace and
investing in increased use of renewable energy to treat water. Allowing a correlated attributes specification does not substantially change the magnitude or
ranking of preferences when looking at attribute coefficients.
28

Only Green ´ Reuse showing significant levels of correlation in N1c and N2c. I restricted
all covariances involving Length, F req, and Cost to be 0, re-estimated the N2 model, and did a
likelihood-ratio test. The LRT statistic was 28.451 against a X92 statistic of 16.92. I reject the
null hypothesis of covariance parameters equal to zero and use the full covariance matrix.
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Initial discussion of preferences is based on the specifications from the baseline model (MNL1), which only estimated main effects. Because all attributes
were centered on their status quo level for estimation (given in Table 2.1), coefficients are interpreted as an indication that the average customer’s is better off
or worse off from a one-unit or one percent change from the status quo.29 The
attributes Cost, Length, F req, and F req ˚ Length have negative signs indicating
the average customer is worse off with increases in infrastructure investment
costs, average outage length, and the number of future outages at home.30
The attributes Reuse, Green, and N otif y all have positive signs. The average ratepayer is better off from increasing levels of Albuquerque greenspace
irrigated with reuse water, energy used by the utility generated from renewable resources, and advance notification of outages due to planned maintenance
provided by the utility. The same basic results are seen when accounting for
classical heterogeneity and latent, random heterogeneity with correlated and
uncorrelated attributes.
My results are comparable to other water utility studies that have studied
similar attributes. In Hatton MacDonald et al. (2003); Hensher et al. (2005)
and Willis et al. (2005), longer and more frequent outages and higher costs
negatively impact customer well-being. Blamey et al. (1999) also finds a positive effect to ratepayers from irrigating with reuse water. Hensher et al. (2005)
find that advance notification is positive only if provided within a week of the
planned outage.
Model MNL2 includes self-reported heterogeneity characteristics interacted
29

For the attribute F req, 0 outages were used as the status quo level for the analysis based on
respondents’ self-reported level of outages experienced at home. The mean number of outages
experienced by respondents prior to the survey was 0.63, while the median number was zero.
30
The interpretation of the negative F req ˚ Length term is that individuals also consider
these attributes together and that outages at home that are longer and more frequent leave
the customer even worse off.
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with attributes, showing that there exists explainable variation in preferences.
Interaction coefficients are all positive and highly significant at the 1% level.
Having a higher income diminishes the negative impact of higher costs. Individuals with a high school diploma or less experience less of a negative impact
with longer average outages than those with at least some years of college. Individuals who self-reported having previously experienced an outage at home
were less negatively impacted by longer outages than those who had not previously experienced an outage, suggesting that they had acquired skills in dealing with outages or found out it was not as bad as expected. This result is
similar to Hensher et al. (2005) who conclude that ratepayers employ adaptive
strategies after experiencing outages.31 Strong water conservation attitudes
increase the positive impact from increases in the use of reuse water for irrigation and renewable energy use. The sign on these interactions is generally as
expected, signaling the validity of the estimated results.
The four RPL specifications (N1u, N1c, N2u, and N2c) have similar signs
and significance levels on the mean and standard deviation coefficients. The
standard deviation coefficients are large in comparison to the population mean.
In all RPL models, the ratio of the mean to the standard deviation is less than
one for all attributes except Length, indicating significant latent heterogeneity.
Even N2u and N2c still display quite large standard deviations indicating observable characteristics and attitudes do not account for a significant portion
of the preference variation.
In the four RPL specifications, between 5-10% of coefficients for F req and
1-2% of coefficients for Length are positive (theoretically incorrect) due to distributional assumptions. I interpret this as a sign that the individual is costsensitive and prefers adaptive behavior to deteriorating service conditions or
31

In contrast, Hatton MacDonald et al. (2003) found that previous experience of outages
insignificant.
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are indifferent, not that they prefer more frequent or longer outages. With
an essential good such as water, individuals cannot decide to forgo it in the
face of rising costs for improved service. These individuals should have a
theoretically-correct sign on Cost. Something similar happens with the Cost
coefficients although this is another extreme type of customer. One to ten percent of individuals have a positive cost coefficient, which is informative of price
insensitive customers, likely high income (Lanz & Provins, 2013). However
I expect them to display the correct sign on Length and F req. Both of these
customer types will end up with incorrectly-signed MWTP estimates, with the
latter more likely reflected in outliers on the positive end of the MWTP distribution due to extremely small, positive cost coefficients. For all three attributes, the two correlated attributes specifications display higher percentages
of incorrectly-signed coefficients.
N1c and N2c show the effect of allowing for correlated attributes. The estimated covariance matrices for N1c and N2c are reported in Table 2.5. A positive correlation indicates that individuals who like high levels of one attribute,
also prefer high levels of the other attribute (Colombo et al., 2007).32 Several
significant correlations occur in both N1c and N2c, indicating that the observed
attitudes or characteristics were not the cause of the initial correlation pattern
in N1c. Green and Reuse exhibit strong positive correlation. Individuals who
prefer greater investment in reuse water infrastructure also prefer increased
investment in the use of renewable energy to treat and distribute water. Length
is negatively correlated with Cost, indicating that individuals who highly value
lower costs on their water bill, are willing to forgo investments in distribution
infrastructure that would reduce the average outage length. Other correlations only occur in N2c, such as Length and Reuse, which show a weak positive
32

Train (1998) also interprets positive correlations as individuals placing above average emphasis on those attributes in comparison to other descriptive attributes. He suggests that this
implies individuals values those attributes together.
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correlation.
Likelihood ratio tests indicate that including respondent characteristics and
allowing for a correlated attribute structure both improve the model fit. Overall
the best fitting model is N2c, which includes unobservable characteristics and
allows for correlated attributes.
Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 report monthly mean and median MWTP for all six
specifications. For Model MNL1, MWTP values are calculated using the point
estimates from Table 2.3; 95% confidence intervals are calculated using the
Krinsky-Robb procedure (Krinsky & Robb, 1986). For the RPL models, individual conditional β’s were generated using the procedure described by Train
(2009).33 The estimated MWTP values for all the survey ratepayers forms the
MWTP distribution for the survey population. Results from the baseline MNL1
indicate the median ratepayer is willing-to-pay an extra $0.17 per month into
a dedicated Infrastructure Investment Fund to increase by 1% the amount of
urban greenspace irrigated with reuse water above the current 25%. She is
willing-to-pay $0.13 per month for a one percent increase in the amount renewable energy use by the water utility above the current 20% and $0.07 per month
for a 1% increase in advance notification of outages due to planned maintenance above the current 70%. She is willing-to-pay $0.71 to avoid a one-hour
increase in the average length of an outage across all customers from the current 3 hours and $0.78 to avoid experiencing an additional outage at home over
the next five years.34 The MWTP values for the Length, F req, and Reuse at33

An individual’s preferences are located somewhere on the distribution of population preferences. When her other choices are also considered, then that provides a narrower distribution
of preferences around a section of the population preferences. Bayes’ Rule connects the two.
The product of the probability of an individual’s series of choices conditional on the population distribution and the function describing their conditional preferences is set equal to the
product of the probability of an individual’s series of choices conditional on their preferences
and the function describing the population preferences. Rearranging solves for the individual’s
conditional preference distribution.
34
Estimated coefficients represent customers’ preferences for a one-percent change in the
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tributes refer to paying for the necessary distribution infrastructure to achieve
a one-unit change in each attribute so are indirectly comparable although they
are described in different units.
As observable characteristics and latent heterogeneity, both correlated and
uncorrelated are added, the effect on the distribution of the MWTP can been
seen primarily through the mean MWTP. As would be expected, the median is
less influenced by outliers. Still, it is apparent that the median MWTP from
the RPL models are more conservative than those from the MNL models, even
falling outside the 95% confidence intervals for MNL1. This is likely a result
of the normal distribution for the random parameters, which now allows for a
percentage of the respondents to have negative preferences towards certain infrastructure investments or to be price insensitive. Within the RPL models, the
median MWTP from the two correlated specifications is more conservative still,
similar to Train (1998). One result of the correlated attributes specification is
that a greater percentage of individuals have negative willingness-to-pay values.35 Furthermore, the distribution of estimated MWTP from the correlated
specifications is seen to have a greater variance with more extreme outliers, as
will be discussed. This makes the resulting MWTP less useful in policy applications and offsets the econometric improvement from estimating a correlated
specification.
The impact on the MWTP distribution from a correlated attributes structure is examined using a quantile approach, as recommended by Scarpa et al.
(2012) since quantiles are robust to outliers. Table 2.8 provides the unadjusted
ı
”
β
{100
. MWTPLength is calculated as Length
. Dividing
attribute. For instance, βLength “ Length´3
100
βCost
the coefficient by 100 returns the interpretation to the original units describing the attribute.
35
Negative MWTP values can be a result of a positive Cost coefficient or a negative numerator coefficient in the MWTP ratio. If it the former, then the individual is price insensitive
but has positive preferences towards the attribute. In the case of the latter, the individual has
negative preferences towards the attribute.
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distributions for the Length, and Table 2.9 for the F requency attributes.36 Estimated MWTP by quantile is reported for the all models following the method
in Campbell et al. (2014), without standard errors or confidence intervals. The
distribution is initially characterized by examining the interquartile range
(IQR), defined as the central spread between the 25th and 75th percentiles.
The IQR is more dispersed for the correlated specifications of both N1 and N2,
indicating a less peaked distribution of MWTP values. Gray boxes highlight
the negative values from each specification, confirming the greater percentage
of negative MWTP values in the correlated specifications.

2.6.1 Impact of correlated attributes on MWTP determinants
I also look at the determinants of estimated MWTP for two attributes, F req
and Length, to consider the impact of estimating a correlated attributes specification. This is one method to test validity of the results (Scarpa et al., 2011).
Because of the issue with extreme outliers for the correlated specification, I remove 5% of the outliers on each end of the MWTP distributions of N2u and N2c.
This allows us to examine the impact of a correlated attributes specification on
the determinants of MWTP for the majority of water utility customers.37 The
dependent variable, M W T Pnk , represents ratepayer n’s estimated MWTP for
attribute k and is regressed on a vector of explanatory socio-economic variables.38 Table 2.10 lists the explanatory characteristics and the results of the
four regressions.
36

No extreme outlier values were dropped.
Campbell (2007); Scarpa et al. (2011) use this procedure to look at what characteristics
influence MWTP.
38
M W T Pnk “ β0 ` β1 Income ` β2 F emale ` β3 Hispanic ` β4 N earbyOutages ` β5 W est `
β6 SouthSE
37
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Results indicate living in an area of Albuquerque with more rapidly deteriorating distribution infrastructure, NearbyOutages, increases the estimated
MWTP to avoid more frequent outages and longer outages than living in areas
where pipe breaks are not as frequent.39 The results of the OLS regression
on the MWTP distributions in N2u and N2c for F req and Length indicate that
an individual living in a high break area has an estimated MWTP to avoid an
additional outage that is $0.31 (N2u) and $0.51 (N2c) higher than the estimated
MWTP for someone who lives in a low break area. This individual also has an
estimated MWTP to avoid a longer outage that is $0.21 (N2u) and $0.63 (N2c)
higher than the estimated MWTP of an individual who lives in a low break
area. The results indicate that living in a high break area has a greater impact
on MWTP in the distribution from the correlated model.
Income is also a significant determinant of MWTP to avoid more frequent
outages in both the uncorrelated and correlated specifications. I expect this
given that the Cost ˚ Income interaction term was significant in the analysis.
The estimated MWTP distribution in the N2u specification indicates that as
income increases categorically, estimated MWTP increases by $0.07. But the
results in N2c are contradictory; the sign on Income is negative meaning that
MWTP to avoid one additional outage decreases by $´0.08 as income increases,
so that an individual with a total household income of $220, 000 has an estimated MWTP that is $0.56 less than an individual with a total household income of $18, 000. By dropping the extreme outliers, which usually are a result of
near-zero marginal utility of income coefficients for higher income individuals
the relationship between income and MWTP appears to be theoretically incorrect and would fail a validity test. This is a trade-off of using the correlated
39

ArcMap GIS software was used to geocode the location of each individual’s address. The
water utility provided GIS files of the distribution system with pipe breaks between 1995-2009
already geocoded. I created a half mile buffer zone around each individual’s location and did a
Count of all the breaks that fell within each buffer zone.
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specification. It also could reflect the higher percentage of negative values in
the correlated specification. Even with the extreme five percent dropped, approximately ten to twenty percent of MWTP values in the correlated specification are negative and could be related to higher income individuals.
Finally, several characteristics that were weak determinants of estimated
MWTP in N2u were female and living in south Albuquerque (F req) and income
and Hispanic (Length); these were not significant determinants of estimated
MWTP from the N2c specification.40

2.7 Discussion and Implications
One goal of the study was to examine if estimating a correlated attributes
structure would improve general understanding of preferences and how it
would impact the MWTP distribution. This has an implicit goal of understanding if more is gained by the improved econometrics than is lost from the cost in
modeling. Similar to the literature, I find that the correlated attributes result
in an slightly better model fit and offers some insight into ratepayers’ preferences for combinations of attributes together.
However, the correlated attributes model also results in an increased spread
of the MWTP distribution, a greater percentage of negative MWTP values, and
more extreme negative MWTP outliers. Estimating the determinants of MWTP
indicates socio-economic groups that have significantly different WTP for service level improvements. However, as a result of the extreme outliers in the
40

In the initial stages of analysis I tested for preference variation due to demographic and
attitudinal characteristics by estimating a main effects model on sub-datasets, calculating 95%
confidence intervals using the Krinsky-Robb method and graphing them to display overlaps.
Results suggested that Income and Hispanic characteristics had varying preferences, but Gender did not. I tested for varying preferences among regions of Albuquerque and failed to reject
the hypothesis of similar preferences, but was using four regions instead of three.
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correlated attributes model, ten percent of the MWTP distribution must be
dropped in order to analyze the determinants of MWTP. Significant determinants of MWTP are found to be living in an area with deteriorating infrastructure and income, but the sign on the coefficient for income is negative
in N2c which is hard to believe. It may reflect that under the correlated attributes structure the individual cost coefficients very near to zero increased
reflecting the covariance term in the individual’s standard deviation. These
are likely high income individuals who subsequently have extreme MWTP for
an attribute. These are the observations that were dropped. Alternatively, it
could be due to the increase in negative MWTP values even with five percent
of the most extreme negative outliers dropped.
When calculating societal willingness-to-pay for policy scenarios, the increase in negative MWTP values results in more conservative median MWTP.
I calculate willingness-to-pay for a hypothetical policy scenario that focuses on
improving drinking water distribution infrastructure and compare the effect
on monthly bills using median MWTP from correlated and uncorrelated specifications.41
The Cost attribute in the survey was described as the amount that would
be paid into a dedicated Infrastructure Investment Fund over the course of
five years. Table 2.11 estimates the amount that would be collected from approximately 179,000 single-family residential customers over the course of the
investment fund for a 1% or 1-unit change in the infrastructure project, using median figures from each model. For the random attributes, the correlated
estimates are between 11% and 42% smaller than the uncorrelated model estimates. This represents quite a difference if calculating willingness-to-pay for a
larger increase such as a 10% increase in reuse water infrastructure or to avoid
41

The water utility in Albuquerque, New Mexico reports an increased need for infrastructure
investment in upcoming decades in their 2011 Asset Management Plan.
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a 3-hour increase in the average length of an outage.
These lower estimates when using the correlated MWTP results come from
the covariance elements which are included in the standard deviation term in
each individual’s unique βn . Many of the covariances were not significant. I
calculated a LRT between a model with only the significant covariances and
one with all covariances; the LRT statistic failed to reject the null hypothesis
that the limited model was an improvement. Thus I report results from model
with all covariances. Perhaps if the other model results were used, there would
be a smaller percentage of negative extreme outliers. The correlation structure
results in a more spread out MWTP distribution. And for some individuals,
the correlation moves them from the positive side of the distribution to the
negative side. The existence of more extreme outliers indicates that a greater
number of individuals have a cost coefficient very close to zero in the correlated
specifications. However, an individual’s marginal utility of income is dependent
on their pattern of choices and so it this issue of more extreme outliers may not
be as much of an issue in other datasets. But the analyst should be aware of
the possibility.
A policy scenario was created to compare the estimated monthly amount
per ratepayer for investment in drinking water distribution infrastructure between uncorrelated and correlated attributes models (see Table 2.12). Policy
totals are calculated and the monthly impact on individual ratepayer accounts
is calculated for validation with the self-reported hardships. The monthly bill
impact assumes equitable division of the policy scenario costs without accounting for any subsidy to low income ratepayers. The hypothetical policy scenario
focuses on drinking water infrastructure since preferences were stronger for
those investments. The monthly impact on ratepayers under an equity scenario is $4.95 using results from the correlated model and $6.50 with uncorre-
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lated model results. This is well within the bounds of the Cost attribute that
individuals saw in the survey.42 These amounts also correspond to individuals’
perception of the hardship their household would experience when faced with
an increase in their water bill due to infrastructure investment.43 This suggests these hypothetical policy scenario funds realistically correspond to what
individuals could actually pay. In addition, this suggests that a redistribution
of the funding for infrastructure investment needs could likely be accomplished
based on income levels in an equitable and efficient manner.
Finally, the utility prefers the greater initial investment in Scenario 4 but
considers the more gradual investment increase in Scenario 6 more feasible for
ratepayers even though it does not totally eliminate the backlog (ABCWUA,
2011). In the first five years of these two scenarios, the extra amount collected
is $45 and $33.75 million, respectively. While the funding scenarios described
in the Asset Management Plan use a different timeframe than the 5-year Investment Infrastructure Fund, the results can still provide guidance in what
ratepayers are willing-to-pay to avoid deteriorating drinking water distribution infrastructure and that perhaps the water utility could pursue a funding
plan that has a greater increase in investment in earlier years. The hypothetical policy collects between $53 and $70 million depending on the model
results over the same five year period and keeps the monthly Infrastructure
Fund charge at an amount that does not cause undue hardship for the majority. Only 8% of respondents reported that an additional $5 on their monthly
water bill would cause moderate or great hardship. The majority of these individuals are low income, which might provide guidance in designing subsidies
for this portion of ratepayers.
42

The Cost attribute ranged from $0 to $15.
Only one quarter of low income individuals and seven percent of high income individuals
report moderate to great hardship with an increase of $5 in their monthly water bill.
43

42

Chapter 2. Preferences for water utility infrastructure investment

2.8 Conclusion
In my empirical study of the impact of using correlated models on preferences,
I find that ratepayers have robust preferences across uncorrelated and correlated specifications. Significant unexplained preference variation exists as
measured by the standard deviation, although income, lacking any college education, previous experience with outages at home, and strong water conservation attitudes do influence preferences for specific attributes. I examine the
impact of using a correlated attribute structure on preferences and the entire
MWTP distribution. In the best fitting model that includes the influence of
observable characteristics, the correlated attributes structure indicates that
individuals who are more cost sensitive also display adaptive behavior towards
longer outages. Investing in reuse water infrastructure and investing to avoid
longer outages in drinking water distribution infrastructure are weakly seen
as substitute investments by individuals. Correspondingly, individuals who favor high levels of renewable energy investment, also strongly favor investment
in reuse water.
The second goal of the analysis was to examine the impact of a correlated
attributes specification on the MWTP distribution. For my data, incorporating
a correlated attributes structure increases the spread of the MWTP distribution. Median MWTP values from the correlated models are significantly more
conservative than the homogeneous model, however not always significantly
different from the uncorrelated versions. Including observable characteristics
does not significantly change the estimated median MWTP. However, for the
Length attribute the median from N2u with observed heterogeneity was not
very different from the median in N2c when correlated attributes were estimated. It could be that estimating observable heterogeneity can be undertaken
instead of a correlated attributes.
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The biggest concern with the correlated attributes specification is the increase in magnitude and number of extreme outliers, especially on the negative
end. The perceived level of support for most attributes decreases as a greater
percentage of individuals have negative MWTP. These two issues impact the
median values for all attributes, resulting in much more conservative median
values. To effectively use a Stage 2 analysis of the MWTP determinants, 10%
of observations must be dropped from the correlated attributes model due to
the extreme outliers.
Finally I estimate a policy scenario to compare aggregated results against
the water utility’s stated estimate of upcoming annual drinking water distribution renewal needs and find that they are comparable. There is a distinct
difference between the funding amount suggested by the two models because
of the more conservative values in the correlated specification. In considering
the impact of using correlated RPL models, consistently in the literature and
in this study too, they provide a better fit to the data. The information provided by the correlation matrix is useful to policymakers and improves the understanding of preferences. However, these models are more computationally
demanding, have greater issues with convergence, and are problematic with
regards to extreme negative outliers. Estimating an uncorrelated specification
with a second stage analysis of the determinants of the MWTP distribution is
a valid alternative to estimating a correlated attributes model. Water utility
practitioners should be aware of the challenges and implications of estimating
a correlated attributes model. Estimating both correlated and uncorrelated
models can complement each other and provide additional information with
regards to MWTP.
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Table 2.1: Survey Attributes
Attributes

Description

Main effects attributes
Freq
Frequency of outages the
ratepayer experiences at his
home over next 5 years
Length
Average length, in hours,
of outages for all
water utility customers
Reuse
Percent of urban greenspace
irrigatedby reuse water

Model specificationa

Levelsb

(Freq - 0)/100

0, 5, 10

(Length - 3)/100

3, 8, 15

(Reuse - 25)/100]

25, 45, 65

Green

Percent of energy used by utility
from renewable sources

(Green - 20)/100

20, 40, 60

Notify

Percent of time ratepayers receive
advance notification of outages
due to planned maintenance
Additional amount ($) on monthly
bill for the next 5 years

(Notify - 70)/100

20, 70, 90

Cost

Interaction effect
\
Freq
˚ Len Interaction term between Length
and Frequency. Attributes
centered on their mean
mean to minimize collinearity.
a

0, 2, 6,
10, 12, 15

(Len-8.6)*(Freq-5.2)

For model estimation, variables were created to represent the percentage change
in the attribute from the status quo level.
b
Status quo level is in bold. Each respondent was asked for their
own individual status quo level of outages experienced. The median level of outages
experienced was 0 for 69% of respondents; mean was 0.63. The median value was used.
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Table 2.2: Demographic and Attitudinal Characteristics
Survey
respondents
$40,000-$59,999

Albuquerque metro
(owner-occupied)a
$47,989
($50,000-$74,999)

Individual a HS Diploma/
GED or less schooling;
1=yes; 0 = some college

15.1%

36.0%
(30.9%)

OutExperc

Individual had at least
one home outage between
2004-09; 1 = one or more;
0 = no outages

30.6%

–

Conserved

Individual has high water
conservation index of
11-12; 1 = yes; 0 = else

38.7%

–

Characteristic
Income

Description
Pre-tax income,
continuousb . Divided by
$1,000,000 in analysis

NoCollege

a

Within the Albuquerque metro 63.1% of housing units were owner-occupied
(2010 Census & 2006-2010 ACS 5-year estimates), exclusive of multi-family housing.
b
Income was categorical. For analysis, category mid-point was used. Income
for highest and lowest categories are 10% above and below the cutoff points,
respectively. Categories: (ď $19,999); ($20,000-$39,999); ($40,000-$59,999);
($60,000-$99,999); ($100,000-$149,999); ($150,000-$199,999); (ě $200,000).
c
Non-responses (17.4%) were imputed with a value close to the median, 0.001.
These observations were not dropped from the analysis.
d
Strong conservation index was calculated by adding Likert score rating acceptability
from [1,3] for each of following conservation methods: (i) higher rates for high use levels;
(ii) water education programs; (iii) required conservation/restrictions; (iv) rebates
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Table 2.3: Results Model Specification 1
Variable
Freq

Parameter
description
Mean coefficient

Freq SD

S.d.(coefficient)

Length

Mean coefficient

Length SD

S.d.(coefficient)

Freq*Length

Mean coefficient

Green

Mean coefficient

Green SD

S.d.(coefficient)

Reuse

Mean coefficient

Reuse SD

S.d.(coefficient)

Notify

Mean coefficient

Cost

Mean coefficient

Cost SD

S.d.(coefficient)

LL:
BIC scoreb
No. parameters
Obs.

MNL1
Coeff. (se)
-8.362***
(0.666)

-7.601***
(0.566)

-0.004***
(0.0014)
1.427***
(0.166)

1.766***
(0.154)

0.703***
(0.086)
-0.107***
(0.006)

-1618.1579
3292.4115
7
3022

a

RPL-N1ua
Coeff. (se)
-24.17***
(4.21)
30.63***
(6.27)
-23.88***
(4.10)
18.14***
(4.59)
-0.009**
(0.004)
4.20***
(0.84)
9.16***
(1.73)
4.75***
(0.83)
6.28***
(1.39)
2.09***
(0.39)
-0.32***
(0.05)
0.34***
(0.06)
-1515.7806
3127.725
12
3022

RPL-N1ca
Coeff. (se)
-20.28***
(2.78)
28.09***
(5.22)
-20.88***
(3.05)
19.07***
(3.46)
-0.007*
(0.004)
4.48***
(0.86)
7.81***
(1.34)
3.91***
(0.60)
5.59***
(1.05)
2.21***
(0.35)
-0.27***
(0.04)
0.34***
(0.05)
-1498.1024
3172.506
22
3022

Model N1: normal distribution (Grn, Reu, Len, Freq, Cost), 500 Halton draws.
Significance levels: ˚ ď0.10,˚˚ ď0.05,˚˚˚ ď0.01
b
The BIC information criterion is used to compare model fit as it includes
the number of observations.
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Table 2.4: Results Model Specification 2
Variable
Freq

Parameter
description
Mean coefficient

Freq SD

S.d.(coefficient)

Length

Mean coefficient

Length SD

S.d.(coefficient)

Freq*Length

Mean coefficient

Green

Mean coefficient

Green SD

S.d.(coefficient)

Reuse

Mean coefficient

Reuse SD

S.d.(coefficient)

Notify

Mean coefficient

Cost

Mean coefficient

Cost SD

S.d.(coefficient)

MNL2
Coeff. (se)
-10.096***
(0.936)

-8.396***
(0.616)

-0.004***
(0.001)
1.101***
(0.209)

1.442***
(0.195)

0.736***
(0.088)
-0.157***
(0.011)

Observable heterogeneity about the mean
Cost*Incomec
0.646***
(0.118)
Freq*OutExper
4.364***
(1.349)
Len*NoCollege
4.802***
(1.495)
Grn*Conserve
0.907***
(0.333)
Reu*Conserve
1.008***
(0.323)
LL:
-1580.3461
BIC score
3256.84
No. parameters
12
Obs.a
3018

RPL-N2ua
Coeff. (se)
-28.27***
(4.93)
31.49***
(6.83)
-24.94***
(4.07)
17.34***
(3.60)
-0.009**
(0.004)
3.07***
(0.84)
8.54***
(1.53)
3.63***
(0.73)
5.77***
(1.30)
2.08***
(0.36)
-0.46***
(0.08)
0.32***
(0.06)

RPL-N2c
Coeff. (se)
-24.81***
(3.84)
26.44***
(5.00)
-21.32***
(3.01)
19.79***
(3.64)
-0.008**
(0.004)
3.65***
(0.87)
7.74***
(1.30)
2.59***
(0.55)
4.83***
(0.87)
2.17***
(0.33)
-0.40***
(0.06)
0.32***
(0.05)

2.01***
(0.47)
10.49**
(4.29)
9.97**
(4.31)
2.77**
(1.16)
2.84***
(0.97)
-1484.7887
3105.81
17
3018

1.89***
(0.42)
9.84**
(3.80)
10.58***
(3.95)
2.29**
(1.07)
3.14***
(0.89)
-1465.1624
3146.694
27
3018

Significance levels: ˚ ď0.10,˚˚ ď0.05,˚˚˚ ď0.01
a
There are 3022 observations for MNL1, N1u, N1c; difference is from one education nonresponse. RPL-N1u and RPL-N1c were re-estimated minus the individual. Similar results.

48

Chapter 2. Preferences for water utility infrastructure investment

Table 2.5: Covariance matrix: RPL-N1c and RPL-N2c
Frequency Length

Green

Reuse

Cost

Model RPL-N1c
Frequency 788.77˚˚˚
Length
13.99
Green
-13.54
Reuse
34.89
Cost
-2.70˚

.
363.52˚˚˚
-40.63
33.82
-1.76˚

.
.
60.97˚˚˚
25.19˚˚
0.46

.
.
.
31.27˚˚˚
0.41

.
.
.
.
0.12˚˚˚

Model RPL-N2c
Frequency 699.11˚˚˚
Length
66.68
Green
-28.33
Reuse
29.67
Cost
-1.57

.
391.54˚˚˚
-40.68
39.35˚
-1.93˚˚

.
.
59.90˚˚˚
25.06˚˚˚
0.49˚

.
.
.
23.34˚˚˚
0.34

.
.
.
.
0.10˚˚˚

The estimated values on the diagonal are variances for each attribute,
which are also given in the standard deviation coefficients in Table ??.
˚˚˚ ˚˚ ˚
, , indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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Table 2.6: Model Specification 1: Mean and Median MWTP per month
MNL1 (95% CIa ) RPL-N1ub RPL-N1cb
Monthly MWTP to avoid one additional outage at home in next five years
Median $0.78 (0.67, 0.93) $0.56
$0.35
Mean
$0.34
$2.78
Monthly MWTP to avoid a 1-hour increase in average outage length
Median $0.71 (0.61, 0.83) $0.61
$0.39
Mean
$0.74
$5.12
Monthly MWTP for a 1% increase in energy use by
water utility that is from renewable sources
Median $0.13 (0.11, 0.16) $0.11
$0.10
Mean
-$0.04
$0.51
Monthly MWTP for a 1% increase in urban greenspace irrigated
with reuse water
Median $0.17 (0.14, 0.19) $0.13
$0.07
Mean
$0.21
$0.73
Monthly MWTP for a 1% increase percent of time advance notification
of a planned maintenance outage is provided by the utility
Median $0.07 (0.05, 0.08) $0.06
$0.06
Mean
$0.05
$0.41
a
b

Calculated 95% CI with Krinsky-Robb method, 1000 draws.
Distribution of conditional individual estimated MWTP values.

50

Chapter 2. Preferences for water utility infrastructure investment

Table 2.7: Model Specification 2: Mean and Median MWTP per month
MNL2 RPL-N2ua RPL-N2ca
Monthly MWTP to avoid one additional outage at home in next five years
Median $0.81
$0.60
$0.51
Mean
-$10.69 -$0.09
-$2.06
Monthly MWTP to avoid a 1-hour increase in average outage length
Median $0.68
$0.58
$0.36
Mean
-$4.55
-$1.62
-$1.97
Monthly MWTP for a 1% increase in energy use by
water utility that is from renewable sources
Median $0.15
$0.11
$0.09
Mean
$3.72
$0.21
-$0.24
Monthly MWTP for a 1% increase in urban greenspace irrigated
with reuse water
Median $0.19
$0.11
$0.08
Mean
$4.16
-$0.49
-$0.09
Monthly MWTP for a 1% increase percent of time advance notification
of a planned maintenance outage is provided by the utility
Median $0.06
$0.06
$0.06
Mean
$0.09
-$0.15
-$0.07
a

Distribution of conditional individual estimated MWTP values.
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Table 2.8: Monthly MWTP ($) by percentile for Length

Percentile

MWTP to avoid a 1-hour longer outage
for the average customer
RPL-N1u RPL-N1c RPL-N2u RPL-N2c

99th
98th
96th
95th
93rd
90th
85th
80th
75th
50th
IQRa
25th
20th
15th
10th
7th
5th
4th
2nd
1st

17.76
9.75
6.24
5.39
4.15
2.99
1.69
1.33
1.16
0.61
0.81
0.35
0.32
0.28
0.16
-0.90
-3.01
-4.05
-8.99
-17.32

18.86
9.37
5.56
5.02
3.90
2.87
2.11
1.72
1.17
0.39
1.02
0.15
0.11
-0.11
-1.91
-2.73
-4.67
-6.07
-9.49
-28.28

24.42
9.94
5.46
4.48
3.59
2.85
1.74
1.34
1.09
0.58
0.78
0.31
0.24
0.20
-0.28
-2.18
-3.33
-4.66
-11.55
-22.49

22.76
14.17
7.65
6.31
4.91
3.25
2.10
1.57
1.24
0.36
1.15
0.09
0.00
-0.40
-1.90
-3.30
-4.91
-6.42
-13.44
-29.60

Mean

0.87

0.56

0.69

0.56

A negative MWTP for is interpreted that the ratepayer is willing to adapt to
deteriorating service levels rather than pay for an improvement in service.
a
The interquartile range represents the difference between MWTP at the 25th
and 75th percentiles. It measures the dispersion of the distribution.
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Table 2.9: Monthly MWTP ($) by percentile for Frequency

Percentile

MWTP to avoid 1 additional outage
at home over next 5 years
RPL-N1u RPL-N1c RPL-N2u RPL-N2c

99th
98th
96th
95th
93rd
90th
85th
80th
75th
50th
IQRa
25th
20th
15th
10th
7th
5th
4th
2nd
1st

15.23
10.31
5.83
4.82
3.96
2.67
1.78
1.57
1.46
0.56
1.22
0.24
0.15
-0.02
-0.23
-0.89
-1.93
-3.14
-8.41
-13.43

14.77
8.05
4.75
3.91
3.18
2.67
2.18
1.90
1.43
0.35
1.44
-0.01
-0.11
-0.45
-2.05
-3.17
-3.87
-5.42
-10.44
-21.69

18.68
8.25
5.41
4.78
3.71
2.85
2.11
1.69
1.46
0.60
1.23
0.23
0.10
-0.08
-0.55
-1.76
-3.57
-4.58
-11.50
-23.52

23.40
12.91
6.82
5.44
4.31
3.06
2.28
1.85
1.49
0.51
1.37
0.12
-0.03
-0.28
-1.68
-2.97
-4.40
-6.35
-12.92
-24.12

Mean

0.89

0.50

0.70

0.68

A negative MWTP for is interpreted that the ratepayer is willing to adapt to
deteriorating service levels rather than pay for an improvement in service.
a
The interquartile range represents the difference between MWTP at the 25th
and 75th percentiles. It measures the dispersion of the distribution.
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Table 2.10: Stage 2 analysis: characteristics and determinants of MWTP
Frequency
N2c

Demographicsa

N2u

Income
Female
Hispanic
NearbyOut
West
SouthSE
R2
No. obs.

0.07 (0.03)**
-0.17 (0.08)**
-0.04 (0.08)
0.31 (0.10)***
0.08 (0.09)
-0.18 (0.10)*
0.0303
667

N2u

-0.08 (0.04)**
-0.10 (0.10)
0.12 (0.10)
0.51 (0.15)***
0.16 (0.12)
-0.13 (0.14)
0.0241
666

Length
N2c

0.05 (0.03)*
0.003 (0.07)
-0.18 (0.08)**
0.21 (0.09)**
-0.01 (0.09)
-0.03 (0.09)
0.0368
668

-0.01 (0.04)
0.04 (0.11)
0.02 (0.12)
0.63 (0.16)***
0.06 (0.13)
-0.04 (0.14)
0.0300
667

Five percent outliers on each end have been dropped.
Significance levels: ˚ ď 0.10,˚˚ ď 0.05,˚˚˚ ď 0.01
a
Demographics defined: Income = total household income, categorical.
Female = individual is female; binary.
Hispanic = individual is hispanic; binary. NearbyOut = a high number (16-64)
of pipe breaks were within half-mile radius of house in past 5 years; binary.
Reported by ABCWUA. GIS-techniques were used to create a half mile radius
zone and count the number of pipe breaks. West = household is west of Rio
Grande River (base is northeast Albuquerque); binary. SouthSE = household
is in south Albuquerque (base is northeast Albuquerque); binary.
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Table 2.11: Aggregated WTP ($mil) for all residential ratepayers over 5 years
MNL1a RPL-N1u RPL-N1c N1u:N1c RPL-N2u RPL-N2c N2u:N2c
Aggregate WTP to avoid one more outage at home over next five years
$8.38
$6.01
$3.77
-37%
$6.44
$5.470
-15%
Aggregate WTP to avoid a 1-hour increase in average outage length
$7.62
$6.57
$4.20
-36%
$6.27
$3.87

-38%

Aggregate WTP for a 1% increase in amount of energy used by ABCWUA
from renewable sources
$1.40
$1.20
$1.08
-11%
$1.19
$0.97
-19%
Aggregate WTP for a 1% increase in Albuquerque urban greenspace
irrigated with reuse water
$1.83
$1.35
$0.78
-42%
$1.20
$0.90

-25%

Aggregate WTP for a 1% increase in advance notification of a planned
maintenance outage is provided by the utility
$0.75
$0.61
$0.65
6%
$0.59
$0.65
9%
Median figures from each model used. Total amounts rounded.
There were 178,968 single-family residential ABCWUA customers as of Dec 2013.
(per Katherine Yuhas, March 7, 2014).
a
These figures represent the amount paid over five years for a one percent
or one-unit increase in the attribute level.
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Table 2.12: Policy scenario for drinking water
newal
Infrastructure Investment
Avoid 5 hour longer average outage length
across all water utility customers
Avoid 5 additional outages at home
over next five years
Increase by 10%, the share of time ratepayer
receives advance notification
of a planned maintenance outage
Total
Annual amount
Annual amount per residential accounta
Monthly amount per residential accounta

distribution infrastructure reRPL-N2c
$19,328,544

RPL-N2u
$31,140,432

$27,382,104

$32,214,240

$6,442,848

$6,442,848

$53,153,496
$10,630,699
$59.40
$4.95

$69,797,520
$13,959,504
$78.00
$6.50

Median results from each model used to calculate totals.
In this scenario, the status quo levels for the Reuse and Green attributes do not change.
a
Total amount divided by 178,968 residential accounts to get per account figures
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Figure 2.1: Sample CE Question
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Figure 2.2: ABCWUA pipe breaks in the five years prior to the study (2010
Census Tracts)
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Figure 2.3: MWTP to avoid 1 additional outage at home over the next five years
(RPL-N2u), Median MWTP per month by tract
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Figure 2.4: MWTP to avoid 1 additional outage at home over the next five years
(RPL-N2c), Median MWTP per month by tract
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Chapter 3
The estimation of marginal
utility of income in
preference-space and WTP-space
models

3.1 Introduction
Two categories of mixed logit models are used to analyze choice experiment
data and estimate marginal willingness-to-pay (MWTP) for environmental
goods and services: preference-space models and WTP-space models. Non-cost
attribute coefficients are interpreted as marginal utilities in preference-space
models, but as MWTP in WTP-space models. Studies comparing the two methods note that the benefits to a WTP-space model result from directly estimating
heterogeneous MWTP separately from the heterogeneous cost scale parameter,
while in the preference-space model MWTP is calculated post-estimation as the
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ratio of two marginal utility coefficients. In the WTP-space model, estimated
MWTP has the specified distribution of each random parameter so all distributional moments are defined (Scarpa et al., 2008; Hensher & Greene, 2011;
Scarpa et al., 2012). When the marginal utility of income (MUI) is specified
random in a mixed logit preference-space model, the both the numerator and
denominator in the calculated MWTP ratio are random. The resulting distribution of the MWTP ratio often will not have a defined distribution.
The objective of this paper is to compare the MWTP distributions from the
WTP-space model and several specifications of the preference-space model using different assumptions for the MUI. The two models are described as being
formally equivalent, but the research question asks under which preferencespace distributional assumption for MUI are they equivalent? A comparison
with preference-space mixed logit models under different distributional assumptions for cost establishes a baseline to characterize the MWTP distribution in WTP-space.
The issues of the MWTP distribution in preference-space models result from
the random MUI.1 A random MUI parameter typically provides a better fit and
is considered more realistic than a fixed cost parameter (Hole, 2008). Theoretically a random MUI is negatively correlated to income. The MUI for a low
income individual is usually greater than the MUI for a high income individual, a percentage of whom may have a near-zero or positive MUI depending
on the specified distribution. Individuals with a near-zero or positive MUI are
considered price insensitive. When MWTP ratios are calculated, near-zero MUI
values result in extreme outlier MWTPs. WTP-space models do not allow price
insensitive individuals, because the MWTP is directly estimated; a zero MUI
is not possible in the denominator, so the WTP-space model has fewer or no ex1

This is the coefficient of the random cost parameter (Lanz & Provins, 2013).
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treme outliers. The implicit assumption is that each individual has a non-zero
MWTP for an attribute (Lanz & Provins, 2013). A negative MWTP is possible.
WTP-space and preference-space models are often referred to as being ‘formally equivalent’ (Train & Weeks, 2005; Scarpa et al., 2008). Mathematically they are. But there has been little discussion if they are equivalent in
behavior as a result of the different method of including the MUI or under
which distributional assumptions are they equivalent. Past research using
preference-space mixed logit models conclude that a random cost parameter
improves model fit and is more realistic (Balcombe et al., 2009; Hole & Kolstad, 2012). The WTP-space model is described as having a heterogeneous cost
scale parameter, implying a random MUI. If so, the resulting MWTP distribution should follow theoretical validity tests of income in a similar manner as
the preference-space models with random MUI.2 Various studies have shown
estimated MWTP values to be positively related to income in preference-space
mixed logit models (Jacobsen & Hanley, 2009; Giergiczny et al., 2012). I refer
to the positive relationship between MWTP and income as the income effect.
This paper contributes to the growing WTP-space literature by examining the
income effect in the WTP-space estimates and comparing it to preference-space
models under different distributional assumptions for the MUI parameter.
Research comparing WTP-space models with preference-space models todate has been primarily concerned with model fit and the impact on central
statistical moments such as the mean, median, and standard deviation since
these are the most commonly used results for policy makers. Results have been
mixed as to preferred model fit, however several studies have found that the
WTP-space models result in more conservative median estimates with tighter
2

In their paper describing best practices for using stated preference techniques to value the
environment, Arrow et al. (1993) suggest using a cross tab of income with WTP as a validity
test of contingent valuation results. This is an easy test for the MWTP values estimated from
choice experiment studies as well.
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confidence intervals (Train & Weeks, 2005; Sonnier et al., 2007; Scarpa et
al., 2008). Some researchers advocate for the use of WTP-space models to
avoid instability associated with calculating MWTP as the ratio of two random
marginal utilities (Balcombe et al., 2010).
This study adds a water utility infrastructure application to the WTP-space
literature. Currently, I am aware of only one article using a WTP-space model
from the water utility sector; they examined preferences describing tap water
delivery (Scarpa et al., 2012). Other papers using WTP-space models have focused on food/agriculture (Balcombe et al., 2009, 2010), transportation (Train
& Weeks, 2005; Hensher & Greene, 2011), health (Hole & Kolstad, 2012), recreation (Scarpa et al., 2008), energy (Scarpa & Willis, 2010), retail goods (Sonnier
et al., 2007), and environmental economics (Lanz & Provins, 2013).
The empirical application has three purposes. First, the impact of different assumptions about the MUI is compared using the results and model fit of
WTP-space and preference-space models. Second, I use validity testing of the
MWTP by income from each model to compare the behavior of the WTP-space
estimates against the behavior of preference-space models under different cost
assumptions. Third, the MWTP estimates are weighted to examine benefits
received relative to income and local infrastructure conditions. Data are from
a choice experiment survey that valued investment in water utility infrastructure in a southwestern U.S. metropolitan area. Three preference-space mixed
logit models are estimated: one model using a fixed cost attribute and two
models using random cost attributes that assume a normal and lognormal distributions. These are compared with a WTP-space mixed logit model. Results
are consistent with the literature comparing the two models: the preference
space model fits the data better, but exhibits extreme outliers in MWTP for the
random cost models, most notably when cost is normally distributed. Given
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that some researchers prefer the WTP-space model because of the tighter distribution, removing between 2% and 10% of outlying values is one solution to
obtaining a comparable MWTP distribution in a preference-space model, especially if negative outliers are considered theoretically incorrect.

Estimated MWTPs are often used to assess the social benefits of a policy
and are assumed to reflect individuals’ value for a good along with the tradeoffs they are willing to make (Loomis, 2011). For this dataset, results from the
validity test of the WTP-space distribution indicate that MWTP is not related
to income. This implies a similar level of social benefits across income classes.
By weighting MWTP values with the ratio of household income to Census tract
median household income for owner-occupied housing units, I attempt to provide a more precise assessment of social benefits 3

An important conclusion of this study is that while the WTP-space model
provides a more realistic distribution of MWTP, it lacks the income effect that is
visible in the preference-space models with random cost. In fact, the distribution and the estimated MWTP values are very similar to the preference-space
model with the fixed cost parameter. As a result, I conclude that the preferencespace models might be preferable, in spite of the distributional problems, given
that a random cost parameter is considered an improvement over a fixed cost
parameter. However, more research is needed into the implications of the estimation of MUI in the WTP-space model.

3

Median household income for owner-occupied housing units was used as this more accurately reflects the survey respondents.
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3.2 Theory
The underlying utility equation is the same for both preference-space and
WTP-space models. The primary differences between the two is in the estimation of the individual-specific βn coefficients and the MUI coefficient, λn .

3.2.1 Utility equation
Preference-space models
Preference-space mixed logit models focus on estimating individuals’ preferences or marginal utilities for attributes. The utility equation for individual n
who selects an alternative j from choice opportunity t is:
˚
Unjt
“ βn˚ Xnjt ´ λ˚n pnjt ` e˚njt

(3.1)

Notation is similar to other papers estimating WTP-space and preference-space
models for comparison (Scarpa et al., 2008; Scarpa & Willis, 2010; Hensher &
Greene, 2011). Utility is assumed to be separable for the vector of non-cost attributes, Xnjt , and cost, pnjt . βn˚ is the vector of associated marginal utilities, pnjt
represents the cost attribute, and λ˚n represents the heterogeneous marginal
utility of income. The

˚

indicates these are the individual’s true underlying

preferences, unobservable to the analyst. The error term is distributed iid,
2

2

extreme value Gumbel, e˚njt „ p0, σn6π q where σn is inversely related to the error term’s variance and unique to each individual.4 To obtain a constant error
4

Typically a homogeneous scale term has been assumed, σ, indicating that each individual has the same randomness inherent in their decision-making. Louviere et al. (2002) argue
that this assumption can bias utility estimates and is unrealistic from a decision-making perspective. They propose that each individual’s has a unique scale that should be considered in
estimation. The WTP-space model allows for this so I use a σn term throughout.
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term, scale the utility equation by σn .

Let Unjt “

˚
Unjt
,
σn

βn “

˚
Unjt
e˚njt
β˚
λ˚
“ n Xnjt ´ n pnjt `
σn
σn
σn
σn

(3.2)

e˚
njt 5
.
σn

Because the βn and σn

˚
βn
,
σn

λn “

λ˚
n
,
σn

and εnjt “

are confounded, preference-space models normalize the scale term at 1. This
scaled utility equation is the preference-space model because the estimated
coefficients represent preferences:
(3.3)

Unjt “ βn Xnjt ´ λn pnjt ` εnjt

The βn s are interpreted as the heterogeneous marginal utilities for non-cost
attributes and the λn is the heterogeneous marginal utility of income. MWTP
is estimated as the ratio of the two coefficients, M W T P “

βk
.
λn

WTP-space models
The utility equation for a WTP-space mixed logit model is a reformulation of
Equation 3.2. In WTP-space, coefficients for the non-cost attributes are interpreted as MWTP for each attribute (Train & Weeks, 2005; Scarpa et al., 2008).
This allows for separate WTP heterogeneity from scale heterogeneity.
Rearrange and simplify Equation 3.2:

„
˚
e˚njt
Unjt
1 λn ˚
˚
“
βn Xnjt ´ λn pnjt `
σn
σn λn
σn

„
1 λ˚n σn ˚
˚
Unjt “
β Xnjt ´ λn pnjt ` εnjt
σn σn λ˚n n

„
λ˚n σn βn˚
Xnjt ´ pnjt ` εnjt
Unjt “
σn λ˚n σn
5

(3.4)
(3.5)
(3.6)

The scale term is confounded with each attribute in the denominator. Several researchers
have pointed out that a heterogeneous scale term leads to some degree of correlation among
attribute coefficients. Perfect correlation results if preferences are fixed and scale is random or
partial correlation if both are random (Louviere et al., 2002; Scarpa et al., 2008).
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Unjt


„
λ˚n βn
“
Xnjt ´ pnjt ` εnjt
σn λn

(3.7)
(3.8)

Unjt “ λn rwn Xnjt ´ pnjt s ` εnjt

Equation 3.8 is the estimated WTP-space model; the vector wn is directly
interpreted as the MWTP for attributes, M W T Pn “ wn “

βn
λn

“

˚ {σ
βn
n
λ˚
n {σn

“

˚
βn
.
λ˚
n

Both

wn and preference-space MWTP are scale-free, leading to the argument that
they are directly comparable. In the estimated model, λn represents the MUI.
It is estimated and reported as the coefficient for the cost parameter, implying
that it is not directly a part of the MWTP or wn coefficient. This results in a
reduced income effect between estimated MWTP and income categories.

3.2.2 Individual-specific βs
The estimation of the βs provides some distinction between the two models.

Preference-space βn
In the preference-space mixed logit model, an individual’s unique preferences
from Equation 3.3 are expressed as:
βn “ b ` υn

(3.9)

where βn „ pb, Υq; similar notation would denote the parameters of the random MUI, λn . Here b and Υ are the estimated parameters representing the
population mean and variance.6
6

Often, independent attributes are assumed, which results in the off-diagonal elements of
Υ being zero.
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3.2.3

WTP-space βn

Individual βn coefficients in a WTP-space model should be presented in the
context in which they will be estimated, although the underlying theory is
the same. Studies using WTP-space models have followed two conventions:
(i) estimate in Stata or NLogit using a modified generalized multinomial logit
(GMNL) model under certain restrictions (Hensher & Greene, 2011; Hole &
Kolstad, 2012); or (ii) directly program, usually in Biogeme and often using Bayesian methods (Scarpa et al., 2008; Balcombe et al., 2009; Thiene &
Scarpa, 2009; Balcombe et al., 2010; Scarpa & Willis, 2010; Scarpa et al.,
2012).7 Greene & Hensher (2010) showed that the generalized multinomial
logit model resulted in a WTP-space model under specific restrictions.8 I estimate the WTP-space model using the modified GMNL method because, given
the nature of the attributes, it is likely that over the distribution of survey
respondents there will be both positive and negative WTP values so the unbounded normal distribution is appropriate.
The utility equation for the GMNL model, as described in Fiebig et al.
(2010), starts from Equation 3.3:
Unjt “ βn Xnjt ´ λn pnjt ` εnjt

(3.10)

Introduce the GMNL formulation of the βn and λn coefficients:
Unjt

„ ˚ „
„
 
 
λ
p1 ´ γq ˚
p1 ´ γq ˚
β˚
` γ`
` γ`
θn Xnjt ´
ηn pnjt ` εnjt (3.11)
“
σn
σn
σn
σn
„

7

Using a GMNL frame work allows for partial scale and price heterogeneity but restricts
the distribution of the MWTP values to the normal distribution, while the WTP-space program
allows various distributions for the MWTP coefficients but assumes either the scale or price
coefficient is fixed, resulting in perfect correlation between the two (Scarpa et al., 2012).
8
The generalized multinomial logit (GMNL) model nests various models and allows for the
testing of scale heterogeneity with preference heterogeneity. Mixed logit, scaled multinomial
logit and multinomial logit models are all nested within the GMNL model Fiebig et al. (2010).
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In the GMNL model, the γ parameter takes a value between r0, 1s; it impacts
the influence of the heterogeneous scale on the preference heterogeneity terms,
represented by the individual standard deviation terms θn or ηn . For the WTPspace formulation, γ is restricted to zero:
„ ˚

„ ˚

β
λ
θn˚
ηn˚
Unjt “
Xnjt ´
pnjt ` εnjt
`
`
σn σn
σn σn
Unjt “

1 ˚
1 ˚
rβ ` θn˚ s Xnjt ´
rλ ` ηn˚ s pnjt ` εnjt
σn
σn

(3.12)
(3.13)

Let βn˚ “ β ˚ ` θn˚ and λ˚n “ λ˚ ` ηn˚ , which is the standard manner of writing out
individual-specific coefficients in a mixed logit model. βn˚ represents heterogeneous preferences for non-cost attributes and λ˚n represents heterogeneous
MUI:
1 ˚
rβn Xnjt ´ λ˚n pnjt s ` εnjt
σn
„

λ˚n βn˚
Xnjt ´ pnjt ` εnjt
“
σn λ˚n

Unjt “

(3.14)

Unjt

(3.15)

Unjt “ λn rwn Xnjt ´ pnjt s ` εnjt

(3.16)

Equation 3.16 shows how the estimation is done under the GMNL specification to arrive at Equation 3.8. In studies that use WTP-space models, the
results tables report wn as the non-cost attribute coefficients, while λn is reported in some manner as the cost parameter. The estimation of λn requires
explanation. Regardless of whether the WTP-space is estimated as a modified
GMNL or directly programmed, λn combines the heterogeneous marginal utility of income, λ˚n , with the heterogeneous scale, σn . Hensher & Greene (2011)
refer to λn as a normalizing constant, in the sense that the coefficient wn is normalized by λn . Lanz & Provins (2013) also describe the WTP-space model as
using the MUI to scale the utility equation. When estimating the WTP-space
model as a modified GMNL model, λn is estimated using the constraints on the
scale term σn described by Fiebig et al. (2010). The description of estimating
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λn will use the term scale, but the scale and cost coefficients are confounded so
are functionally the same for this discussion.

3.2.4 Random versus fixed cost
An issue with the mixed logit model is that the cost parameter is often fixed
for convenience, while non-cost attributes are specified random (Colombo et
al., 2009). A fixed cost parameter simplifies the issue of estimating the WTP
distribution, which takes on the distribution of the numerator’s random attribute. A large number of initial mixed logit studies modeled cost heterogeneity in the classical heterogeneity manner through interactions between
the cost attribute and socioeconomic characteristics for issues of convenience
and tractability (Revelt & Train, 1998; Hensher & Greene, 2003; Colombo et
al., 2007). However, this ignores a current debate about the appropriateness
of assuming a constant MUI for all respondents. Hensher et al. (2005) argue
that a fixed cost only indicates that the ratio of the scale term to the price is
constant, not that all individuals have the same marginal utility of income. A
fixed cost parameter simplifies the issue of estimating the WTP distribution,
which takes on the distribution of the numerator’s random attribute. However,
research indicates that this is a restrictive assumption (Hole & Kolstad, 2012).
Balcombe et al. (2009) find that models with a fixed cost coefficient underperform the models allowing for cost heterogeneity. Scarpa et al. (2008) considers
fixing the cost coefficient to imply an identical MUI across individuals and a
constraint on the scale parameter to be fixed.
More recent research modeling cost heterogeneity concludes that modeling
cost heterogeneity improves model fit, compared to the case of a fixed cost parameter (Meijer & Rouwendal, 2006; Hole, 2008; Hole & Kolstad, 2012). Some
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researchers specify cost to be random (Train, 1998; Hole, 2008; Regier et al.,
2009); in this case the most commonly chosen distribution is the lognormal,
which forces the sign to be positive.9 The assumption of a random parameter
specification for cost, and the log-normal specification in particular, has a number of consequences for the resulting MWTP. First, making cost random means
that some individual cost parameters will be quite small, potentially inflating MWTP estimates for these individuals. Second, a log-normal specification
means a fat right-hand tail, which will also inflate MWTP when the non-cost
attribute is also specified log-normal. The end consequence is that the MWTP
can be inflated and will have a very large range (Hensher & Greene, 2003).

Research into the effects of the distribution chosen for a random cost parameter finds that the median is not as sensitive as the mean WTP to different distributions (Meijer & Rouwendal, 2006). A few studies outside the water
utility literature have combined unobserved heterogeneity in a random cost parameter with observed heterogeneity due to income, environmental and other
demographic characteristics (Greene & Hensher, 2007; Baskaran et al., 2009;
Tait et al., 2012). Issues of specifying a distribution for the cost parameter led
to the development of the WTP-space models whose estimated coefficients are
the ratio of the attribute to the cost parameter, allowing the researcher to specify a distribution for the WTP and avoid the issue of taking the ratio of two
different distributions (Train & Weeks, 2005; Scarpa et al., 2008; Hensher &
Greene, 2011; Hole & Kolstad, 2012).

9

For attributes assumed to cause disutility as they increase across the population, the attribute is multiplied by ´1 in the model to force the behaviorally-appropriate negative sign.
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3.2.5 Validity testing of distributional benefits

Estimated MWTP should be interpreted in the context of an individual’s income and MUI (Broberg, 2010). Microeconomic theory suggests that MUI and
income have an inverse relationship; as income increases, each extra dollar
adds less to overall utility and marginal utility of income decreases. As a result,
MWTP and income should be positively related. Giergiczny et al. (2012) find
that increasing income leads to lower marginal utility of income and higher
WTP values. Examining the relationship between MWTP and income is one
method of validity testing.
This relationship typically holds in preference-space models when the cost
parameter is random. MWTP is a function of both the marginal utility or preference for the non-cost attribute and the marginal utility of income, M W T P “
βk
.
λn

The improvement in WTP-space models, described via smaller standard de-

viations and reduced incidence of extreme MWTP, is in part due to the separate
estimation of WTP coefficients, wn , from the heterogeneous cost/scale parameter, λn . However this may reduce the income effect on MWTP.
There has been little discussion about validity tests on MWTP distributions as an additional sign of behavioral reliability. Arrow et al. (1993) initially describe various validity checks on resulting MWTP estimates in their
paper describing best practices for using stated preference surveys to value
the benefit of the environment. They suggest income levels. Construct validity is one type of validity testing using respondent characteristics as predictor
variables for WTP values; income is one example cited because theory would
say that MWTP values should increase with income. Construct validity can
be tested using between-subjects comparisons with mean WTP estimates from
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sample groups within the respondent group (Freeman III, 2003).10 Using regression techniques, various studies have shown income to be positively related
to MWTP (Campbell, 2007; Jacobsen & Hanley, 2009; Cooper, Burton, & Crase,
2011). Studies argue that theoretically the underlying utility functions are
equivalent and the MWTP should be interpreted in the same manner (Train &
Weeks, 2005; Scarpa et al., 2008). This implies that the MUI, λn , in a WTPspace model is accurately reflected in the MWTP, wn , coefficients even though
it is estimated separately. If true, then the median MWTP coefficients from
WTP-space models should also be increasing in income.

3.3 Empirical Application
3.3.1 Survey
The data for this study were collected as part of a choice experiment survey conducted with a sample of residential customers of the water utility in the Albuquerque, NM metropolitan area to understand their preferences for infrastructure investments. Serious infrastructure deterioration is not system-wide in
Albuquerque but occurs more often in Census tracts with lower median household incomes. This relationship is depicted in Figure ?? where darker color
Census tracts indicate higher numbers of pipe breaks over the five years preceding the survey and the dot size increases to indicate higher median household income. ABCWUA has had a lower annual break rate than six peer cities
with similar miles of pipe (ABCWUA, 2006).11 However, in 2011, the water
utility wrote a long-term asset renewal plan and projected increasingly deteri10

Regression techniques and within-subject comparisons are also mentioned.
The six cities were Oakland (CA), Denver (CO), Kenosha (WI), New York (NY), Louisville
(KY), and Philadelphia (PA).
11
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orating infrastructure over the next forty years (ABCWUA, 2011).
The CE survey was developed in accordance with the survey protocol detailed in Dillman (2007). Attributes were chosen based on an extensive literature search; Hatton MacDonald et al. (2003); Hensher et al. (2005); Willis et
al. (2005) were excellent guides. Eight focus groups conducted throughout the
water utility’s service area helped refine the survey. The survey was tested
iteratively through debriefing interviews and a final pretest survey that was
mailed to a sample of 200 customers. The final survey was sent to residential
customers using the standard five contacts, where subsequent contacts after
the first survey packet were only made with non-respondents.
Infrastructure investments were characterized by six attributes, which are
described in Table 2.1. Cost was described as a monthly amount added on to
the water bill dedicated only for infrastructure investment. The drinking pipe
infrastructure investment was described as more frequent outages at home,
Frequency, longer average outages across all utility customers, Length, and
the percentage of time ABCWUA can provide advance notification of an outage due to planned maintenance, Notify. Reuse pipe infrastructure, Reuse,
was described as the percentage of urban greenspace irrigated with reuse water. Renewable energy investment, Green, was described as the percentage of
energy generated from renewable sources. Each non-cost attribute had three
levels, while cost had six levels.
The Choiceff macro was used to generate an efficient design under the model
assumption of a linear-in-parameters utility function with interactions (Kuhfeld, 2010). The design generated 32 choice sets, each with two investment
alternatives.12 Choice questions were examined to make sure there were no
12

Similar to Hensher et al. (2005), there was no status quo alternative in each CE question.
I chose not to include a status quo option because water pipe infrastructure is not a static
good. The status quo service levels will worsen under the current status quo of no additional
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dominated alternatives, but rather that trade-offs were being made. Four CE
questions were grouped together for eight survey versions. An example of the
choice question is seen in Figure 2.1.
The survey sample was 1,900 residential customers randomly selected by
the water utility from their address database. These customers were primarily
homeowners or renters who received and paid the monthly water bill. Under the assumption that individuals within a household shared the same basic
preferences for infrastructure investment, it did not matter who opened the
survey packet.13 A conservative RR1 response rate was calculated of 45.8%,
according to guidelines set out by the American Association of Public Opinion
Research (AAPOR, 2009).14 There were 3,317 initial observations.

3.3.2 Sample statistics
Table 3.1 provides mean statistics for all survey respondents and by income category. The median survey respondent is 55 years old, female, nonHispanic, with a Bachelor’s degree, and a household income between $40,000
and $59,999. Her water demand includes light outdoor watering in summer
and she has moderate attitudes towards water conservation with no atypical
household needs that affected water use.15 She has no children living at home,
is a long-term resident of New Mexico but has only lived at her current home
investment dollars.
13
In fact, Scarpa et al. (2012) found no significant difference in WTP for tap water attributes
between couples in the same house.
14
An RR1 response rate assumes all survey addresses are eligible respondents even if the
post office returns a survey marked undeliverable or unclaimed. RR1 “ ER {pER ` EN R `
U EN R `N EN R q. The denominator is the sum of eligible surveys returned (ER ) and not returned
(EN R ), unreturned surveys of unknown eligibility (U EN R ), and those who are not eligible at all
(N EN R ).
15
Atypical water demand can result from being a stay-at-home parent, running a home business, or having a member of a sensitive sub-population at home.
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for 10 years. She has not experienced an outage at home over the past five
years and her Census tract has experienced fewer than average pipe breaks.
I also compared mean statistics of the survey respondents to two Census survey populations: owner-occupied housing in Bernalillo County and the general population of Albuquerque/Bernalillo County metropolitan region.16 Survey households were representative by age, geography, and income level, but
a greater percentage were female, non-Hispanic, and had a higher education
level than the average Albuquerque/ Bernalillo County homeowner.17
Descriptive statistics by income are presented in Appendix B since this
study focuses on the marginal utility of income. The median low income individual has different characteristics than middle and high income individuals.18 She is more likely to be Hispanic than the average survey respondent,
is slightly older and has attended college a few years but does not have a degree. She has lived in New Mexico longer and lives in a Census tract that has
experienced a higher-than-average number of pipe breaks.

3.3.3 Empirical model specification
I estimate four models.19 A linear-in-parameters utility function is used for the
preference-space models:
16

We use two Census products because ABCWUA’s service area does not encompass the entire city and yet includes part of unincorporated Bernalillo County. The owner-occupied housing comparison more accurate reflects the survey population.
17
In comparison to the metropolitan population, survey respondents were only representative geographically. Survey respondents were wealthier, older, with a higher educational level,
and more likely to be female and non-Hispanic than the average Albuquerque resident.
18
Low income is defined as having an annual household income of less than $39,999, middle
income is defined as $40,000 to $99,999 and high income is defined as over $100,000.
19
Models are estimated in Stata 13.0 using commands written by Hole (2007) and Gu & Hole
(2013).
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Unjt “ β1 F reqj ` β2 Lenj ` β3 N otj ` β4 Reuj ` β5 Grnj ` β6 F \
reqLen ´ λn Cost (3.17)
\
In Equation 3.17 Notify and F req
˚ Len are fixed; the other attributes are random.20 The non-cost random attributes are specified as normally distributed.21
Uncorrelated models are estimated since the focus is on the validity of the resulting MWTP distributions.22
For the three mixed logit preference-space models, Equation 3.17 is estimated. The distribution of the Cost parameter is altered to compare the resulting distributions against the distribution from the WTP-space model. In Model
F1, Cost is fixed so the marginal utility of income coefficient is constant, λn “ λ.
The subsequent distribution of MWTP has finite moments and follows the distribution of the numerator attribute (Hole & Kolstad, 2012). Researchers have
argued against a constant MUI as unrealistic (Scarpa et al., 2008). Many studies now allow for a random cost attribute, which results in better model fit
(Balcombe et al., 2009; Hole & Kolstad, 2012; Lanz & Provins, 2013).
Two additional preference-space models are estimated that allow for a random cost using normal (Model N1) and lognormal (Model L1) distributions. Under the assumption of a normally distributed cost attribute m, the estimated
marginal utility of income is λm “ bm `sm ωm . Here s represents the individual’s
standard deviation and ω is a draw from the standard normal distribution that
places the individual somewhere on the distribution. Under the assumption
\
The interaction term F req
˚ Len has a hat to indicate that the terms were centered on their
means prior to being multiplied to reduce collinearity.
21
Scarpa et al. (2012) argue that while normal distributions may be mis-specified for some attributes, this can be minimized if the estimated standard deviation coefficients are sufficiently
small so that only a small percentage of individuals end up with the wrong sign.
22
Several papers find no significant difference in estimated MWTP values between correlated
and uncorrelated mixed logit preference-space models (Colombo et al., 2007; Scarpa et al.,
2012). Hole & Kolstad (2012) find similar results between correlated and uncorrelated WTPspace models.
20

78

Chapter 3. Preference-space and WTP-space models
of lognormally distributed cost attribute k, the logarithm of the coefficient is
distributed normally, λk “ exppbk ` sk ωk q.
Much research has gone into considering what distribution is appropriate
for the cost attribute because it exerts such influence on the MWTP distribution
(Hensher & Greene, 2003; Meijer & Rouwendal, 2006; Balcombe et al., 2009;
Hensher & Greene, 2011).23 Individual MUI coefficients very near zero result
in unrealistic extreme values of MWTP (Scarpa et al., 2008), while others argue
that this is informative of price insensitivity (Giergiczny et al., 2012; Lanz &
Provins, 2013).
For the WTP-space model (W1), I follow papers by Hensher & Greene
(2011); Hole & Kolstad (2012); Scarpa et al. (2012) and estimate a WTP-space
model using a generalized multinomial logit framework under certain restrictions. The utility specification in Equation 3.17 is the basis for the empirical
WTP-space model:
Unjt “ λn rw1 F reqj ` w2 Lenj ` w3 N otj ` w4 Reuj ` w5 Grnj ` w6 F \
reqLen ´ Costs
(3.18)
Equation 3.18 is the empirical specification for the WTP-space model. Nonprice MWTP coefficients follow a normal distribution, while the confounded
price scale λn coefficient is estimated lognormally. Specifying a normal distribution for attributes allows for the possibility of negative MWTP values.
In the WTP-space specification, λn term is confounded with the heterogeneous scale, which must be positive. As a result, λn is specified lognormal.
λn “ exppλ ` τ ωq
23

(3.19)

Hess et al. (2005) favor using unconstrained distributions such as the normal and removing
some percentage of outliers or wrong sign estimates. Balcombe et al. (2009) found that specifying cost as lognormally distributed outperformed unconstrained and constrained alternative
distributions.
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where λ is the mean scale value, τ is the standard deviation with a standard
normal distribution, ω „ N p0, 1q. To ensure that λn normalizes at 1, take the
expectation of Equation 3.19 and set it equal to 1.
Erλn s “ Erexppλ ` τ ωqs

(3.20)

τ2
q“1
2

(3.21)

Erλn s “ exppλ `

The derivation from Equation 3.20 to Equation 3.21 can be found in Chapter
2

2, Appendix A. From Equation 3.21, only τ can be estimated. Setting λ “ ´ τ2

achieves Erλn s “ 1. The parameters reported in the results tables of studies using WTP-space models vary in terminology. Some report lnpλn q and the
standard deviation, while others report a Parameter for cost (WTP-space) and
Variance parameter in scale (τ ); I report results using the latter terminology.
They are reporting the same thing because the random cost and scale coefficients are confounded within λn . The standard deviation of λn is the estimated
τ.

3.4 Results
Table 3.2 provides the estimated means and standard deviation coefficients for
all four estimated models. The first three columns are the preference-space
models where the marginal utility of income is fixed (F1), normally distributed
(N1) and lognormally distributed (L1). The final column reports the WTP-space
model (W1) results. Other studies use these model combinations of mixed logit
preference-space and WTP-space models for comparison of results.
In general, our results are consistent with the literature comparing model
fit between WTP-space and preference-space models. Goodness-of-fit to the
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data is measured by comparing log-likelihood and information criteria scores.24
Similar to Train & Weeks (2005); Sonnier et al. (2007); Hensher & Greene
(2011); Lanz & Provins (2013), the WTP-space model has a poorer fit with the
data than the preference-space mixed logit models that allow for a random cost
attribute.25 Log-likelihood scores, as well as AIC and BIC criteria, indicate that
Models W1 and F1 have almost the same model fit in contrast to Balcombe et
al. (2009); Scarpa et al. (2012) who find the WTP-space models outperforms
the mixed logit with a fixed cost. Overall, Model L1 has the best fit; this model
specifies a lognormal cost attribute.
The signs on the coefficients are as expected and consistent across models
as are the significance levels. This contrasts from Hole & Kolstad (2012); Lanz
& Provins (2013), who find the significance of estimated coefficients can change
between model types. All mean and standard deviation coefficients are highly
significant at the 1% level.26 The ratio of mean to standard deviation coefficients are less than one for all attributes except Length, indicating a great deal
of variation in preferences for infrastructure investment. All preference variation is due to latent influences as no observable characteristics or attitudes
were included.
The comparison of MWTP distributions is of key interest in this paper because it provides a baseline for comparing the behavioral equivalence of the
WTP-space and preference-space models. Statistical moments of the distribu24

Likelihood ratio tests could not be used because the models use different distributions but
are not nested.
25
Scarpa et al. (2008); Balcombe et al. (2009); Scarpa et al. (2012) find the WTP-space model
to be an improvement.
26
A more in-depth discussion regarding the interpretation of ratepayer preferences can be
found in Chapter 2 of my dissertation. In general, the representative water utility customer
prefers less frequent outages at home, shorter average outage lengths, and a lower monthly
cost paid to the dedicated Water Infrastructure Investment Fund. Higher rates of investment
in renewable energy use by the utility and reuse water pipe infrastructure as well as greater
notification of planned outages positively impact the same customer.
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tion of MWTP for all are given in Table 3.3 (models L1 and N1) and Table
3.4 (models (F1 and W1). The median, mean, standard deviation, minimum
and maximum MWTP are reported for each model. The first column for each
model includes the entire MWTP distribution; the second and third columns
drop two and ten percent of observations, respectively.27 Estimated MWTP
values are calculated for all four models using conditional individual coefficients estimated using the procedure described by Train (2009). These coefficients are considered a closer approximation of the individual’s true, underlying preferences by Greene et al. (2005) and are conditional on their observed
choices.28 The individual-specific coefficient wn is reported as the MWTP for
the W1 model, consistent with the theoretical model.
If estimated MWTP from all four models are considered to provide a realistic range of the underlying MWTP, then the median MWTP per month to
avoid an additional outage at home over the next five years ranges from $0.54
to $0.92. The median MWTP per month to avoid an increase in the average
outage length of one hour ranges from $0.75 to $1.01; the median MWTP per
month for a one-percent increase the amount of urban greenspace irrigated
with reuse water ranges from $0.12 to $0.17. The median MWTP per month for
a one-percent increase in the amount of renewable energy used by the utility
ranges from $0.11 to $0.15. Consistently across models, the largest standard
deviation is for the frequency of outages experienced at home, which is the
primary attribute describing individual experience with deteriorating pipes.
Comparing the central moments and minimum/maximum MWTP estimates
between models in Table 3.4, the similarity between the distributions of the
WTP-space (W1) model and preference-space fixed cost (F1) model is quite no27

There is no standard for dropping a percentage of extreme outliers although some researchers advocate this practice instead of using a bounded distribution (Hess et al., 2005).
28
The coefficients represent the mean and standard deviation for customers who would make
the same choices with the same set of choices.
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table. Hole & Kolstad (2012) also find that the mean WTP estimates from the
WTP-space models are much more similar to the WTP estimates from the basic
MNL model and the mixed logit with a fixed cost parameter.29
As seen in Table 3.4, the WTP-space model, W1, and preference-space model
F1 with fixed cost have the smallest, and very similar, standard deviations for
all attributes. The tighter distribution interval for the MWTP in WTP-space
is consistent with recent papers (Train & Weeks, 2005; Sonnier et al., 2007;
Scarpa et al., 2008; Balcombe et al., 2009; Hensher & Greene, 2011; Hole &
Kolstad, 2012; Scarpa et al., 2012; Lanz & Provins, 2013).30 Note that the standard deviation for the Reuse attribute is much smaller than for the Frequency
and Length attributes. If WTP-space results are interpreted as the MWTP with
a scalar cost, this might imply that individuals have more homogeneous preferences towards investing in reuse pipe infrastructure as compared to investing
in drinking pipe infrastructure. This may reflect that urban greenspace is more
of a public good enjoyed by all, while drinking pipe infrastructure is related to
service experienced by the individual and service levels vary according to the
local infrastructure conditions.
As expected, given distributional properties, Models N1 and L1 exhibit extreme outliers (see Table 3.3). When it comes to extreme MWTP values in the
distribution, the cause is primarily traced back to marginal utility of income
coefficients very close to zero (Scarpa et al., 2008). Unsurprisingly then, the
normal distribution, which spans zero and can allow for draws close to zero
in both the positive and negative quadrants, displays the most extreme values
29

Hole & Kolstad (2012) conclude that estimating a random cost and correlated attributes
has more impact on model fit than the difference between preference-space and WTP-space
estimation.
30
Kernel density graphs visually demonstrate tighter MWTP distributions in Scarpa et al.
(2008) and Hole & Kolstad (2012), while ordered observation graphs are used to compare the
magnitude of extreme outliers (Hensher & Greene, 2011).
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at both the positive and negative ends of the MWTP distribution. I compare
the spread under conditions of dropping two and ten percent of extreme outliers for all models as Hess et al. (2005) recommends.31 With L1, removing
ten percent of the distribution eliminates most of the theoretically incorrect
signs on the Length and Frequency attributes and the MWTP distribution is
constrained to a reasonable level. Two percent is actually sufficient to correct
the negative sign for the Length attribute. With N1, removing ten percent is
not enough to truly correct the issue.32 The mean MWTP for the fixed cost and
WTP-space models do not change even as MWTP values at the distribution
ends are dropped, confirming a lack of influence due to outliers.
Ordered observation scatter plots allow visual comparison of the positive
and negative ends of the MWTP distribution. Figure 2 and Figure 3 focus
on the lowest and highest 60 MWTP estimated observations from the W1 and
F1 models, using the Frequency attribute. These two models display no presence of extreme outliers and, most notably, have remarkably similar estimated
MWTPs at each end.33

3.4.1 Income validity
Various studies using preference-space and contingent valuation models have
shown income and MWTP to have a positive relationship (Jacobsen & Hanley,
31

They do not recommend a certain percentage of outliers, just that they be dropped.
Often theoretically incorrect signs are assumed to reflect mis-specification of preferences. I
suggest that, for this data, theoretically incorrect signs reflect adaptive behaviors. Individuals
prefer to adapt to worsening service levels and not face higher water bills, rather than they
actually prefer more outages.
33
Ordered observation scatter plots were also generated for all four models together. As expected, models L1 and N1 had extreme values. The three most extreme MWTP values for N1,
both positive and negative, were not included because their magnitude obscured the information provided by the rest of the observations. The values were $417, $200, and $135 (positive
end) and -$118, -$135, and -$367 (negative end). These graphs are available upon request.
32
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2009; Broberg, 2010). Using second-stage regression techniques, income has
been found to be significantly related to MWTP (Campbell, 2007; Abildtrup et
al., 2013).34 While many studies have noted that the tighter intervals seen in
the WTP-space models are a positive development, there has been a lack of
validity testing against theoretical predictions of behavior such as the income
effect on MWTP.35 The MWTP distribution is examined using different income
levels as a measure of construct validity recommended by (Arrow et al., 1993;
Freeman III, 2003).
MWTP is influenced by the variation in MUI resulting from a random cost
parameter, which implies that individuals are affected by an extra dollar differently. Donaldson et al. (2002) argues that the MUI is responsible for most of the
variation in MWTP for health care interventions and that MWTP more reflects
individuals’ ability-to-pay for a health care intervention. Economic theory predicts the MUI should be decreasing with income so higher income individuals
should have a smaller λn than lower income individuals. Findings show this
with both cost estimated using lognormal and normal distributions, although
the effect is greater for the lognormal distribution.36
Median MWTP by income categories is provided in Table 3.5. Quantiles and
median MWTP are reported as they are less affected by outliers caused due to
the distribution (Scarpa et al., 2012); it has already been shown that Models N1
and to a lesser extent, L1, have extreme outliers. Three income categories were
34

Abildtrup et al. (2013) found income to be significant both positively and negatively depending on what type of forest recreation was being valued; it was never insignificant.
35
Sonnier et al. (2007) find the WTP-space models more closely approximate the true WTP in
their research using simulated data, which could be considered a form of convergent validity
testing.
36
I test this by looking at the mean MUI for the seven income categories for model L1 (lognormal) / N1 (normal), respectively. Mean λ = -1.12 -0.38 ($18,000), -1.04 -0.37 ($30,000),
-0.76 -0.32 ($50,000), -0.74 -0.32 ($80,000), -0.48 -0.24 ($125,000), -0.69 -0.28 ($175,000), and
-0.39 -0.25 ($220,000).
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used.37 Low income is defined as an annual income less than $40,000; twentynine percent of households fell in this category. Forty-six percent of respondent
households are defined as mid-income, between $40,000 to $99,999. Twentyfour percent of households are considered high-income with an annual income
greater than $100,000.38
What is immediately noticeable is that the estimated median MWTP for
all attributes in Models N1 and L1 are increasing in income and the variation
between the 25th and 75th quantiles is increasing. This result is attributable
to the random cost parameter. Model F1 shows small positive income effect
in estimated median MWTP. The variation between the quantiles doesn’t increase but each quantile is increasing in income. But for Model W1, the effect
is almost imperceptible for the Reuse and Green attributes and only slightly
increasing for the Length and Frequency attributes, even less than Model F1
where the cost is fixed. The variation between quantiles doesn’t change, nor
does the MWTP at each quantile increase much with income. The distribution
appears practically the same for the low income group as for the high income
group. Across all attributes the increase in MWTP for Model W1 between lowto high-income ranges from one to thirteen cents while average estimated income increases from $27,000 (low-income) to $146,000 (high-income). For example, the median MWTP to avoid one additional outage at home increases
from $0.48 to $0.76 to $1.46 for Model L1 and from $0.79 to $0.92 to $1.08 for
Model F1. For Model W1, the increase with income is $0.86 to $0.90 to $1.03.
There is a two-cent increase in median MWTP across income categories for
37

Of the 850 respondent households, 70 did not indicate an income level and are not included
in this table.
38
These income classifications were chosen in part due to the number of survey respondents
in each income category. Eight percent of survey respondents had an annual household income
of less than $19,999 and eight percent had annual income of $150,000 or more. The low, middle,
and high income categories used correspond roughly to income descriptions of working class,
middle-class, and upper-middle-class income levels.

86

Chapter 3. Preference-space and WTP-space models
the attributes describing increased infrastructure investment in reuse water
irrigation.
Scenarios were created and monthly Infrastructure Investment Fund
amounts were calculated using the median figures for each income category
(see Table 3.6). Every water utility customer faces the same investment fund
amount on their monthly bill; using the median MWTP values for low-, mid-,
and high-income groups allows water utility managers to understand the bill
impact by income groups. Four scenarios were created simulating investment
scenarios that focused on deteriorating pipe infrastructure locally (Scenario 1),
deteriorating pipe infrastructure in other parts of Albuquerque (Scenario 2),
failing infrastructure and water scarcity (Scenario 3), and a focus on water
reuse infrastructure and renewable energy (Scenario 4). The goals of each scenario vary and are reflected in the different levels changes to each attribute.
Monthly amounts are reported for each income group. The first thing to note, is
that with the exception of two high-income WTP values, the monthly amounts
for all income groups and all models are less than $15, the highest cost level
presented in the survey. Two high-income WTP values are outside that range
due to the log-normal distribution for the cost attribute in Model L1.
Second, Models N1 and L1 with the heterogeneous MUI reflect the greatest
spread between the low-income and high-income groups for all scenarios. Models F1 and W1 show relatively small increases between the monthly amounts
for each scenario as income increases. Again, notably the scenario amounts are
almost identical for F1 and W1, reflecting the similarity of the MWTP distribution. For example, the range of monthly investment amounts calculated using
W1(F1) median MWTP values ranges from $6.49 ($6.41) for low income individuals to $7.42 ($7.46) for high income individuals (Scenario 1) or $6.50 ($6.55)
for low-income and $7.65 ($7.58) for high-income (Scenario 2). In comparison,
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the range for the same scenarios using L1 model results shows an income effect, where WTP is increasing in income from $5.08 to $11.31 for Scenario 1
and $4.82 to $11.64 for Scenario 2.
The calculated scenario amounts appear contradictory when compared
against respondents’ self-reported level of hardship with higher water bills
(see Table 3.7). Individuals reported the amount of hardship they would face
from water bill increases of $5, $10, and $15 due to infrastructure investment.
More low income individuals report hardship at every level than do high income individuals which supports the theory that MUI decreases in income. For
instance, 25% of low-income individuals reported that an extra $5 per month
would cause ‘no hardship’, while 50% and 68% of mid- and high-income individuals reported the same; for an increase of $15 per month, one percent of low
income individuals reported ‘no hardship’ as compared to 29% of high-income
individuals.
Approximately 70% of high-income individuals report that an extra $10 on
their monthly water bill would cause a little or no hardship, while only 21% of
low-income individuals report the same. Yet their calculated monthly WTP for
Scenarios 1 through 4 are very similar, thus appearing to be lower than what
high-income individuals state that they can pay with little hardship or higher
than low-income individuals stated hardship level. For instance, high-income
individuals would face an additional amount of $7.42, $7.65, $11.62, and $13.49
under Scenarios 1 through 4, respectively. Low-income individuals would face
an additional amount that is only $1.00 to $1.50 less in each scenario.
Interestingly, low income individuals would face a higher monthly bill impact in all 4 scenarios if median MWTP values from Model F1 or W1 with the
fixed cost are used as compared to the monthly bill impact using the median
results from Models N1 or L1 where MUI is allowed to vary. The assumption
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of a constant MUI adversely impacts these households.39

3.4.2 Measuring distributional impact across income category
Many cost-benefit analyses use MWTP to analyze how benefits are distributed.
Typically MWTP is used as an indication of how much an individual values an
improvement in an environmental good, but that would lead to the assumption
that high-income individuals receive a much greater benefit from pipe infrastructure investments than low income individuals do. Map 3.1 shows that the
median household income is lower in the Census tracts with the greatest level
of deteriorating infrastructure. A lower MWTP in those Census tracts may
reflect a willingness to adapt to worsening conditions as a reflection of their
ability-to-pay, but the benefits of improving infrastructure would actually be
greater than in tracts with good infrastructure.
Deteriorating infrastructure typically is a bigger issue in older and
centrally-located neighborhoods in cities where median household incomes are
often lower. This is certainly the case in Albuquerque as seen in Map 3.1 which
depicts the median household income of each Census tract with the incidence
of pipe breaks reported by the water utility. Census tracts with darker colors
have higher incidences of reported pipe breaks over the five years preceding
the survey. The dots represent the size of the median household income in
each Census tract and increase with income. The map shows that, in general,
median household income tends to be smaller in the Census tracts with the
highest incidence of pipe breaks. Map 3.2 shows the distribution of survey respondent household income levels, which resembles the average Census tract
39

Conversely, assuming a constant MUI likely positively impacts high-income households by
understating their marginal rate of substitution.
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income patterns seen in the accompanying map.
In order to measure social benefits of investing in water utility infrastructure, one approach discussed in Loomis (2011) is to weight MWTP values by
the ratio of the median income of each income group to the population median
income. By overweighting the benefits to low income groups and underweighting the benefits to high income groups, the minimizes the impact of ability-topay on MWTP estimates. I extend this to a more localized approach for each
household by weighting each household’s MWTP for an investment attribute
by the ratio of their household income to the median household income for
owner-occupied units within their Census tract (‘the income ratio’).40 Thus the
weighted benefits to each individual are relative to the Census tract in which
they live.
Table 3.8 compares the unweighted and weighted mean MWTP estimates
from Model W1 for all infrastructure investment attributes. The unweighted
mean MWTP estimates show little to no increase as income increases, reflecting the absence of the income effect. For instance, the estimated mean MWTP
by income category of avoiding an extra outage at home is $0.78, $0.86, and
$0.92 as income categories increase from $20,000 to $70,000 to $175,000 respectively. If the unweighted MWTP is considered the social benefit of the
investment, then the benefit of avoiding one more outage to a high-income individual would be more than the benefit to a low-income individual. However,
the household income of the wealthier person could be six to seven time larger
than for the low-income household. So, I’d argue that the $0.92 MWTP is less
valuable to that high-income individual than $0.78 is to the low-income household, which would suggest that MWTP should be weighted by income in some
40

Using the median household income for owner-occupied units is a more conservative
weighting scheme since that median income of home owners is typically greater than the median household income when renters are included.
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manner. Weighted MWTP estimates indicate that the net benefits received by
income category are $1.81, $0.94, and $0.54 to avoid an extra outage at home.
The estimated mean MWTP for an additional 1% of urban greenspace irrigated
with reuse water changes by one cent across income categories using the unweighted MWTP. However, the mean weighted MWTP indicate social benefits
of $0.34, $0.17, and $0.09 as income increases.
Table 3.9 shows the impact of weighting estimates for the WTP-space W1
model and the preference-space lognormal cost L1 models for all observations
within one Census tract in the south-central part of Albuquerque experiencing
above average deteriorating infrastructure and with a range of income levels.
The water utility recorded 46 pipe breaks in the five years preceding the survey
and the median household income for owner-occupied housing units is $62,054.
There were five survey households in this Census tract, whose characteristics
are fairly similar with household income showing the greatest variation. The
income ratio for these households ranges from 0.48 to 3.55. Two individuals
have very similar MWTP to avoid an extra outage at home, but different incomes. Individual A has a MWTP of $0.79 and a household income of approximately $75,000; 1.29 is their income ratio. Individual B has a MWTP of $0.65
and a household income of approximately $220,000; 3.55 is their income ratio. Weighting the estimated MWTP provides a clearer picture of the benefit
of one less outage at home in relation to their income level: $0.62 and $0.18,
respectively.
The weights are one way of relating estimated MWTP and social benefits, as
similar infrastructure benefits are received by multiple households in a Census
tract when a failing pipe is repaired. However, the ability-to-pay varies and
thus the MUI surely varies as well. One interpretation is that based on their
observed choices and estimated preferences, the weighted MWTP values are a
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more accurate reflection of the value of the infrastructure investment.

3.5 Conclusion
This paper estimated four mixed logit models, three preference-space models
with normal (N1) and lognormal (L1) distributions of the cost attribute, plus
a fixed (F1) cost attribute and one WTP-space model (W1). There were three
purposes to the paper. The first is that while comparisons between mixed logit
preference-space and WTP-space models have been studied, the literature is
still growing and has not demonstrated overwhelmingly that one method is
better than the other (Train & Weeks, 2005; Sonnier et al., 2007; Scarpa et al.,
2008; Balcombe et al., 2009; Hensher & Greene, 2011; Scarpa et al., 2012; Lanz
& Provins, 2013).
Not all researchers conclude that WTP-space models are an improvement
over the preference-space model. Hensher & Greene (2011) note that tradeoffs exist between models that fit the data better and those that result in more
realistic estimates of the MWTP distribution. Hole & Kolstad (2012) conclude
that the difference between the two models matters less than specifying the
cost attribute random with a non-zero covariance matrix. Scarpa et al. (2008)
note the WTP-space model allows a heterogeneous scale term over individuals
that is separate from heterogeneous WTP estimates.41 This study contributes
to the general body of research comparing these models using a dataset on preferences for water utility infrastructure. The second purpose is to use validity
testing of the MWTP median measures from each model by income category
to establish a baseline for behavioral equivalence between the WTP-space dis41

Hensher & Greene (2011) find that including scale in a preference-space model results in
more similar distributions between preference-space and WTP-space distributions of WTP.
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tribution and the preference-space distributions under different assumptions
about the MUI. The final purpose weights the MWTP estimates to get a clearer
picture of social benefits.
One of the more interesting results is how similar the estimated MWTP
and distributions are between Models W1 and F1, while the two models that
allow for a heterogeneous MUI (L1 and N1) fit this data better than either
Model W1 or F1. The mixed logit model with a lognormal cost (L1) provided
the best fit overall but has a dispersed MWTP distribution. Consistent with
several other studies the calculated MWTP distributions are much tighter and
the median MWTP values are more conservative in the WTP-space model (W1),
similar to the fixed cost model. Scarpa et al. (2008) argue that either a fixed
cost coefficient or estimating in WTP-space will ensure a bounded distribution,
although a tight distribution can lessen heterogeneity in MWTP that exists in
the population; this is a good description of my results.
I interpret the results from the WTP-space model as an indication that estimating the heterogeneous scale cost parameter separately from MWTP heterogeneity acts to fix the cost in the resulting MWTP estimates. As a result, there
Model W1 shows little relationship between increasing income and MWTP estimates. Economic theory and empirical research indicate that MWTP values
should increase with income for a normal good, as occurs with the preferencespace models that have a random cost. The WTP-space median MWTP increase with income category but only slightly and are more comparable to the
increases under fixed cost assumptions. Hypothetical infrastructure investment scenarios are calculated using median MWTP for each attribute by income categories. The monthly amounts calculated using the WTP-space model
estimates contradict individuals’ self-reported hardship levels when faced with
increased water bills.
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GIS-mapping techniques show a relationship by Census tract between lower
median household income level and more deteriorating pipe infrastructure.
Use of a weighting ratio reduces the influence of ability-to-pay and improves
understanding of the social benefits of infrastructure renewal projects across
Census tracts. The weighted benefits indicate a greater value to lower income
individuals, as expected considering the relationship between deteriorating infrastructure and median income.
The WTP-space model may be a promising method, however it does not appear to be significantly different from just estimating a preference-space model
with a fixed cost parameter. The MWTP distribution from the WTP-space fails
an income validity test, which is problematic from a theoretical standpoint if,
indeed, the cost scale coefficient is heterogeneous. The preference-space model
with a lognormal cost parameter is found to be the best fitting with a MWTP
distribution that increases in income. Between two to ten percent of the distributional outliers must be dropped if negative MWTP are considered theroetically incorrect, which is also problematic since the majority of the dropped
observations are from high-income individuals. Using a weighting scheme that
attempts to relate the social benefits received to income and local infrastructure conditions is one suggestion to alleviate the problematic issues with both
models.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
Mean
Attribute

Description

or %

S.d.

Age

Age of respondent, in years; continuous

54

16

Female

Respondent is female; 1=yes, 0=no

0.54

0.50

Hispanic

Respondent is Hispanic; 1=yes, 0=no

0.33

0.47

HSDiploma

Highest level of education is high

0.15

0.36

0.30

0.46

0.55

0.50

0.31

0.46

13.4

14.2

0.03

0.18

0.83

0.38

0.14

0.35

school diploma or GED; 1=yes, 0=no
AA

Highest level of education is some years
of college or an AA degree; 1=yes, 0=no

BA

Highest level of education is a Bachelor’s
degree or higher; 1=yes, 0=no

HomeOut

Respondent experienced an outage at home
in previous 5 years; 1=yes, 0=no

TractOuta

Number of pipe breaks in Census tract
in previous 5 years; continuous

Water0

0% pct of property is watered in
typical summer month; 1=yes, 0=no

Water50

1-50% pct of property is watered in
typical summer month; 1=yes, 0=no

Water100

51-100% pct of property is watered in
typical summer month; 1=yes, 0=no

Children

Children live in the household; 1=yes, 0=no

0.30

0.46

HHb

Household has aytpical water use; 1=yes, 0=no

0.38

0.48

NM

Years lived in NM; continuous

33

19

Address

Years lived in current home; continuous

15

14

Westside

Lives west of Rio Grande River; 1=yes, 0=no

0.27

0.44

South

Lives in south Albuquerque; 1=yes, 0=no

0.24

0.43

North

Lives in northeast Albuquerque; 1=yes, 0=no

0.49

0.50
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
Mean
Attribute

Description

or %

S.d.

a

Pipe breaks reported by ABCWUA for five years prior to the survey, aggregated by Census Tract

b

Water outages at home may affect certain sub-populations differently, i.e. a stay-at-home parent,

a home business, or someone with a sensitive health issue.
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Table 3.2: Results Preference- and WTP-space models
Attribute

Frequency
Freq sd
Length
Length sd
Reuse
Reuse sd
Green
Green sd
Notify
FreqLen
FreqLen(se)
Cost
ln(Cost)b
Cost sd
Cost (λn )
Variance
in scale (τ )
Parameters
Observations
LL score
AIC
BIC

Preference-space
F1
N1
L1
Coefficient (se) Coefficient (se) Coefficient (se)

WTP-spacea
W1
Coefficient (se)

-15.47(1.76)***
20.80(2.87)***
-13.98(1.44)***
11.30(2.00)***
2.95(0.33)***
3.10(0.58)***
2.58(0.40)***
5.97(0.75)***
1.14(0.15)***
-0.006***
(0.002)
-0.18(0.02)***

-0.83(0.08)***
1.14(0.12)***
-0.76(0.05)***
0.65(0.10)***
0.16(0.02)***
0.16(0.03)***
0.14(0.02)***
0.33(0.03)***
0.06(0.01)***
-0.0004***
(0.0001)

-23.87(4.07)***
29.41(5.79)***
-23.66(3.78)***
17.90(3.89)***
4.70(0.78)***
6.00(1.21)***
4.11(0.76)***
9.32(1.69)***
1.97(0.34)***
-0.007*
(0.004)
-0.32(0.05)***
0.34(0.06)***

-22.48(3.12)***
27.94(5.34)***
-21.91(2.90)***
15.96(3.32)***
4.28(0.63)***
5.19(0.99)***
4.10(0.70)***
8.36(1.23)***
1.64(0.26)***
-0.003
(0.004)
-1.93(0.20)***
1.86(0.35)***

-1.51(0.20)***
0.74(0.35)**
11
3317
-1709.2031
3440.4062
3506.5566

12
3317
-1665.157
3354.314
3426.4781

12
3317
-1651.295
3326.59
3398.7541

Significance levels *** ď 0.01, ** ď 0.05, * ď 0.10
Coefficients on non-cost attributes are interpretable as the mean MWTP.
c
Using Revelt & Train (1998), Cost (Model L1) is calculated mean=0.825,
a

median=0.145, sd=1.925
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Table 3.3: Models N1 & L1: MWTP ($) distribution with 0%, 2%, and 10% of
outliers trimmed
N1 (Cost normal)
L1 (Cost lognormal)
100%
98%
90% 100% 98% 90%
Monthly MWTP to avoid one additional outage at home over next five years
Median 0.54
0.54
0.54 0.77
0.77 0.77
Mean
0.97
0.86
0.83 1.30
1.26 1.15
St. dev. 21.99
2.18
0.85 1.95
1.44 1.12
Max.
417.20 16.38 4.04 25.69 7.46 4.17
Min.
-367.37 -11.87 -1.57 -12.86 -1.24 -0.08
Monthly MWTP to avoid a 1-hour increase in average outage length
Median 0.60
0.60
0.60 1.01
1.01 1.01
Mean
1.07
0.92
0.84 1.39
1.32 1.24
St. dev. 14.02
2.35
1.02 1.66
1.28 1.09
Max.
315.67 13.52 5.34 26.83 5.98 4.03
Min.
-117.91 -11.50 -2.28 -0.66
0.01 0.05
Monthly MWTP for a 1% increase in urban greenspace irrigated with
reuse water
Median 0.12
0.12
0.12 0.16
0.16 0.16
Mean
0.13
0.16
0.16 0.24
0.25 0.22
St. dev. 1.60
0.44
0.20 0.61
0.28 0.21
Max.
22.28
2.94
0.92 3.28
1.50 0.87
Min.
-18.86
-2.69
-0.37 -14.39 -0.34 0.003
Monthly MWTP for a 1% increase in energy use by water utility
that is from renewable sources
Median 0.11
0.11
0.11 0.11
0.11 0.11
Mean
-0.14
0.08
0.12 0.24
0.24 0.21
St. dev. 5.10
0.59
0.21 0.53
0.41 0.27
Max.
58.80
2.90
0.64 2.55
1.83 1.25
Min.
-86.55
-5.13
-0.71 -6.16
-0.98 -0.32
Obs.

850

834

765

850

98

834

765
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Table 3.4: Model F1 and W1: MWTP ($) distribution with 0%, 2%, and 10% of
outliers trimmed
F1 (Cost fixed)
W1 (WTP-space)
100% 98% 90% 100% 98% 90%
Monthly MWTP to avoid one additional outage at home over next five years
Median 0.90
0.90 0.91 0.92
0.92 0.92
Mean
0.86
0.86 0.87 0.85
0.85 0.87
St. dev. 0.64
0.61 0.53 0.64
0.61 0.53
Max.
2.62
2.18 1.70 2.76
1.97 1.70
Min.
-1.26 -0.63 -0.25 -1.19 -0.78 -0.30
Monthly MWTP to avoid a 1-hour increase in average outage length
Median 0.76
0.76 0.76 0.75
0.75 0.75
Mean
0.77
0.77 0.77 0.76
0.76 0.76
St. dev. 0.28
0.27 0.23 0.32
0.29 0.25
Max.
1.62
1.43 1.26 1.80
1.50 1.30
Min.
-0.40 0.10 0.34 -0.73 0.08 0.29
Monthly MWTP for a 1% increase in urban greenspace irrigated with
reuse water
Median 0.17
0.17 0.17 0.16
0.16 0.16
Mean
0.16
0.16 0.16 0.15
0.15 0.16
St. dev. 0.08
0.07 0.06 0.07
0.06 0.05
Max.
0.38
0.31 0.28 0.43
0.30 0.26
Min.
-0.21 -0.06 0.04 -0.11 -0.02 0.04
Monthly MWTP for a 1% increase in energy use by water utility
that is from renewable sources
Median 0.15
0.15 ‘ 0.15 0.15
0.15 0.15
Mean
0.14
0.14 0.15 0.14
0.14 0.15
St. dev. 0.21
0.20 0.17 0.20
0.20 0.17
Max.
0.61
0.52 0.45 0.65
0.55 0.45
Min.
-0.44 -0.38 -0.21 -0.44 -0.35 -0.22
Obs.

850

834

765

850

834

99

765
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Table 3.5: MWTP ($) per month, distribution by income
category
Income: Less than $39,999
Percentile

F1

N1

L1

W1

Income: $40,000 to $99,999
F1

N1

L1

W1

To avoid one more home outage over next 5 years
25th

0.38

0.22

0.08

0.40

0.43

0.27

0.12

0.40

50th

0.79

0.47

0.48

0.86

0.92

0.57

0.76

0.90

75th

1.32

1.26

1.83

1.32

1.39

1.40

2.11

1.37

S.d.

0.66

8.02

1.69

0.65

0.62

22.38

1.55

0.63

To avoid a 1-hour increase in longer average outage
25th

0.56

0.35

0.12

0.51

0.57

0.34

0.22

0.55

50th

0.71

0.48

0.54

0.69

0.76

0.63

1.03

0.77

75th

0.94

0.95

1.56

0.96

0.97

1.10

1.94

0.99

S.d.

0.28

4.93

1.28

0.30

0.29

9.82

1.35

0.33

1% more urban greenspace irrigated with reuse water
25th

0.11

0.04

0.02

0.11

0.12

0.05

0.03

0.12

50th

0.15

0.10

0.11

0.15

0.18

0.11

0.17

0.16

75th

0.20

0.21

0.31

0.19

0.21

0.24

0.37

0.20

S.d.

0.08

0.36

0.37

0.06

0.08

1.93

0.33

0.07

1% increase in renewable energy use
25th

0.00

0.02

0.01

0.03

-0.03

-0.03

0.01

-0.02

50th

0.15

0.10

0.07

0.16

0.15

0.11

0.13

0.15

75th

0.31

0.24

0.34

0.31

0.29

0.27

0.41

0.30

S.d.

0.21

1.90

0.45

0.20

0.21

6.96

0.57

0.20

Income: $100,000 or more
F1

N1

L1

W1

To avoid one more home outage over next 5 years
25th

0.46

0.25

0.25

0.43

50th

1.08

0.90

1.46

1.03
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Table 3.5: MWTP ($) per month, distribution by income
category
75th

1.43

1.58

2.45

1.44

S.d.

0.64

34.03

2.19

0.66

To avoid a 1-hour longer average outage
25th

0.62

0.38

0.47

0.57

50th

0.80

0.74

1.33

0.82

75th

1.03

1.54

2.78

1.03

S.d.

0.28

25.98

1.56

0.32

1% more urban greenspace irrigated with reuse water
25th

0.11

0.05

0.07

0.10

50th

0.17

0.14

0.22

0.17

75th

0.22

0.31

0.46

0.21

S.d.

0.08

2.10

0.36

0.07

1% increase in renewable energy use
25th

-0.01

-0.07

0.01

-0.03

50th

0.17

0.12

0.22

0.16

75th

0.33

0.33

0.51

0.34

S.d.

0.21

4.58

0.53

0.22

Reported quantiles characterize the MWTP distribution per income category.
There are 227 low-income, 356 mid-income, and 187 high-income individuals.
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Table 3.6: Infrastructure Investment Scenarios Estimated WTP/month per
Ratepayer, by Income Category
Scenario by Income Levela

F1

N1

L1

W1

Scenario 1: ´20% notification of planned outages, avoid
`3 hours average outage length, avoid `2 home outages, `10% in urban
greenspace irrigated with reuse water
Low Income
$6.41
$4.38
$5.08
$6.49
Mid Income
$7.12
$5.13
$7.91
$6.91
High Income
$7.46
$6.62
$11.31 $7.42
Scenario 2: Repairs in other parts of Albuquerque... Avoid `6 hours avg outage
length, avoid `1 home outage, `10% urban greenspace irrigated with reuse water
Low Income
$6.55
$4.35
$4.82
$6.50
Mid Income
$7.28
$5.45
$8.64
$7.12
High Income
$7.58
$6.74
$11.64 $7.65
Scenario 3: Failing infrastructure locally ` water scarcity...avoid `1
hour avg outage length, `10% notification of planned outages, avoid `5 home
outages, `25% greenspace irrigated with reuse water, `5% renewable energy use
Low Income
$9.76
$6.33
$6.74
$10.14
Mid Income
$11.21 $7.28
$10.53 $10.62
High Income
$11.90 $9.94
$16.33 $11.62
Scenario 4: Renewable Portfolio Standards policies...
avoid `3 hours average outage length, avoid `1 outage at home,
`40% greenspace irrigated with reuse water, `20% renewable energy use
Low Income
$11.92 $7.91
$7.90
$12.13
Mid Income
$13.40 $9.06
$13.25 $12.61
High Income
$13.68 $11.12 $18.65 $13.49
Low income: Less than $39,999; Mid income: $40,000 to $99,999;
High income: $100,000 or more
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Table 3.7: Financial Burden of Infrastructure Investment

$5/ month
$10/ month
$15/ month

(L)b

None
(M)c (H)d

Level of Hardship
Small
Some
(L) (M) (H) (L) (M) (H)

26
6
1

50
14
9

27
15
5

68
42
29

28
32
14

20
27
22

20
24
14

12
27
21

5
17
18

Mod./ Great
(L) (M) (H)
28
55
79

11
27
56

7
15
31

a

Low income (L): Less than $39,999; Mid income (M): $40,000 to $99,999;
High income (H): $100,000 or more
The survey question asked respondents to indicate the level of hardship that
would result should the water utility increase the monthly bill by the
stated amount. Levels are None, Small, Some, Moderate, Great Hardship.

Table 3.8: Unweighted and Weighted Mean MWTP estimates (Model W1)

Freq.
Length
Reuse
Green
Notify

Low Income
W1
W1norma
Mean(sd) Mean(sd)

Mid Income
W1
W1norm
Mean(sd) Mean(sd)

High Income
W1
W1norm
Mean(sd) Mean(sd)

0.78(0.65)
0.72(0.30)
0.15(0.06)
0.15(0.20)
0.06(0)

0.86(0.63)
0.76(0.33)
0.16(0.07)
0.13(0.21)
0.06(0)

0.92(0.66)
0.82(0.32)
0.16(0.07)
0.15(0.22)
0.06(0)

1.81(1.79)
1.63(0.90)
0.34(0.20)
0.34(0.55)
0.14(0.05)

a

0.94(0.82)
0.80(0.45)
0.17(0.10)
0.14(0.23)
0.06(0.02)

The column W1norm reports WTP-space estimates weighted by
the ratio of respondent’s household income to the median
Census tract owner-occupied household income (‘income ratio’).

103

0.54(0.44)
0.48(0.25)
0.09(0.05)
0.09(0.14)
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Table 3.9: Social benefits (weighted MWTP $), Census Tract 5.02 in South
Central Albuquerque
Frequency
Length
Reuse
Green
Gender/Ethnicity
Age
Education
Water
Income
IncRatioc

Frequency
Length
Reuse
Green
Gender/Ethnicity
Age
Education
Water
Income
IncRatioc

Frequency
Length
Reuse
Green
Gender/Ethnicity
Age
Education
Water
Income
IncRatioc

Id: No. MH3C9FUA
W1
W1na L1
L1na
0.74 0.57
2.83 2.19
0.44 0.34
1.45 1.12
0.32 0.25
0.78 0.60
0.09 0.07
-0.03 -0.02
Male, Non-Hispanic
40 yrs
B.A.
1 - 25% of property
$60,000 to $99,999
1.29
Id: No. MK3ET96A
W1
W1n
L1
L1n
0.99 0.49
5.21 2.59
1.25 0.62
6.57 3.26
-0.02 -0.01 -0.53 -0.26
0.00 0.00
0.39 0.19
Male, Non-Hispanic
34 yrs
M.A.
1 - 25% of property
$100,000 to $149,999
2.01
Id: No. UHBPMEBA
W1
W1n
L1
L1n
0.79 0.62
0.34 0.26
1.10 0.85
0.41 0.32
0.16 0.11
0.03 0.03
0.14 0.13
0.08 0.06
Female, Non-Hispanic
48 yrs
M.A.
1 - 25% of property
$60,000 to $99,999
1.29

Id: No. BM4XPE9A
W1
W1n L1
L1n
-0.36 -0.73 0.05 0.11
0.26 0.53 0.08 0.16
0.10 0.20 0.02 0.04
0.22 0.45 0.01 0.03
Female, Non-Hispanic
60 yrs
M.A.
26-50% of property
$20,000 to $39,999
0.48
Id: No. KJMY8GHA
W1
W1n L1
L1n
0.65 0.18 0.09 0.03
0.74 0.21 0.09 0.03
0.11 0.03 0.01 0.00
0.12 0.03 0.02 0.01
Female, Non-Hispanic
45 yrs
B.A.
26-50% of property
$200,000 or more
3.55

ABCWUA reported 46 pipe breaks in Census tract 5.02 between 2004-2009.
a
Models W1n and L1n were normalized using the income ratio.
c
Income ratio = Individual HH income / Tract median HH (owner-occupies) income
Median HH income for owner-occupied housing in tract 5.02 was $62,054.
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Figure 3.1: Median HH income (Census) and ABCWUA-reported outages,
2004-2009
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Figure 3.2: Respondent income (interpolated across service area by Kriging)
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Figure 3.3: Negative end of MWTP distribution for WTP-space and F1 fixed
cost preference-space models, Frequency attribute
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Figure 3.4: Positive end of MWTP distribution for WTP-space and F1 fixed cost
preference-space models, Frequency attribute
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Chapter 4
Water consumption by
irrigation-only customers under
an irrigation budget program in
a southwestern U.S. water utility

4.1 Introduction
As water utilities transition from using unsustainable withdrawals from underground
aquifers as a primary water supply to more sustainable surface water, they must account for the water they use.1 An initial quantity of acre-feet of water is diverted,
treated, and distributed throughout the system for consumption. At the end of the
utility’s service cycle, a prescribed number of acre feet of water must be cleaned to environmental standards and returned to the river under return flow requirements for
use downstream or to meet interstate water compacts. Consumptive water demand is
1

Examples include the water utilities that service Albuquerque (NM), Fresno (CA), Chicago

(IL)
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the percentage of water used that is not returned to the river. Landscape irrigation
is an example of consumptive use of water resources. The research questions in this
chapter focus on estimating the price elasticity of demand and the characteristics that
influence demand under a irrigation water budget program whose goal is to optimally
manage consumptive water use.
Albuquerque Bernalillo County Water Utility Authority (ABCWUA) provides water
service to ratepayers in Albuquerque,NM. It is a representative utility for a metropolitan city in the southwestern U.S. facing the need the maximize water use efficiency
due to recurring drought conditions, population growth, and a switch to a surface water supply. The San Juan Chama (SJC) project was finished in 2008 to provide a more
sustainable water supply using surface water from the Rio Grande River to reduce
the reliance on an overused underground aquifer. The SJC project involves a series of
tunnels, pipelines, and intakes that transfer water from southern Colorado’s San Juan
River (part of the Colorado River Basin system) to New Mexico’s Chama River, a tributary of the Rio Grande. The SJC water permit requires approximately fifty percent of
the surface water taken from the Rio Grande to be returned to the river downstream
from the city as return flow credits, leaving fifty percent for consumptive use.
Population growth and severe drought periods also increase the pressure to make
every drop of water count. Between 1990 and 2010, the population of metropolitan
Albuquerque increased by 41%.2 During the summer of 2002, between 70 and 83% of
the state was classified as experiencing extreme to exceptional drought. These drought
patterns repeated in 2011 and 2013 as well.3 Many urban water utilities in the southern U.S. and California face some combination of these challenges.
In order to maximize optimal water use while facing the challenges mentioned,
water utilities implement conservation programs targeted at different types of water
demand. Outdoor water use is often the focus, because it is considered nonessential
2

According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the population increased from 387,486 to 546,364 in
those 20 years.
3
Data from U.S. Drought Monitor maintained by the National Drought Mitigation Center
at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. Available at http:droughtmonitor.unl.edu
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use yet can have a larger effect on demand than indoor water use (Ramachandran &
Johnston, 2011). In addition, even though general water demand is price inelastic,
outdoor water use tends to be more price elastic than indoor water use.
Water budgets are an effective tool for water utilities with a high need for conserving water and are useful for managing consumptive water use, including irrigation.
Approximately 25 utilities use water budgets for irrigation or residential customer
classes, primarily in California and the western U.S. (Mayer et al., 2008).
As a long term demand-side conservation tool, water budgets are relatively new.
They combine non-price quantity restrictions with an increasing block rate price structure to achieve demand-reduction conservation programs.4 Unique customer characteristics determine an efficient allotment of water for each account and surcharge
penalties increase for excess water use over the allotted amount (Mayer et al., 2008).
Baerenklau et al. (2014) find that they significantly reduce demand, although it is most
effective as a long term conservation tool.
There is mixed evidence as to the effectiveness and impact of quantity restrictions
on demand (Kenney et al., 2008; S. Olmstead, 2014) and (Wichman et al., 2014). Wichman et al. (2014) find that mandatory quantity restriction policies have the greatest
impact as compared to other non-price conservation policies. Kenney et al. (2008) argues that overall restrictions are more useful for high volume consumers but price is
more effective for low volume households; this is even more true during drought. They
find that an additional effect of quantity restrictions is to reduce price elasticity for all
households. Others argue that restrictions are a more effective demand management
tool than increasing water prices; Duke et al. (2002) finds that water prices in summer
months would have to increase 591 percent in order to realize the same 25 percent
reduction that can be mandated under quantity use restrictions.
4

Non-price conservation policies include educational programs, rebates, incentives, outdoor
use restrictions on watering technologies or specific days, and quantity restrictions mandating
a percentage reduction in demand. Price policies include increasing block rates, penalties for
water waste, and scarcity pricing.

110

Chapter 4. The Impact of an Irrigation Water Budget Program
However, pricing conservation policies have been advocated by economists who argue that the welfare loss to households is less and households have the most flexibility
to optimally allocate their water demand to their highest priority uses, although equity
issues due to income are acknowledged (Renwick & Archibald, 1998; Grafton & Ward,
2008; S. Olmstead & Stavins, 2008; Mansur & Olmstead, 2012). Under pricing policies, high income households can avoid conserving water because they can afford the
high marginal rates; low income households cannot so the conservation burden falls
more heavily on them (Duke & Ehemann, 2004). This trade-off between conservation
burden efficiency and equity due to income is reduced under a water budget program.
Mayer et al. (2008) note that water budgets allocate the burden of conservation and
promote efficient water use in a more equitable manner than the use of restrictions or
pricing policies alone.5 To my knowledge, only Baerenklau et al. (2014) has studied
water budgets; they focused on the residential context.
The analysis uses a unique dataset comprised of water use and surcharge data for
1,107 irrigation-only accounts of ABCWUA. They initiated the irrigation water budget
(IWB) program for large-scale public sector and commercial customers in 2004 to encourage more water-saving xeriscape landscapes as those accounts were consistently
among the biggest water users and water wasters.6 Water conservations savings for
indoor use had approached the maximum amount possible according to their calculations; they began to examine the impact of outdoor irrigation practices.
This study uses a 2SLS model to estimate the elasticity of demand for all IWB
accounts as well as site categories, public versus private sector, and low versus high
water users while controlling for standard weather variables and site characteristics.
A random effects model examines the impact of the past season’s irrigating behavior
on this year’s irrigating behavior. An ordered logit model examines the characteristics
5

Mayer et al. (2008) notes that each water utility must define ‘efficient’ for themselves and
their ratepayers; there is no single accepted definition of what constitutes efficient water use.
6
ABCWUA defines large water wasters as accounts who are frequently fined for irrigating
excessively so that water runs into the street or during restricted daytime hours of 11a.m. to
7p.m.. Many irrigation-only accounts fell into this category prior to the implementation of the
IWB program Email exchange with Katherine Yuhas, May 6, 2015.
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that affect the probability of an account’s irrigation decision reflecting efficient, excess,
or extreme water consumption. This study contributes to the literature on water demand by showing that within the irrigation-only customer class, commercial and HOA
accounts, landscaped lots under 100,000 feet2 , and low water users are more price
sensitive.
In addition, this paper contributes to a limited water literature examining water
budgets. Baerenklau et al. (2014) has studied water budgets in a residential customer
context, but as far as I am aware, nobody has examined the irrigation-only customer
class. Residential customers under a water budget conservation program often have
other non-price and price policies operating simultaneously so it is difficult to completely separate out the effect of the water budget alone (Kenney et al., 2008). Corral
et al. (1999) also argue that the effect of using price policies to encourage conservation is reduced when water utilities have non-price conservation policies as well. IWB
customers in this dataset have no competing conservation programs, so changes in water demand with respect to the water budget program can be studied easier. Results
from this study can be compared to residential water budget programs that combine
indoor and outdoor use. By focusing on irrigation water budgets separate from other
conservation policies, a water utility can fine tune the approach for residential outdoor use. Findings suggest that accounts with water consumption of 100-150% of their
IWB have a greater probability of irrigating behavior changes than either efficient or
extreme water budget consumers. ABCWUA might want to target this group first.

4.2 Literature Review
In the water economics literature, residential consumers have been the focus of a large
quantity of research into water demand. Residential consumers are a large percentage of any water utility’s customer base, so looking at residential water demand for
single-family households helps utilities target policies to this group (Kenney et al.,
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2008).7 Less attention has been given to non-residential or irrigation-only customers
since they are a much smaller percentage of the customer base. Thus to consider conservation policies and elasticity of demand for irrigation-only ratepayers, I examine
the literature on conservation for residential customers. There is an extensive literature that has looked at the elasticity of demand for indoor and outdoor water use at
the household level (Arbues et al., 2003; Dalhuisen et al., 2003).

4.2.1 Elasticity of demand
Researchers consistently find that water demand is price inelastic. Arbues et al. (2003)
cite 63 studies in their discussion of issues involved in estimating water demand with
price elasticity ranging from ´1.12 to `0.332. Meta-analyses by Espey et al. (1997)
and Dalhuisen et al. (2003) report mean and median estimates of price elasticities at
´0.51, ´0.38 (short run),´0.64 (long run) and ´0.41, ´0.35, respectively.
Studies have compared price elasticity and water demand functions by income
quintile (Ruijs et al., 2008), income and lot size (Renwick & Archibald, 1998; Mansur
& Olmstead, 2012), the water utility’s pricing structure (S. M. Olmstead et al., 2003;
S. Olmstead et al., 2007), summer/winter seasons (Klaiber et al., 2012), geographical region or cities (Nieswiadomy, 1992; Renwick & Archibald, 1998), household size
(Arbues et al., 2010), level of water consumption (Kenney et al., 2008; Klaiber et al.,
2012), modeling approach (Dalhuisen et al., 2003), and droughtnormal years (Corral
et al., 1999; Kenney et al., 2008). In addition, Gaudin (2006) argue that while microeconomic theory indicates a relationship between price and quantity demanded for
consumers, in the water industry, utilities don’t have to post prices and consumers may
not realize the price until after they consume a given quantity. They look at the effect
of increasing the amount of water price information to consumers and find that price
elasticity increases with price information, although it is still inelastic.
7

Kenney et al. (2008) note that between 70% and 80% of Aurora (CO) Water’s customer base
are residential customers.
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Price responsiveness is usually greater for non-essential, outdoor water use although the elasticity can vary by season, drought years, or income level (Mansur &
Olmstead, 2012). Ramachandran & Johnston (2011) shows that water use for outdoors activities such as lawns and pools has a larger effect on demand than water use
for indoor needs. Mansur & Olmstead (2012) find that outdoor water use is elastic,
´1.20, in wetter months and inelastic, ´0.67, in dry months, while also the households
who are wealthy with big housing lots have the most inelastic outdoor demand, ´0.41,
while lower income/small lot households are the most price responsive for outdoor use,
´0.791. However, Martin & Kulakowski (1991) conclude that formal studies on price
elasticities are not a good guide for setting water prices based on their case study of
Tucson Water.

4.2.2 Conservation
Research into the effect of conservation policies is a subset of the literature on water
demand. Conservation policies can be grouped by price and non-price policies. Price
policies affect demand through price structure of water rates (increasing block rates,
uniform) and through penalties for water waste, and scarcity pricing. Non-price policies include educational programs, new technologies rebates, incentives, outdoor use
restrictions, and quantity restrictions. Ramachandran & Johnston (2011) note that
educational and technological policies work to reduce demand in the long-run, while
use restriction policies are a short-run demand reduction tool.
There is considerable debate as to whether price or non-price conservation policies are more effective. Renwick & Archibald (1998) note that non-price conservation
policies encourage reduced demand in a way that price policies cannot because water demand tends to be price inelastic. Pint (1999) argues that an increasing block
rate (IBR) price structure is effective as a drought management strategy. S. Olmstead
& Stavins (2008) also argue for price-based conservation policies, saying that those
provide households with the most flexibility in their individual water demand yet col-
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lectively, the demand reduction goal is achieved. They also point out that non-price
policies are more costly to enforce and monitor.
Most water utilities do not have strictly price or non-price conservation policies,
but rather a mixture of both. They may have a block rate tariff system with a rebate
program for low flow appliances, an individual water budget with scarcity pricing, and
restrictions under drought conditions. Corral et al. (1999) argue that the effect of
using price to encourage conservation is reduced when water utilities have non-price
conservation policies as well.
Initial research into the effect of conservation programs indicated that they had
little effect but they only included a dummy variable to indicate the presence of a
conservation program. Nieswiadomy (1992) find that conservation programs do not
significantly influence on household demand in any region of the United States. Corral et al. (1999) created three dummy variables for each of five types of conservation
policies to indicate level of enforcement/severity of the restriction. Halich & Stephenson (2009) created a conservation policy implementation index that incorporated the
intensity with which non-price conservation programs were used in a water district;
this means what type of non-price policy is used, how the policy is advertised to consumers, and whether it is voluntary or mandatory. Mandatory restrictions resulted
in a 4 to 22% decrease in water demand as compared to 0 to 7% for voluntary restrictions. Martin & Kulakowski (1991) argues that water conservation policies must be
combined with real price increases to be effective; in the case of Tucson Water, a real
price increase meant raising prices by 10 percent minimum. An increasing block rate
structure does not count as a real price increase.
Renwick & Archibald (1998) look at the effect of increasingly severe price and nonprice conservation policies mandated in two California water districts during a drought
period and find that they were the most effective for households with larger outdoor
water needs due to more landscaped areas. However, when they looked at the effect of
the policies by income level, the evidence was mixed. In one community, the wealthier
households responded the most, while in the other community, the poorest households
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were more responsive. The effect of rebates varies across the focus of the rebate. Indoor
rebates were effective for all customers but the outdoor rebates were only significant
for high volume users, so likely the other household types were using less water than
the restrictions allowed anyways (Kenney et al., 2008).
Several studies look at the effect of price and non-price conservation policies on
water demand under drought or scarce water conditions (Renwick & Archibald, 1998;
Corral et al., 1999; Hensher et al., 2006; Kenney et al., 2008; S. Olmstead & Stavins,
2008; Cooper, Burton, & Crase, 2011; Mansur & Olmstead, 2012). Using stated preference surveys, Hensher et al. (2006); Cooper, Burton, & Crase (2011) look at consumers’
WTP to avoid drought restrictions. Fines for water waste are a method of penalizing
non-compliance with water use restrictions and during times of drought, the penalties often increase. Renwick & Archibald (1998) include penalties for violating the
water allocation scheme in their marginal price variable. Pint (1999) considers how
households respond to price increases in Alameda County Water District during the
California drought of the late 1980’s and concludes that an IBR price structure is an
effective conservation tool in drought periods.
Quantity restrictions can be moderate or severe. Moderate quantity restrictions
might include time of day watering or certain days of the week. Stricter quantity
restrictions involve limiting or banning certain outdoor uses or restricting watering
to hand held hoses for a few hours. Some research argues that restrictions are more
effective than increasing water prices; Duke et al. (2002) finds that water prices in
summer months would have to increase 591 percent in order to realize the same 25
percent reduction that can be mandated under quantity use restrictions.
Restrictions appear to be effective under certain conditions and are more effective
on certain classes of customers. Corral et al. (1999) find that use restrictions are effective in reducing water demand but only if they are mandatory; landscaping audits also
have a significant effect although not as large as mandatory use restrictions. The effect of use restrictions is even larger when the regression is run using just dry months’
data. Kenney et al. (2008) argues that overall, but especially during drought times,
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restrictions are more useful for high volume consumers but price is more effective for
low volume households. They find that an additional effect of quantity restrictions is
to reduce price elasticity for all households. They also find that both restrictions and
price are not effective at the same time, households appear to respond to one or the
other. On the other hand, Ramachandran & Johnston (2011) find that non-price water
use restrictions have a very small effect on water demand, and in fact, all else equal,
water demand increases during periods of use restrictions. Neighborhood effects also
play a role; using a GIS cluster analysis for lot size, they find that very large parcels
tend to have relatively higher water demand, even under use restrictions. Cooper,
Rose, & Crase (2011) find that individuals have preferences for how use restrictions
are implemented and that they prefer having some method of reporting noncompliance. Use restrictions are only effective if individuals comply and that occurs if the net
cost of complying is less than the net benefit, including fines avoided.
Further research has studied the loss in welfare from stringent outdoor use restrictions (Dandy, 1992; Grafton & Ward, 2008; S. Olmstead & Stavins, 2008; Mansur
& Olmstead, 2012). In particular, Mansur & Olmstead (2012) estimate welfare gains
of $96 per household from using price-based conservation policies over outdoor use
restrictions although they acknowledge the implications that while overall consumption would be reduced, the less price sensitive larger income, big lot size households
would reduce water consumption less than low income, small lot households. In allocative terms, the former group would consume 47% of total water demand, up from
34%, while the latter group would consume only 17%, a decrease of 6%. Grafton &
Ward (2008) find an average welfare loss of about $150 per household from using restrictions, concluding that price would be a better mechanism to achieve conservation
goals with less welfare loss. Dandy (1992) finds that the loss in welfare resulting from
stringent outdoor water use restrictions is greater than using a price mechanism to
encourage the same conservation.
Several authors discuss the allocation issue of different conservation policies.
(Duke et al., 2002) looks at the three conservation policies: scarcity pricing, water
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rationing, and mandatory restrictions. Under scarcity pricing and mandatory restrictions, households living on large lots bear the majority or all of the conservation burden, while with a water rationing policy everyone bears the burden as the conservation
target is set for each household, however the conservation target goal may hit harder
on lower income/smaller lot sizes who do not have as much nonessential water use.
Renwick & Archibald (1998); S. Olmstead & Stavins (2008) note that under price conservation policies, the burden falls more on low income households, who are typically
more price sensitive and for whom the water bill represents a greater percentage of
their income. Duke & Ehemann (2004) discuss the equity issues with scarcity pricing
because high-income households can pay the high marginal rates above the scarcity
price threshold, while low-income households cannot, so they are forced to conserve.
However, S. Olmstead & Stavins (2008) note that while price conservation policies
can be regressive in water allocation, these type of policies cause utilities to earn large
profits in the short run when they use drought pricing, due to the price inelasticity
of water demand. However, utilities are usually restricted by their regulatory boards
to earn no profit or very low profits as a natural monopoly. To address allocative equity issues, these excess profits could be returned to consumers based on some income
formula as rebates or subsidies.
Water budgets combine quantity restrictions with increasing block rates, while assigning each customer an allotment of water sufficient for efficient consumption based
on their unique characteristics. Mayer et al. (2008) note that more than 20 water utilities have implemented some form of water budget; the most common kind of water
budget is for landscape irrigation use. . However, they work best for water utilities that
face the need to encourage efficient consumption and are a more proactive approach
to addressing drought conditions. Communities must define what efficient means in
their own context, but overall customers and water utility staff tend to consider water
budgets a fairer and more equitable way of reaching a community’s conservation goals.
Because water budgets are a relatively new conservation tool, very few studies
have been conducted. Baerenklau et al. (2014) study the impact on reducing water de-
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mand of a residential water budget for the Eastern Municipal Water District (EMWD)
over a ten-year period. Between 2003 and 2008, the EMWD had a uniform price structure. Demand elasticity for those years is estimated using a fixed effects model and
then used to predict demand during the four years of the water budget, 2009-2012, in
order to compare demand savings. Demand under the water budget is estimated with
a discrete continuous choice (DCC) modeling strategy. They estimate price elasticity
of demand as being more inelastic under the water budget structure (´0.58) than under the uniform rate structure (´0.76). Under the water budget, demand reduction of
approximately 17% was achieved, gradually over four years. Their results also suggest that households retain the more water conservation behaviors that are learned in
order to avoid higher marginal prices, even in the face of future price declines.

4.2.3 Theoretical issues

Endogeneity is often assumed to exist due to modeling quantity demanded as a function of price, given that the price charged depends on the quantity used. This leads to
biased and inconsistent estimated parameters if OLS is used because of possible correlation between the error term and independent variables. Two-stage least squares
regression that employs instrumental variables techniques is commonly used to overcome this issue (Renwick & Archibald, 1998; Kenney et al., 2008; Ruijs et al., 2008; Arbues et al., 2010; Wichman et al., 2014). However, using a Hausman test Nieswiadomy
(1992) fails to reject the hypothesis of endogeneity and uses an OLS model in their
study. Effects of being in a pricing structure with increasing block rates were dealt
with by including a dummy variable (Kenney et al., 2008).
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4.3 ABCWUA irrigation water budget program
and data
Irrigation-only accounts comprise approximately 2% of ABCWUA’s customer base but
use 9% of the total water consumption (see Table 4.1).8 In contrast, single-family
residential accounts comprise 87% of the total accounts but only 53% of the total water
demand.9 Water consumed by irrigation-only accounts is 100% consumptive, irrigation
demand, while less than 40% of residential water use is lost to outdoor use.
ABCWUA does not offer other conservation programs to irrigation-only accounts;
any estimated changes in demand as a result of the water budget program can be
isolated. So while this customer class is small in relation to the entire customer base,
outdoor water demand by all customer classes still accounted for approximately 40%
of ABCWUA’s total water demand in 2013 (see Table 4.1). Controlling consumptive
water demand helps manage water supplies in arid regions, where outdoor water use
by all customer classes can be a large percentage of the water system loss.10
Prior to 2004, large irrigation-only accounts were consistently among the group
of customers fined for water waste prompting ABCWUA to initiate the IWB program
to encourage better irrigation practices and water conservation for these customers.
Each customer was budgeted an efficient quantity of water for irrigation purposes.11
IWB allotments are determined by the annual amount of water necessary to efficiently irrigate the square area and customer type.12 Aerial photography and a map8

Fire hydrants and fire lines also fall into this category.
Data provided by Katherine Yuhas, Conservation Office at ABCWUA. Account statistics
indicate numbers in December 2013.
10
For instance, the Southern Nevada Water Authority reports 60% of water use is considered
consumptive, primarily for landscape irrigation (Bennett, 2012).
11
Calculating an irrigation water budget differs from a residential water budget which include historical winter use to allow for essential indoor water needs by household (Mayer et
al., 2008). Irrigation water budgets rely on landscaped area and use type because irrigation
typically does not occur in winter months.
12
Most customer accounts have a water budget of 35 inches of irrigation water per square foot
of landscaping annually. Golf courses receive 37-40”/square foot depending on the construction
9
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ping software were used to calculate the amount of irrigated square feet for each property. The water budget reflects the amount of water needed for efficient watering.13 For
instance, if the customer’s property is 100% turf area, fully efficient watering would
still use approximately 140% of their irrigation budget.14 Accounts that irrigate with
reuse water from ABCWUA receive an additional 10% water use over their budget.
Water consumption within an account’s IWB is charged the commodity rate of
$1.531 per unit of water.15 Surcharges are assessed for every unit of water consumed
above the IWB allotment. Efficient water consumption up to 100% of the IWB receives
no surcharge. For excess water consumption between 100 ´ 150%, the surcharge is 50%
of the commodity charge; each unit of water costs 1.5 times the commodity charge. The
surcharge for extreme water consumption above 150% of the IWB allotment equals the
commodity charge; each unit of water costs double the commodity rate. Accounts are
billed monthly for water consumption using only the commodity charge during the
irrigating season, March through November. Then total water consumption is calculated and the surcharge determined. The surcharge appears on the following March’s
irrigation water bill.16 Table 4.2 provides descriptive statistics on annual water consumption, percentage of IWB used and assessed surcharges. Figure 4.1 displays water
consumption levels overall between 2008-2013 and Figure 4.2 shows consumption levdate, and athletic fields receive 45”/square foot because of greater wear and tear on the turf
(ABCWUA, 2014)
13
An efficient level of watering is considered 0.5” of water soaking into the ground after a
watering session. Fully efficient watering, where the water that leaves the sprinklers all soaks
into the ground is impossible due to wind, evapotranspiration, and the slope of the land. Irrigating efficiency of 70% is considered good. Conversation with Richard Chapman, SmartUse,
on June 1, 2015.
14
Distribution uniformity is another issue. After an irrigating session, approximately the
same amount of water should soak in at all spots across the landscape, as measured using catch
cans to capture irrigation water. Most properties are approximately 50% in their irrigation
practices, meaning that the lowest quartile of catch cans has approximately half the water as
the overall average across all catch cans. Conversation with Richard Chapman, SmartUse, on
June 1, 2015.
15
Prior to July 1, 2011 the commodity rate was $1.385 per unit of water. A unit of water is
748 gallons.
16
Accounts may request an ABCWUA high consumption use water audit of their property
to improve their irrigation practices. Approximately 52% of IWB accounts have received a
landscape audit.
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els for each individual year.17
The mean and median percentage of water budget use are shown in Figure 4.3,
while 4.4 shows the water consumption for all observations plus the median consumption level, including outliers, for each year. Most notably, the mean and median percentages of the IWB used are declining between 2011-2013, however the outliers indicating mega-water consumption are more extreme and more numerous. During those
years a large percentage of Bernalillo County was classified as experiencing moderate and severe-to-exceptional drought levels and new accounts were added from the
smaller utility acquired by ABCWUA.18

19

The statistics given on efficient, excess, and extreme water consumption levels do
not mean that the same accounts are in each water use category every year. I consider
irrigating patterns as how many years an account exceeded their water budget and
categorize them as never, occasional, half, most, and consistent. The items of specific
interest are the extremes in behavior, i.e. how many accounts always are within their
IWB or always exceed it. ABCWUA’s policy aims to reduce the latter category. Table
4.3 describes the irrigation pattern variables. These are not used in the models, merely
to classify behavior.
Historically, the biggest water wasters were the public sector accounts and the
parks.21 Histograms are used to examine irrigating patterns by ownership/landscape
size, (see Figure 4.5), and by site type (see Figure 4.6). The x-axis reflects the scale
of irrigating patterns, from 0 (never exceeds the IWB) to 4 (always exceeds the IWB).
A greater percentage of private sector accounts never exceed their water budget as
17

In their study of residential water budgets, Baerenklau et al. (2014) note that 82% of their
sample consume a water quantity within the two price blocks considered efficient use.
18
The years of 2011 through 2013 experienced recurring drought, however water utility
customers were within the annual consumption goals and so mandatory drought restrictions
were not needed.Conversation with Katherine Yuhas, ABCWUA Water Conservation Officer, on
March 19, 2015.
19
In 2012 25% of Bernalillo County was classified as experiencing moderate drought conditions, while 61% of the county was classified under severe to exceptional drought.20 For 2013,
the percentages are 22% and 79%, respectively.
21
It could also be said these accounts were the most non-compliant.
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compared to public sector accounts with the same size landscape area. Private sector
accounts with less than 100,000 feet2 of landscaping have lower rates of consistently
exceeding their IWB as compared to the other three groups. These statistics are in
line with prior behavior. The final panel in each figure show the irrigating pattern
percentages for all accounts for comparison. Almost 40% never exceeded their IWB,
while another 12% occasionally exceeded it. Nine percent exceeded their IWB half the
time. Forty percent consistently or most years exceeded their IWB.
Public and private sector accounts with a landscape size of greater than or less
than 100,000 feet2 have different water consumption. The mega-water consumption
above 1000% of IWB occurs in the smaller landscaped accounts both public and private
sector (see Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8). This level of water consumption is not seen in
the large landscaped accounts. The median accounts across the years are signified
with a red diamond and connected with a line. The median private sector account is
typically within the irrigation budget as compared to the median public sector account,
regardless of landscape size.
Data are in a micropanel format with a small number of years, (T “ 6), and a large
number of accounts, (N “ 1, 107). It is an unbalanced panel; there is not annual data
for each account between 2008-2013. ABCWUA purchased a smaller water utility in
northwest Bernalillo County in 2010, so those accounts only have two years of data
for 2012-2013.22 Other customers are missing a year’s data due to faulty meter readings, broken water pipes with misleading water consumption, or zero water use due
to landscape renovation. I started with 5,461 observations of irrigation data on 1,107
customers. We decided to omit observations with less than 10 percent of their irrigation budget used in year t because less than ten percent was not seen as a realistic
amount of irrigating to keep even xeriscape alive; a faulty meter was assumed.23 The
final dataset has 4,748 valid observations.

22
23

There are 245 accounts from this small water utility.
Conversation with Richard Chapman, SmartUse, on February 27, 2015.
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4.4 Theory and Empirical models
This paper addresses two research questions that focus on estimating the price elasticity of demand and the characteristics that influence demand. Random effects, ordered
logit, and 2SLS instrumental variables models are used for analysis. The first research
question examines what influences an account’s irrigating behavior in two ways: (1a)
the influence of the previous year’s water consumption level on this year’s demand;
and (1b) the characteristics that affect an account’s current water consumption decision. The second research question looks at the price elasticity of demand resulting
from the increasing block surcharge rate structure.

4.4.1 Question 1a: Does consumption last year affect the
current year water consumption level?
A random effects model is used to initially examine how past water consumption affects the current percentage of the water budget used. Random effects allow for unobserved heterogeneity both between groups and within groups. This analysis wants to
specifically examine the differences in irrigating behavior due to organizational characteristics that are time invariant such as public and private accounts with different
landscape sizes as well as different business categories. I assume between group variation is more relevant in this case than within group variation. This motivates using
a random effects model rather than the more standard fixed effects model (Moulton,
1986).
Model I: P ctIW Bjt “ γLag1.P ctbudjt ` β1 Pj ` β2 Wt ` β3 Oj ` pφj ` εj q

(4.1)

Account j’s irrigating behavior in year t is modeled through the percentage of the
budget used, PctIWBjt . It is a function of last year’s irrigating behavior, denoted by
the Lag1 indicator and variables describing physical characteristics of the site, Pj ,
weather, Wt , and organizational characteristics Oj . The error term has two compo-
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nents: φj , which represents the ‘between accounts’ latent heterogeneity of account j,
while ε is the remaining, random error term ‘within accounts’.
First I consider the issue of serial autocorrelation, which is usually present in crosssectional time series data, and if using a lagged dependent variable is an appropriate
solution. Serial autocorrelation violates the OLS assumption of independent error
terms and instead, Epεj εi q ‰ 0 occurs. I test for autocorrelation using a standard
Lagrange Multiplier test under a random effects specification using accounts with at
least four years of data.24 Honoré & Kyriazidou (2000) show that at least four observations is an identification restriction for binary discrete choice models with panel data.
The percentage of the IWB used is also the basis for the dependent variable in the
second part of the research question, so any autocorrelation present in Model I should
be present in Models II and III.
I estimate the model given in Equation 4.1 without the lagged variable and predict
the residuals, which are then regressed on the explanatory variables including the
lagged residual. The coefficient on the lagged residual is positive and significant at the
5% level, indicating serial correlation is present.25
Including a lagged dependent variable (LDV) is one solution for eliminating autocorrelation.26 A LDV allows the dynamic process of changing behavior to be included
in the model; past behavior influences present behavior. This is a reasonable assumption with irrigation water demand since the basic water requirements of the landscape
remain the same. I re-estimate Equation 4.1, including a one-period lagged term,
24

Often independent variables are lagged as well in an AR(p,q) model, where p and q represent the number of lags for dependent and independent variables. I choose not to do this
because the effect of last year’s weather variables is likely incorporated in last year’s water
consumption decision.
25
I also test against the lagged residuals for two time periods, but the coefficient on the
residual with two lags is not significant.
26
Including LDVs is not without controversy. An unpublished paper in political science by
Achen (2000) has been cited frequently to argue that in the absence of a causal relationship
between the dependent variable and the LDV, including a LDV appears to improve model fit
but at the cost of possibly altering the signs and significance of other explanatory variables.
LDVs should only be included to avoid omitted variable bias.
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Lag1.P ctbudjt . A Durbin’s alternative statistic is calculated to test for serial autocorrelation once a lagged dependent variable is included; the more standard Durbin-Watson
statistic is unreliable in the presence of lagged dependent variables (Durbin, 1970;
Greene, 2003). The calculated h statistic has a value of ´0.291.
Equation 4.1 is the empirical specification for this research question. The coefficient on Lag1.PctIWBjt variable is a proxy indicator of the influence of last year’s
behavior.

4.4.2 Question 1b:

What characteristics affect an ac-

count’s water consumption level decision?
Every year an IWB account makes one of three observable water consumption choices
based on the percentage of the budget used: an efficient level of water use within
their irrigation budget quantity, excess water use, or extreme water use. An ordered
logit model is appropriate when the annual water consumption level is observed but
factors influencing the choice are latent; the breakpoint between ordered choices is
also unseen.
The discrete choice variable, Y , represents observed irrigating behavior wjs , s P
r0, 2s for irrigation account j; s is the numerical representation of water consumption
levels. Underlying the irrigating behavior is a continuous latent variable, y ˚ , and an

unobservable random component ε:
y ˚ “ βX ` ε

(4.2)

The probability of falling into a specific category, s, depends on whether the dependent variable, Y, has crossed the threshold of latent variable, y ˚ , where κ represent
the breakpoints between thresholds (Greene, 2003). If irrigation account j does not
exceed its IWB, then Y “ 0; if excess water consumption, Y “ 1; if extreme water
consumption, Y “ 2. More generally, it is written:
P rpYj “ sq “ P rpκs´1 ă Yj ď κs q, @s “ 0, 1, 2
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P rpYj “ sq “ P rpκs´1 ă βX ` εj ď κs q, @s “ 0, 1, 2

(4.4)

The probability of the observed decision, Yj being in a category s is related to the
error term being between the two breakpoints minus the deterministic portion of the
equation.27 Each probability is the difference between two CDF functions.
P rpYj “ sq “ P rpεj ă κs ´ βXq ´ P rpεj ď κs´1 ´ βXq

(4.5)

P rpY “ 0q “ F p´βXq

(4.6)

P rpY “ 1q “ F pε1 ´ βXq ´ F p´βXq

(4.7)

P rpY “ 2q “ F pε2 ´ βXq ´ F pε1 ´ βXq

(4.8)

Under the assumption of a logistic random error term, the probability of observed
choice q P S is written:
P rpYn “ q|Xn q “

exppXn βq q
řS
1 ` s“1 exppXn βs q

(4.9)

Research question 1b examines the characteristics that influence the water consumption decision. In the empirical model, the dependent variable for the ordered logit
model is the observed water consumption category for account j in year t. The decision
Yjt is described by the dependent variable Consumptionjt , whose three categories are:
Efficientjt , Excessjt , Extremejt . The ordered categories are based on the water budget surcharge structure, which is similar to the residential water budget described by
Baerenklau et al. (2014). ABCWUA allots each account’s water budget, wj0 , based on
its organizational characteristics, Oj , including square footage and landscape use.
Efficient water use: wj0 “ f pOq

(4.10)

Excess water use: wj1 “ 1.5 ˚ wj0

(4.11)

Extreme water use: wj2 “ wj1 ` 1

(4.12)

27

This is obtained by subtracting the deterministic portion: P rpYj “ sq “ P rpκs´1 ´ βX ă
εj ď κs ´ βXq
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Following the procedure in Model I, a one-period lagged variable (Lag1.Con) represents the previous year’s observed irrigation consumption level.28 Two empirical
specifications are estimated:
Model II: Consumptionjt “ β1 Lag1.Conjt ` β2 Pj ` β3 Wt ` β4 P P sizej ` εjt

(4.13)

Model III: Consumptionjt “ β1 Lag1.Conjt ` β2 Pj ` β3 Wt ` β4 SiteCatj ` εjt

(4.14)

In addition to the previous year’s consumption level , other exogenous variables that
influence the probability for this year’s irrigation behavior are the same as previously
discussed for Model I. Models II and III differ only in the vector of organizational site
characteristics, Oj , which describe the accounts based on latent factors common to the
organizational structure hypothesized to influence irrigation choices. Model II uses
a categorical interaction variable between public/private sector and landscape size,
PPsize. Model III includes organizational characteristics through eight site categories,
SiteCatj .

4.4.3 Question 2: What is the elasticity of water demand?
The second research question using a 2-stage least squares (2SLS) regression to examine the elasticity of demand and the price responsiveness. The endogenous issue
between water demand and water price has been discussed extensively in the residential water demand literature (Pint, 1999; S. Olmstead et al., 2007; Baerenklau et
al., 2014; Wichman et al., 2014). This occurs because with a block rate or tiered surcharge rate design, the price charged for water is a function of the quantity of water
consumed so OLS estimates are biased and can result in an upward sloping demand
curve. Various researchers have estimated 2SLS models to resolve these two issues.
Given the structure of the data, I estimate a 2SLS-IV random effects model similar
to (S. M. Olmstead et al., 2003; Wichman et al., 2014).29
28

In the residential literature, variables from the previous period are often used as explanatory variables given the delayed reaction to price and weather signals (Kenney et al., 2008).
29
The discrete-continuous choice (DCC) model has been used to estimate water demand un-
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This data feature a uniform rate structure for monthly consumption and the increasing surcharge block rate structure for the aggregate total.30 Baerenklau et al.
(2014) estimate a fixed effects OLS model for water demand under a uniform rate
structure, where the marginal price faced is the uniform price. Under the increasing
surcharge block rate structure, endogeneity occurs because the final surcharge, which
ultimately influences the marginal price paid by each account, is a function of the
quantity consumed. Under these circumstances, the 2SLS model is a more appropriate choice for modeling water demand.
Baseline water demand, Usejt , by account j in year t is modeled as a continuous
choice and estimated as a function of a vector of weather, Wt and physical site characteristics, Pj , and the natural log of the average price faced by each account:
\jt ` δWt ` φj ` εjt
lnpU sejt q “ α ` β lnAP

(4.15)

The price variable is the log of the instrumented variable average price, AP . All
other variables φj and εjt were explained with Model I.31
Similar to Wichman et al. (2014), the first stage instrumental variables were a series of simulated block marginal prices for different consumption quantities, M Pjkt ,
for each account where k represents the simulated water block.32 An account’s water
der increasing block rate structures by estimating a non-linear budget constraint. Several
researchers advocate the DCC model over a 2SLS approach because it has the capacity to estimate conditional demand based on the block in which a household chooses for consumption.
In addition, it incorporates consumption decisions for consumers located at the budget kink
points between the blocks (Pint, 1999; S. M. Olmstead et al., 2003; S. Olmstead & Stavins,
2008; Baerenklau et al., 2014).
30
The water budget surcharge structure is assessed annually, while water consumption decisions are made daily and billed monthly. As a result, the marginal price per unit each month is
not based on their expected total annual consumption. The marginal price of water consumed
above their IWB only becomes apparent after all consumption has occurred. While it is possible
that an account could track their monthly consumption to see if they are within their budget
as the year progresses, I assume that the majority of accounts do not.
31
Residential water demand models typically estimate income elasticity as well using Census
tract income levels or some other estimate. I attempted to obtain data on property taxes or total
revenues for each account to use as a proxy for income but were unsuccessful. As a result, the
error term, φj , is assumed to capture the effects of each account’s unique budget constraint.
32
IWB are calculated as a function the square footage of irrigated area and range from 54
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consumption rate for each level is based on their specific IWB. Then I calculated each
account’s marginal price of water faced at that level of consumption. This incorporates the increasing surcharge fees that occur at different consumption levels for each
account. The first-stage regression is:
\jt “
lnAP

K
ÿ

k“1

βlnpM Pjtk q ` δLj ` γPj ` φj ` ǫjt

(4.16)

In addition to the marginal price instruments, known landscape characteristics
and site elevation characteristics are included. These instruments are used because
they influence the irrigation water budget for a particular account and thus are correlated with the average price over the range of marginal prices. There is debate in the
literature over using lagged versus current prices and average versus marginal rates
in estimating water demand (Arbues et al., 2003). With respect to electricity demand,
Ito (2014) finds a lack of customer bunching at the kink points of the nonlinear rate
schedule, which would be present if consumers responded to marginal pricing. There
is strong evidence that electric customers respond to average prices instead. Lagged
prices are often used in residential water demand literature because customers receive the bill after the consumption period and become aware of their consumption
block by the related price. However, I chose to use current average price because the
irrigation-only accounts face the same commodity price per unit for their entire seasonal consumption and I assume they are aware of the surcharge fees for exceeding
their IWB.
The model described in Equation 4.15 is the basic water demand equation. Several additional specifications are estimated to further examine the elasticity of price
demand for other groups.
\jt ` δWt ` δ2 P P sizej ` φj ` εjt
Model IV: lnpU sejt q “ α ` β lnAP

(4.17)

square feet to 7.4 million square feet. I simulated a wide range of block rates per 100 units to
account for the various tiers faced by both small and large accounts, k = t 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12.5,
15, 18, 21, 24, 27, 30, 34, 38, 45, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 110, 120, 130, 150, 180, 210, 250, 300,
350, 400, 500, 600, 700, 800, 1000, 1200, 1400, 1600, 1800, 2000.
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\jt ` γplnAP
\jt ˚ SiteCatj q ` δWt ` φj ` εjt
Model V: lnpU sejt q “ α ` β lnAP

(4.18)

\jt ` γplnAP
\jt ˚ Djt q ` δWt ` δ2 P P sizej ` φj ` εjt (4.19)
Model VI: lnpU sejt q “ α ` β lnAP
\jt ` γplnAP
\jt ˚ P P sizej q ` δWt ` φj ` εjt
Model VII: lnpU sejt q “ α ` β lnAP

(4.20)

Model VI includes a vector of interaction variables between the average price and site
categories. This allows us to examine the elasticity of price demand by site categories.
Model VII includes interaction variables between the average price and accounts that
consume only 5 or 10 percent of their IWB and those that consume 90 or 95 percent of
their IWB. This captures the effect of elasticity of low water consumers and high water
consumers. Finally, Model VIII includes interaction variables between average price
and the account ownership size variable, PPsize.

4.5 Data
The weather variables, Wt are annual in nature and describe the seasonal summer
intensity and length.33 I calculated the number of days above the average monthly
temperature for each month, April through October. After trying several specifications, we aggregated the months May through August, DaysAboveAvg, to measure the
intensity of warm season temperatures each year. The length of summer is measured
by the number of days between the first and last 90˝ days, Days90.34
33

Temperature and precipitation data were gathered from the National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) website.
Daily temperature data and mean minimum/maximum monthly temperature data were gathered from the weather station at the
Albuquerque International Sunport airport. Drought index data for the state of New Mexico
and Bernalillo County were gathered from the U.S. Drought Monitor compiled by the University of Nebraska at Lincoln.
34
Alternate intensity measurements were considered: the number of days with temperatures above 90˝ F each month and using drought index variables to measure the percentage
of Bernalillo County classified as experiencing moderate or severe drought. The drought index variables were significant but inconsistent, likely due to the fact that the first three years
of data both variables were equal to zero as the severe drought occurred between 2011-2013.
These variables were ultimately not used.
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Physical site characteristic variables, Pj , include elevation and soil composition
for account j. SoilWater is a categorical variable that indicates the degree of water
absorption of the soil . The values equal 0, 1, or 2; higher values indicate the soil more
readily absorbs water.35
Within the ABCWUA service area elevation varies from 4,900 feet in the river
valley to 6,700 feet at mountain foothills creating micro-climates with varying temperature and precipitation.36 Dummy variables indicate accounts located 5,000 feet and
lower, Elevation5000; between 5,050 and 5,650 feet, Elevation5300; and above 5,700
feet, Elevation5700.37 I have no a priori expectation on the signs for the elevation or
soil variables.
Organizational characteristic variables, Oj , include two categorical variables: (i)
PPsize indicates public/private sector and if the landscaped area exceeds 100, 000 feet2 ;
and (ii) SiteCat indicates the type of site. With regards to PPsize, private sector
accounts have a profit incentive to stay within their IWB. In addition, the size of
the landscaped area might influence the IWB account’s ability to flexibly adjust irrigation habits.38 Four categories are used for PPSize: PublicSmallj (baseline category), PublicLargej , PrivateSmallj , and PrivateLargej . I expect private ownership
and smaller landscaped areas to have a greater probability of efficient water consumption based on prior experience by ABCWUA. There are eight categories in: Commercial
(baseline category), Parks, HOA, StreetMedians, Multi, Education, Government, and
Churches. Accounts within each category are hypothesized to possess similar characteristics such as landscape patterns or business structures that require certain irriga35

Data on soil types for Bernalillo County were gathered from the national Web Soil Survey
conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Natural Resources Conservation Service.
The variable was created following conversations with Rick Strait, USDA State Soil Scientist,
New Mexico
36
I gathered 50-foot contour elevation data for Bernalillo County from the RGIS website
maintained by the University of New Mexico and then spatially mapped irrigation meter locations with the contour data using version 10.1 of ESRI ArcMap software.
37
Using a continuous elevation variable was not significant.
38
Residential water demand studies typically include household parcel size as a proxy for
the amount of outdoor landscape needs (Pint, 1999).

132

Chapter 4. The Impact of an Irrigation Water Budget Program
tion needs.
Demand characteristics Djt indicate if an account used relatively less or more of
their water budget in year t as compared to other accounts as measured by their water
budget consumption percentile. The PctIWBjt was ordered for each year and the water
budget percentage amount was calculated for the 5th, 15th, 85th and 95th percentiles.
Dummy variables indicate if the annual percentage of the water budget used by each
account is within those percentile breakpoints. An account with very low water budget
consumption, relative to other accounts, was in the 5th percentile or lower for year t,
Budg5jt . Budg15jt indicates the account was between the 5-15th percentile and was
a low water budget consumer, relatively. High and very high water budget consumers
are indicated by Budg85jt and Budg95jt , respectively. Budg85jt indicates the account
was between the 85th to 95th percentile and Budg95jt indicates the account was at
the 95th percentile or greater.

4.6 Results and Discussion
I first consider if there are significant differences in water consumption and irrigating
patterns between public/private sector accounts and different types of site categories.
Irrigation-only accounts differ from residential accounts because they involve individuals whose incentives differ. If the irrigator is not the same individual who can make
budget decisions, the price signal is less informative. My hypothesis is that the private sector will respond to price signals as a profit maximizer. Public sector accounts
do not have the same profit maximizing incentive. Results of a t-test between the mean
annual percentage of IWB used for public and private sector accounts are reported in
Table 4.5. For the first year, 2008, the mean percentages are not significantly different.
Every subsequent year the mean percentage of the private sector is significantly less
in comparison to the mean percentage of public sector accounts. This implies perhaps
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a greater responsiveness to the water budget program for private sector accounts.39
Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 report irrigating patterns by public or private sector and
by site types using the index variables described in Table 4.3. X2 tests of significant
differences in overall irrigating patterns between public/private sector and site types
were calculated. The X2 test statistics were 29.78 and 152.25, respectively, as compared to the X24,α“.05 = 9.488 and X228,α“.05 = 41.337. The null hypothesis is rejected;
there are significant differences in the irrigating patterns across time of public versus
private sector and between site types.

4.6.1 Results: Influences on the water consumption decision
Both parts of the first question examine the influence on an account’s water consumption decision. Table 4.6 reports results from part (a) that estimated a random effects
model to examine the influence of the previous year’s consumption.40 The variable of
interest is the one period lagged percentage of the water budget used. It is positive
and highly significant with a value of 0.55, indicating that approximately 55% of the
current year’s consumption use is determined by last year’s consumption use. This is
positive news for ABCWUA, implying that there is room for behavior change.
All private sector accounts and large area public sector accounts have significantly
lower water budget use than small area public sector accounts. Ceteris paribus, a small
area private sector account will use 17% less than a small area public sector account;
a large area private sector account will use about 20% less. More than 70% of these
small public sector accounts are parks, schools fields and government accounts; the
39

For robustness, I also calculate X2 statistics on the differences in public sector versus private sector account changes in irrigating behavior from year to year that result in movement
between surcharge levels. Table D.2 in the Appendix reports statistics across time. The X2
test supports the earlier finding that there are significant differences in irrigating decisions
between public and private sector accounts.
40
All analysis was conducted using Stata 13.
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remainder are low water use street medians. As seen in Figure 4.7, these small public
sector accounts have higher rates of mega-water consumption above 1000% of the water budget, which helps to explain why the other three categories all have significantly
less use.
Interestingly, none of the control variables describing physical site characteristics
or weather are significant, except DaysAboveAvg which is positive and significant at
the 5% level. If there are 100 days between May and August with above average
temperatures, the percentage of the water budget used will increase by 42%.
Subsequently I estimate two specifications of the basic ordered logit model, noted
as Models II and III. There are three ordered categories to the dependent variable,
Consumption, with the categories ordered in increasing severity from efficient water
consumption to extreme water consumption. An ordered logit model assumes proportional odds or parallel regressions between each category and the combined other
categories. For this data that would mean an exogenous variable has the same impact
on the log odds of Pą0 as Pą1. More simply, a variable has the same impact on an
account having either excess or extreme water consumption levels (P=1,2) as on an account having extreme water consumption (P=2). I use a Brant test to test the parallel
regression assumption for both models, rejecting the null hypothesis that each set of
binary logit regressions has the same coefficients (Brant, 1990).41
I estimate and report results from a generalized ordered logit model that relaxes
the assumption of parallel regressions (see Tables 4.8 and 4.7).42 This model estimates
J ´ 1 binary equations, where J represents the number of ordered categories in the
dependent variable. There are three categories, Y “ 0, 1, 2. The binary regressions es¯
´
¯
´
P pY ą1q
pY ą0q
“
Xβ
and
log
timated are log PP pY
k
“0q
P pY ď1q “ Xβk . The first equation estimates

the probability of excess or extreme consumption versus efficient water consumption.
The second equation estimates the probability of extreme consumption versus efficient
41

2
The Brant test statistics were B “ 164.09 against a X0.05,10
“ 18.31 (Model II) and B “
2
176.77 against a X0.05,14 “ 23.69 (Model III).
42
The generalized ordered logit model was estimated in Stata 13 using the gologit2 command
(Williams, 2006).
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or excess water consumption. Using an iterative process, the variables that rejected
the hypothesis of equal coefficients were allowed to vary between the two binary regressions. The remaining variables were fixed. In this partial proportional odds model,
only the variables Lag1.Excess, Elevation5000, Park, HOA, Govt, PublicLarge, and PrivateLarge had a varying impact on the log odds of the two probabilities.
The coefficients in an ordered logit regression model are difficult to interpret alone.
A positive coefficient indicates an increase in the log odds of being in a higher category
when the exogenous variable changes by one-unit. A negative coefficient is the opposite. Marginal effects are more intuitive. A marginal effect is the partial derivative
of the ordered function when the exogenous variable changes by one unit. Marginal
effects for each account are calculated based on their characteristics and then average the marginal effects across the lagged consumption variable and the organization
characteristics PPsize. This is the preferred method for calculating marginal effects
(Greene, 2003).
Table 4.9 reports the marginal effects from Model II according to the probability
of each water consumption category as a function of last year’s water consumption
behavior and the PPsize variable. Efficient water consumption the previous year has
the strongest probability of repeat behavior this year, between 75% and 84% across
all public/private sector accounts of all sizes. Small landscape, private sector accounts
that had excess water consumption the previous year have a 47% probability of repeating the behavior but a 32% probability of having efficient water consumption in
the current year. Large landscape public sector accounts have a 66% probability of having excess water consumption in the current year if they had excess consumption the
previous year. Small landscape public sector accounts have the largest probability of
repeating extreme water consumption behavior if they were extreme water consumers
the previous year.43
43

In the residential literature finds mixed results as to the effect of conservation policies on
accounts with large landscaped areas or large water consumption needs. Renwick & Archibald
(1998); Kenney et al. (2008) find they are more responsive to conservation policies, while
Klaiber et al. (2012) find that these accounts are more price inelastic than low volume wa-
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Marginal effects from Model III are reported in Table 4.10 using the site categories. For all accounts, if they engaged in efficient water consumption the previous
year, there is a high probability that they will again be efficient water consumers; the
probabilities range from 71% to 88%. The same patterns of repeating the previous
year’s behavior are similarly high for accounts that were extreme water consumers.
All accounts, except HOAs and street medians, have more than a 60% probability
of extreme water consumption behavior in the current year. The probability that any
account that engages in extreme water consumption moves to efficient water consumption in the current year is very small, under 15% probability for most. However, there
is between a 10% and 30% probability of reducing water consumption behavior to the
excess consumption category. For ABCWUA, focusing on this consumption level might
be the most productive as they use proportionally more water (see Table 4.13); i.e. with
MultiFamily, 41% of account years are categorized as extreme water consumption with
67% of the total water use. And they have a very high probability of continuing extreme
water consumption.

At first glance, excess water consumption seems less problematic because less water is consumed than with extreme water consumption. The probability of changing
behavior appears more for this group. For most of the sites, except parks and HOAs,
there is less than a 50% probability that they will again have excess water consumption. For commercial, HOA, street medians, and churches, the probability of improving
their consumption behavior to the efficient consumption level is greater than the probability of becoming extreme water consumers. Parks, multi-family, education, and govt
have a greater probability of worse consumption levels becoming extreme consumers.
Preventing these four categories from higher consumption levels might be an area of
focus for ABCWUA as they have among the highest probability of repeating extreme
water consumption behavior.

ter users.
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4.6.2 Results Question 2: What is the elasticity of water
demand?
The second issue examined is the price elasticity of water demand. I estimate four
model specifications (Models IV through VII) to look at the elasticity of demand. Results are reported in Tables 4.11 and 4.12. Overall results indicate that demand is
inelastic, however it varies according to business types, water consumption levels, and
ownership/size. Within the site categories, parks and golf courses have the most inelastic demand, while commercial businesses have the most elastic demand. Accounts
with smaller landscaped areas have more elastic demand than accounts with larger
landscaped areas.
Model IV is the first column in Table 4.11. It is the baseline model. All variables
are significant. Both water use and average price are logged variables so the estimated
coefficient is interpreted as an elasticity. Estimated coefficients on the linear variables
are interpreted as the growth rate for a one-unit or one-percent change in the variable.
The elasticity is the primary coefficient of interest. Results indicate that demand
is inelastic, with an elasticity of demand of ´0.845. A 10% increase in the average
price would result in a reduction of 8.45% in water demand, ceteris paribus. While
this elasticity falls in the range of the absolute value of residential water demand
elasticities, it is at the higher end (Dalhuisen et al., 2003). However, residential demand also includes indoor use which is more price inelastic than outdoor use (Mansur
& Olmstead, 2012). Kenney et al. (2008) estimate a year-round elasticity in Aurora,
Colorado of ´0.60 and suggest that the elasticity would have been greater if they had
strictly focused on the season with high irrigation demand. The irrigation water budget program in some ways mimics a uniform pricing rate structure since the irrigation
customer pays a uniform commodity charge throughout the irrigating season, facing
a possible surcharge if the end consumption total exceeds their IWB. Estimated elasticity of demand is more comparable to elasticities found under uniform water pricing.
Baerenklau et al. (2014) estimate an elasticity of of ´0.76 for this price structure. In
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their meta-analysis of residential water demand studies, Dalhuisen et al. (2003) find
that the rate structure influences the elasticity of demand.
Also of interest, ownership and size have a significant effect on water demand.
Small landscape, private sector accounts use 66% less water in comparison to similar
size, public sector accounts. Not surprisingly, both public and private accounts with
large landscaped areas of more than 100,000 square feet have a greater water demand.
In the residential water demand literature, Mansur & Olmstead (2012) also find that
increasing lot sizes have a significant and positive relationship with outdoor water
demand. However large public accounts use 182% more water, while large private
accounts use 152% more water, all else equal.44
Finally, water demand is affected more by differences between irrigation-only customers, σu , than strictly random error, σe . This is similar to other studies as well
(S. Olmstead et al., 2007).
The second column in Table 4.11 reports the price elasticity for Model V, while Table
4.12 reports the price elasticity for Models VI and VII. Model V estimates price elasticity by SiteCat groups. Are all highly significant, as expected. The base price elasticity
of ´1.152 reflects commercial accounts. This group is the only site type with elastic
demand as measured with an absolute value of the elasticity of demand greater than
one, although both HOA and Govt site types have an elasticity of demand very close
to elastic (´0.986). Parks/golf have the most inelastic demand (´0.697). Subsequent ttests between the coefficients on the site types indicate that HOA, StreetMedian, Govt,
and Church site types do not have statistical differences in their elasticity estimates.
Also there is not a significant difference between multi-family and education site type
elasticities.
Figure 4.11 display the difference between the first and last account years by Site44

I tested for significant differences in water demand between the other three categories
using a X21 test and found that both public and private sector large landscape accounts are
significantly different from private sector small landscape accounts at the 1% level. However,
public and private sector large landscape accounts have weak significant differences at the
10% level.
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Cat. The y-axis indicates the average underlying consumption decision y ˚ , described
in Equation 4.2. Average water consumption as seen on the y-axis ranges between
efficient use (y=0) and excess use (y=1). Largest decrease in water consumption comes
in commercial, education, and churches. This suggests they were more responsive
to water budget programs. However, parks/golf and multi-family increased water consumption between the average first and last year. This confirms the results from Model
V, which shows that they have among the most inelastic demand.
Results from Model VI compare the elasticities of accounts based on the 5th, 15th,
85th, and 95th percentiles of overall budget use. The interaction terms budg5 and
budg15 indicate accounts that were very efficient water consumers. Those accounts
used, on average, 18% and 34% of their water budgets. Budg85 and budg95 were the
most extreme water consumers, using 182% and 292% of their water budget, respectively.
Budg5 and budg15 accounts are significantly more price responsive (although still
price inelastic) as compared to the middle 70% of accounts of budget use, while Budg85
and budg95 are significantly more price inelastic. This could reflect the landscaping
decision of accounts. Accounts that use smaller percentages of the IWB might have
more of their landscape using xeric plantings while the accounts that are in the highest
percentile of budget use could have a greater percentage dedicated to turf or athletic
fields. Or it could reflect a different organizational structure where the accounts in
the highest use percentiles are indifferent to the surcharge rate and so ignore it when
making their water consumption decision.
Finally, Model VII interacts PPsize with price. With regards to the price elasticity,
the size of the landscaped area appears to have a great impact on the price responsiveness. The baseline for comparison are small, public sector accounts. Compared to the
baseline, both private and public large landscape accounts are significantly less price
responsive. This contradicts Renwick & Archibald (1998), who find that increasingly
severe, mandatory price and nonprice conservation policies were the most effective
for households with larger outdoor water needs due to more landscaped areas. How-
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ever, perhaps the small landscape accounts have a correspondingly small employee
size and so can better manage their water consumption or respond quicker to a surcharge. Small private sector accounts have a greater absolute value of price elasticity,
but the effect is weak at the 5% level and small (´0.033). T-tests between the coefficients of each dummy variable indicate that there is no significant difference between
the price elasticity of private and public large accounts.

4.7 Conclusion
The irrigation water budget program is a long-term conservation policy designed to
encourage irrigation-only customers to optimally consume water and reduce wasteful consumptive water practices. Water budgets are seen as more equitable because
they avoid many of the allocative issues associated with conservation policies while
preserving a greater measure of flexibility for customers to make optimal water consumption decisions for their household. Customers with certain characteristics, such
has households on large parcels or different income levels, bear a greater conservation burden under certain policies. Water budgets assign a quantity of water based on
customer characteristics, that is sufficient for efficient water consumption. Irrigation
water budgets are annual in nature, so the customer receives an allotment of water to
use throughout the irrigating season. They can allocate their watering in response to
weather patterns and make optimal landscaping decisions.
To analyze the ABCWUA water budget program, I use an unbalanced panel of six
years of annual water consumption data for 1,107 irrigation-only accounts. Annually,
approximately half of all accounts are within their water budget (efficient water use),
while 25% have excess water use and 25% have extreme water use. Overall the account
years, 40% of accounts never exceed their water budget, while 27% consistently exceed
it.
There are organizational differences in irrigating patterns across the years of the
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dataset and the percentage of the water budget used. Public and private sector accounts have significantly different water consumption behavior. Almost half of private
sector accounts with less than 100,000 square feet of landscaped area never exceed
their IWB, while only one-fourth of large landscape public sector accounts do. All private sector accounts use significantly smaller percentage of their water budget than
public sector accounts. Findings indicate differences in water consumption behavior
between site categories as well. Commercial, HOA, and street median accounts have
the highest percentages of never exceeding their water budgets; parks/golf, education
and multi-family accounts have the lowest percentages of never exceeding and the
highest percentage of accounts that consistently exceed their water budget.
Estimated marginal effects from the ordered logit, partial proportional odds model
indicate that the previous year’s consumption level affects the probability of this year’s
consumption level. Accounts that either had efficient or extreme water consumption
the previous year, have very high probabilities of being in the same consumption level
this year. I find this is less true for accounts who had excess water consumption (defined as between 100-150% of the water budget), who have higher probabilities of
behavior changes. Results by site categories indicate that commercial, HOA, street
medians, and churches have a greater probability of moving from excess to efficient
water consumption in comparison to moving from excess to extreme water consumption. ABCWUA might achieve greater results in terms of encouraging efficient water
consumption with these categories.
A 2SLS model is used to estimate price elasticity of demand. For all accounts, the
elasticity is ´0.845, which is in line with other studies in the literature. When interaction terms are included to analyze the price responsiveness of different groups,
interesting policy recommendations emerge. Accounts with large landscaped areas, regardless of whether they are public or private sector, have more inelastic demand than
public/private sector accounts with small landscaped areas. Many of the large landscaped areas are golf courses and athletic fields which already have water budgets
that incorporate a greater number of irrigation inches per square foot. So the greater
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inelasticity should not reflect their water budget allotments, but rather latent organizational characteristics. Commercial, HOA, and govt accounts are the most price
responsive and parks/golf, multi-family, and educational accounts are the least. A look
at their irrigating status across all years of data, these three groups also consistently
exceed their water budget at a higher rate than other groups.
From a policy standpoint, the demand elasticity results suggest that the price signal through the rate structure is not steep enough to make a change in behavior. Recently, ABCWUA enacted a third water surcharge tier for consumption above 200% of
the irrigation budget with a surcharge of 1.5 times the commodity charge (ABCWUA,
2014). This is a step in the right direction, however higher fines may be necessary.
The Las Vegas Valley Water District calculates excess water use surcharges for golf
courses at a rate of 200%, 500%, and 900% of the highest non-potable water rate.45

45

(Las Vegas Valley Water District website, Service Rules Section 12: Conservation, accessed
March 7, 2014 at http://www.lvvwd.com/assets/pdf/serv rules fulldoc.pdf)
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4.8 Tables
Table 4.1: Characteristics of ABCWUA water customers and water use
ABCWUA
Customer
Typesa

Number of
accounts,
Dec 2013

Percent
of total
accnts

Percent
of total
consumption

Gallons
consumed,
2013 (million)

Percent of
consumption,
outdoor use

Residential
Multi-familyb
Commercial,
Industrial, &
Institutional
Other

178,968
6,589
14,299

87%
3%
7.06%

53%
15%
23%

14,900
4,307
6,495

37%
25%
44%

3,964

2%

9%

2,403

70%

Total ABCWUA 205,316
99.06%c 100%
28,104
Data on customer classes, 2013 water usage, and outdoor water usage provided
by Katherine Yuhas, March 5, 2014.
a
Residential include single-family detached, condos, townhouse, duplexes and
mobile homes all with individual meters. Multi-family indicates an common meter
account for one or more units, i.e. 3- and 4-plexes, apartment complexes, and homes
with guest houses. Commercial includes retail, offices, hotels/motels, shopping centers
that do not use water in production. Industrial means a manufacturing facility using water
in production. Institutional are government buildings, hospitals, schools. Other includes
irrigation-only accounts, fire hydrants, and fire lines. ABCWUA Water and Sewer Rate
Ordinance, accessed 3/7/14 on-line at: http://www.abcwua.org/uploads/files/waterrate.pdf
b
Accounts represent 96,976 units. An apartment building is one account with
multiple units. Email from K. Yuhas, 3/5/14.
c
Solid waste accounts are excluded.
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Table 4.2: Water consumption and surcharge statistics by year
Variable
Uset

Budgett

PctIWBt

Surcht

Description

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Avg. water use
(in unitsa )
Max. water use
(in unitsa )

5,352

5,129

5,795

5,579

4,998

4,468

308,980

291,339

293,970

306,249

327,374

317,671

5,127

5,008

5,395

5,340

4,372

4,319

272,620

272,620

272,620

272,620

272,620

272,620

Avg. % of water
budget used
Max. % of water
budget used

127%

120%

107%

127%

124%

122%

1,436%

1,441%

697%

2,875%

2,625%

2,696%

Avg. surcharge
Max. surcharge

$1,876
$48,493

$1,848
$42,429

$2,065
$42,874

$2,156
$61,253

$1,735
$54,867

$1,625
$36,433

Avg. water
budget (unitsa )
Max. water
budget (unitsa )

Obs.
678
698
660
709
1,002
a
1 unit of water = 748 gallons
b
This excludes the observations that were dropped for using ă 10% of the IWB.

1,001

Table 4.3: Statistics describing water consumption patterns related to the water budget
Variable

Description

Freq. (%)

Never
Occasional
Half
Most
Consistent

Never exceeded its water budget for valid data years
Stayed within water budget most valid data years
Equal years within and exceeding water budget
Exceeded water budget the majority of valid data years
Exceeded water budget every valid data year

432 (39%)
136 (12%)
98 (9%)
147 (13%)
294 (27%)

Total Obs.

1,107
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Table 4.4: Model Variables
Variables

Description

Mean

S.d.

Min.

Max.

122

143

11

2,875

0.70

0.82

0

2

5,154

21,094

1

327,374

85

13

71

102

112

10

100

126

1.12

0.52

0

2

0.22

0.42

0

1

0.71

0.45

0

1

0.07

0.25

0

1

0.31

0.46

0

1

Dependent Variables for Models
PctIWBjt

Percent of water budget used
(Model I); continuous
(WaterUse/WaterBudget)

Consumptionjt

Water consumption, f(PctIWB)
(Models II-III); categorical
0=efficient, 1=excess, 2=extreme

WaterUsejt

Water use (in unitsa )
(Models IV-VII); continuous

Weather Characteristics (Wt ) in yeart
DaysAboveAvgt

Days with above average
temperatures, May-August

Days90t

Days between the first
and last 90˝ F days

Physical Site Characteristics (Pj ) at sitej
SoilWaterj

Ease of water infiltration in soil
0=little, 1=somewhat, 2=more

Elevation5000j

Elevation ď 5000 ft.;
1=yes, 0=no

Elevation5300j

Elevation is 5050 - 5650 feet;

(base category)

1=yes, 0=no

Elevation5700j

Elevation ě 5700 feet;
1=yes, 0=no

Organizational Site Characteristics (Oj ) at sitej
Site category (SiteCatj )
Commercialj

Restaurant, Healthcare, Fitness,

(base category)

Other Commercial, Retail,
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Table 4.4: Model Variables
Variables

Description

Mean

S.d.

Min.

Max.

0.16

0.37

0

1

0.22

0.42

0

1

Wholesale, Office, or Shop. center
HOAj

Home Owners Association,
townhome, or condo association

Parkj

Parks, little league fields,
community center,
golf course, cemetery

StreetMedianj

City or county street median

0.09

0.29

0

1

Multij

Hotel/Motel; Multi/Apartment;

0.07

0.25

0

1

0.06

0.23

0

1

0.08

0.27

0

1

0.02

0.15

0

1

Public sector, ď 100,000 ft2

0.27

0.45

0

1

Public sector, ě 100,000 ft2

0.16

0.37

0

1

0.49

0.50

0

1

0.08

0.27

0

1

14

2.3

11

18

26

5

17

36

Senior Housing
Educationj

Albuquerque Public Schools,
community college,
or other school

Govtj

City Public Works Dept., County,
Federal, State buildings

Churchj

Church

Public or private sector and size (PPsizej )
PublicSmallj
(base)
PublicLargej
PrivateSmallj
PrivateLargej

Private sector, ď 100,000 ft2

Private sector, ě 100,000 ft2

Demand Characteristics (Djt )
Budg5jt

Mean PctIWB, very low budget
use accts, ď 5th percentile of
budget useb

Budg15jt

Mean PctIWB, low budget use
accts, 5th - 15th percentile of
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Table 4.4: Model Variables
Variables

Description

Mean

S.d.

Min.

Max.

219

32

167

322

530

398

230

2,875

budget useb
Budg85jt

Mean PctIWB, high budget use
accts, 85th - 95th percentile of
budget useb

Budg95jt

Mean PctIWB, very high
budget use accts, ě 95th

percentile of budget useb
a

1 unit of water = 748 gallons (1 cubic foot of water = 7.48 gallons, so 1 unit = 100feet3

b

Statistics indicate the percentage of the budget used by accounts at the 5th,

15th, 85th, and 95th percentiles.
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Table 4.5: Tests of significance between average water budget use of public and
private sector accounts
Variable

2008
Mean
(S.d.)

2009
Mean
(S.d.)

2010
Mean
(S.d.)

2011
Mean
(S.d.)

2012
Mean
(S.d.)

2013
Mean
(S.d.)

Public

129
(138)
126
(141)
-0.3451
1.645
676
0.7301

130
(150)
110
(124)
-1.9569
1.645
696
0.0508

116
(82)
98
(74)
-2.9609
1.645
658
0.0032

148
(222)
109
(97)
-3.0823
1.645
707
0.0021

134
(157)
117
(137)
-1.8993
1.645
1000
0.0578

134
(165)
113
(155)
-2.0812
1.645
999
0.0377

678

698

660

709

1002

1001

Private
t-statistic
t-stat˚ pdf, α “ 0.05q
d.f.
Pr(|T | ą |t|)
Obs

H0 : MeanP rivate - MeanP ublic = 0, Ha = MeanP rivate - MeanP ublic ‰ 0
Variable being compared is PctIWB
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Table 4.6: Results Model I: Does past water consumption influence current
irrigating behavior?

Variable

(Model I)
Coefficient (s.e.)

Dependent variable: PctIWBjt
Lag1.PctIWB
0.55 (0.01)***
Soilwater
0.48 (3.90)
Elevation5000 -6.69 (3.79)
Elevation5700 -0.83 (5.56)
Days90
-0.21 (0.20)
DaysAboveAvg 0.42 (0.17)*
PubLargea
-17.46 (4.59)***
a
PrivSmall
-16.93 (3.89)***
PrivLargea
-19.66 (6.41)***
Constant
52.69 (34.13)
σu
14.95
σe
67.07
ρ
0.05
Significance levels: *** ď 0.001, ** ď 0.01, * ď 0.05
a
The baseline category is: public sector, ď 100,000 ft2 .
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Table 4.7: Results Model II: What characteristics increase the probability of an
account exceeding its water budget or engaging in extreme water consumption?
(Model II)
Logit probability

Variable Name

Prob Y ą 0
Prob Y ą 1
Excess or Extreme Use
Extreme Use
vs.
vs.
(Efficient Use)
(Efficient or Excess Use)
Coeff. (s.e.)
Coeff. (s.e.)

Ordered dependent variable: Consumptionjt
Independent variables
Lag1.Excess
2.44 (0.10)***
1.53 (0.13)***
Lag1.Extreme
3.50 (0.11)***
3.50 (0.11)***
DaysAboveAvg
0.02 (0.005)***
0.02 (0.005)***
Days90
0.01 (0.006)*
0.01 (0.006)*
Elevation5000b
-0.27 (0.10)**
-0.27 (0.10)**
Elevation5700
-0.09 (0.14)
-0.09 (0.14)
SoilWater
0.02 (0.10)
0.02 (0.10)
PublicLargec
0.17 (0.13)
-1.00 (0.15)***
PrivateSmall
-0.39 (0.10)***
-0.398 (0.10)***
PrivateLarge
-0.22 (0.18)
-0.98 (0.21)***
Constant
-4.62 (0.98)***
-5.79 (0.98)***
LL score
-2379.1983
Psuedo R2
0.2796
AIC
4788.397
BIC
4879.413
Number of obs.
3190
a
b
c

Significance levels: ˚ ˚ ˚ ď 0.001, ** ď 0.01, * ď 0.05
The baseline category is Elevation5300.
The baseline category is public sector with landscape size ď 100, 000 ft2 .
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Table 4.8: Results Model III: What characteristics increase the probability of an
account exceeding its water budget or engaging in extreme water consumption?
(Model III)
Logit probability

Variable Name

Prob Y ą 0
Prob Y ą 1
Excess or Extreme Use
Extreme Use
vs.
vs.
(Efficient Use)
(Efficient or Excess Use)
Coeff. (s.e.)
Coeff. (s.e.)

Ordered dependent variable: Consumptionjt
Independent variables
Lag1.Excess
2.37 (0.10)***
1.50 (0.13)***
Lag1.Extreme
3.49 (0.12)***
3.49 (0.12)***
DaysAboveAvg
0.02 (0.005)***
0.02 (0.005)***
Days90
0.01 (0.006)*
0.01 (0.006)*
Elevation5000b
-0.27 (0.11)*
-0.02 (0.12)
Elevation5700
-0.15 (0.14)
-0.15 (0.14)
SoilWater
0.01 (0.10)
0.01 (0.10)
Parkc
0.82 (0.12)***
-0.16 (0.13)
HOA
-0.07 (0.14)
-0.42 (0.17)*
StreetMedian
-0.22 (0.19)
-0.22 (0.19)
Multi
0.57 (0.17)***
0.57 (0.17)***
Education
0.29 (0.19)
0.29 (0.19)
Govt
0.48 (0.20)*
0.82 (0.21)***
Church
0.11 (0.27)
0.11 (0.27)
Constant
-5.18 (0.99)***
-6.38 (0.99)***
LL score
-2360.0544
2
Psuedo R
0.2854
AIC
4762.109
BIC
4889.532
Number of obs.
3190
a
b
c

Significance levels: ˚ ˚ ˚ ď 0.001, ** ď 0.01, * ď 0.05
The baseline category is Elevation5300.
The baseline category is commercial IWB account.
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Table 4.9: Marginal effects Model II: probability of Public/private sector accounts’ water consumption given last year’s irrigating behavior
Lag1.Efficient
Lag1.Excess
P(1)
P(2)
P(0)
P(1)
P(2)
(CI)
(CI)
(CI)
(CI)
(CI)
Public, smc
0.130
0.061
0.234
0.552
0.214
(0.12,0.14) (0.06,0.07) (0.22,0.24) (0.54,0.57) (0.21,0.22)
Public, lgc
0.205
0.054
0.203
0.610
0.187
(0.20,0.21) (0.05,0.06) (0.20,0.21) (0.60,0.62) (0.18,0.19)
Private, sm
0.105
0.051
0.336
0.471
0.193
(0.10,0.11) (0.05,0.05) (0.33,0.35) (0.47,0.48) (0.19,0.20)
0.312
0.487
0.201
Private , lg
0.122
0.053
(0.12,0.13) (0.05,0.06) (0.30,0.33) (0.48,0.50) (0.19,0.22)
Lag1.Extreme
P(0)
P(1)
P(2)
(CI)
(CI)
(CI)
Public, sm
0.102
0.235
0.663
(0.10,0.11) (0.22,0.25) (0.65,0.67)
Public, lg
0.076
0.293
0.631
(0.07,0.08) (0.28,0.31) (0.62,0.65)
Private, sm 0.140
0.210
0.650
(0.14,0.14) (0.21,0.22) (0.64,0.66)
Private , lg 0.128
0.216
0.656
(0.12,0.14) (0.20,0.23) (0.63,0.68)
Marginal effects were estimated at the means of the physical site and weather variables.
a
P(0) = Pr(efficient consumption); P(1) = Pr(excess consumption);
P(2) = Pr(extreme consumption)
b
95% confidence intervals (CI) were calculated from the individual average using:
σx
x ˘ 1.96 ˚ ?
where x is the average individual
n
marginal effect, σx is the s.d. and n is the number of observations.
c
Small (sm) indicates landscaped area ă 100,000feet2 , Large (lg) indicates ą 100,000feet2
P(0)a
(CI)b
0.809
(0.80,0.82)
0.741
(0.73,0.75)
0.844
(0.84,0.85)
0.825
(0.82,0.83)
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Table 4.10: Marginal effects Model III: probability of water consumption by site
category given last year’s consumption
Lag1.Efficient
Lag1.Excess
P(0)
P(1)
P(2)
P(1)
P(2)
(CI)
(CI)
(CI)
(CI)
(CI)
Commercial
0.098
0.054
0.344
0.453
0.204
(.10,.10)
(.05,.06)
(.34,.35) (.45,.46) (.20,.21)
Parks
0.240
0.046
0.188
0.631
0.181
(.19,.19) (.63,.63) (.18,.18)
(.24,.24)
(.05,.05)
HOA
0.105
0.037
0.364
0.492
0.143
(.10,.11)
(.04,.04)
(.36,.37) (.49,.50) (.14,.15)
0.399
0.430
0.171
StreetMedian
0.077
0.043
(.07,.08)
(.04,.04)
(.38,.42) (.42,.44) (.16,.18)
MultiFamily
0.147
0.093
0.228
0.467
0.306
(.14,.15)
(.09,.10)
(.22,.24) (.46,.47) (.29,.32)
0.283
0.466
0.251
Education
0.129
0.072
(.12,.13)
(.07,.08)
(.27,.30) (.46,.47) (.24,.26)
Govt
0.099
0.111
0.248
0.386
0.366
(.24,.26) (.38,.40) (.35,.38)
(.09,.11)
(.11,.12)
Church
0.109
0.063
0.329
0.456
0.214
(.31,.35) (.45,.45) (.20,.23)
(.10,.12)
(.06,.07)
Lag1.Extreme
P(0)
P(1)
P(2)
(CI)
(CI)
(CI)
Commercial
0.152
0.208
0.640
(0.15,0.16) (0.20,0.21) (0.63,0.65)
Parks
0.072
0.317
0.611
(0.07,0.07) (0.31,0.32) (0.60,0.62)
HOA
0.163
0.296
0.540
(0.16,0.17) (0.29,0.30) (0.53,0.55)
StreetMedian 0.200
0.216
0.584
(0.19,0.21) (0.21,0.22) (0.57,0.60)
MultiFamily
0.089
0.152
0.759
(0.09,0.09) (0.15,0.16) (0.75,0.77)
Education
0.117
0.173
0.710
(0.11,0.12) (0.17,0.18) (0.70,0.72)
Govt
0.097
0.099
0.804
(0.09,0.10) (0.10,0.10) (0.80,0.81)
Church
0.138
0.194
0.669
(0.13,0.15) (0.18,0.20) (0.65,0.69)
Marginal effects were estimated at the means of the physical site and weather variables.
a
P(0) = Pr(efficient consumption); P(1) = Pr(excess consumption);
P(2) = Pr(extreme consumption)
b
95% confidence intervals (CI) were calculated from the individual average using:
σx
, where x is the average
x ˘ 1.96 ˚ ?
n
individual marginal effect, σx is the s.d. and n is the number of observations.
P(0)a
(CI)b
0.848
(.85,.85)
0.714
(.71,.72)
0.858
(.86,.86)
0.880
(.88,.88)
0.760
(.75,.77)
0.799
(.79, .81)
0.790
(.78,.80)
0.828
(.82,.84)
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Table 4.11: Results Models IV and V: What is the elasticity of water demand?

Variable Name

(Model IV)
Coefficient (s.e.)

Dependent variable: Ln(waterusejt )
AvgPrice
-0.845 (0.227)***
AvgPrice * Park
AvgPrice * HOA
AvgPrice * StreetMedian
AvgPrice * MultiFamily
AvgPrice * Education
AvgPrice * Govt
AvgPrice * Church
DaysAboveAvgt
0.002 (0.001)*
Days90t
-0.003 (0.001)**
PublicLarget
1.819 (0.104)***
PrivateSmallt
-0.662 (0.101)***
PrivateLarget
1.517 (0.165)***
Constant
12.996 (1.723)***
σu
1.353
σe
0.449
ρ
0.901
No. of observations
4578
No. of irrigation accounts 1085
Significance levels: *** ď 0.001, ** ď 0.01, * ď 0.05
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(Model V)
Coefficient (s.e.)

-1.152 (0.221)***
0.455 (0.029)***
0.166 (0.031)***
0.206 (0.038)***
0.327 (0.043)***
0.352 (0.047)***
0.166 (0.041)***
0.214 (0.068)**
0.002 (0.001)*
-0.004 (0.001)***

13.858 (1.621)***
2.668
0.536
0.961
4578
1085
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Table 4.12: Results Models VI and VII: What is the elasticity of water demand?

Variable Name

(Model VI)
Coefficient (s.e.)

Dependent variable: Ln(waterusejt )
AvgPrice
-0.605 (0.178)***
AvgPrice * budg5
-0.203 (0.004)***
AvgPrice * budg15
-0.125 (0.003)***
AvgPrice * budg85
0.089 (0.006)***
AvgPrice * budg95
0.166 (0.010)***
AvgPrice * PubLg
AvgPrice * PrivSm
AvgPrice * PrivLg
DaysAboveAvgt
0.002 (0.001)**
Days90t
-0.003 (0.001)**
PublicLarget
1.843 (0.072)***
PrivateSmallt
-0.565 (0.074)***
PrivateLarget
1.308 (0.119)***
Constant
11.241 (1.341)***
σu
1.026
σe
0.308
ρ
0.917
No. of observations
4578
No. of irrigation accounts 1085
Significance levels: *** ď 0.001, ** ď 0.01, * ď 0.05
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(Model VII)
Coefficient (s.e.)

-0.782 (0.224)***

0.272 (0.014)***
-0.033 (0.014)*
0.249 (0.023)***
0.002 (0.001)*
-0.003 (0.001)**

12.258 (1.688)***
1.504
0.481
0.907
4578
1085
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Table 4.13: Policy issues: Water use by consumption level and category
All obs.

Commercial
Parks
HOA
StreetMedian
MultiFamily
Education
Govt
Church
Total

Obs.
1,270
1,246
817
388
330
249
336
112
4,748

Consumption level
Efficient
Excess
Use
Pct. Pct. Pct.
(units)
obs. use obs.
1,824,894
60% 31% 16%
16,151,427 36% 26% 41%
2,315,605
66% 37% 21%
635,310
72% 51% 13%
859,938
39% 16% 20%
1,753,253
43% 38% 29%
776,543
52% 22% 15%
152,096
56% 33% 19%
24,469,066

Extreme
Pct. Pct.
use obs.
31% 24%
62% 23%
46% 14%
30% 14%
17% 41%
37% 27%
33% 33%
27% 25%

Includes all years of valid observations based on consumption levels.
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Pct.
use
38%
12%
16%
18%
67%
25%
44%
40%
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Figure 4.1: Irrigation consumption level all accounts, 2008-2013
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Figure 4.2: Irrigation consumption level all accounts, by year
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Figure 4.3: Mean and median percent water budget used by year
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Figure 4.4: Water budget pct used with median all accounts, by year
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Figure 4.5: Irrigation patterns by public/private sector and landscape
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Figure 4.6: Irrigation patterns by site categories
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Figure 4.7: Percent budget use, public sector small landscape
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Figure 4.8: Percent budget use, private sector small landscape
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Figure 4.9: Percent budget use, public sector large landscape
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Figure 4.10: Percent budget use, private sector large landscape
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Figure 4.11: Comparison of first and last year consumption levels, by site categories

Comm/ShopCtr
HOA
Park/Golf/Cem

Median

Multi−family
Education

Tier, First Year

163

Gov’t

Tier, Last Year

Church

Chapter 5
Conclusion

5.1 Overview
Water utilities must balance conflicting goals. Federal agencies, industry organizations and utilities themselves are warning ratepayers that infrastructure is deteriorating and will need increased levels of investment to maintain or improve on current service levels. All have warned that ratepayers will likely pay for the majority
of needed investments through higher rates or taxes. Investment costs are rising as
utilities delay investing.
At the same time, finding additional sources of water supply needed due to population growth and changing climate are forcing utilities to promote water conservation
policies that encourage efficient water consumption. These policies have had the unintended effect of reducing revenues to the point that water utilities have had to raise
rates just to cover their current fixed costs. Encouraging additional conservation or
efficient consumption policies can also have the effect of allowing a water utility to delay investing in additional large capital infrastructure projects, which could help them
focus their investment funds on the currently deteriorating infrastructure.
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Water utility managers cannot just raise rates to cover their costs. As a regulated
natural monopoly, rate increases must be approved by a regulators or a water board.
Utility managers should understand their ratepayers’ priorities and their willingnessto-pay for improved service levels as one way to substantiate any rate increase request.
In the face of increasing rates, water utilities need to promote efficient water consumption so ratepayers feel that their rates are being used efficiently. These are the issues
addressed by my dissertation. Specifically, I first examine the issues of ratepayer preferences for infrastructure investments and distribution of benefits using choice experiment data from a water utility serving a metropolitan city in the southwest U.S.. I
conclude by analyzing the water budget program developed by the same utility for a
category of customers whose water consumption is strictly for outdoor, irrigation purposes.

5.2 Chapter 2
5.2.1 Gaps in the literature
Chapter 2 examines the question of ratepayers’ preferences for investing in three types
of water utility infrastructure using a random parameters logit model that specifies
correlated attributes. In the literature on modeling preferences from discrete choice
models, there is a trade-off between econometrically sophisticated methods and information that is useful. Studies have focused on improved econometric specifications or
on basic policy-useful models; this chapter attempts to examine them both together.
Allowing preference heterogeneity is seen as more behaviorally realistic and more
informative to policymakers who want to understand how preferences and WTP vary
across groups with different attitudes or demographics. Random parameters logit
models are widely used in the economic valuation literature; both observable and latent heterogeneity can be modeled in RPL models. Specifying a correlated attributes
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structure within the RPL structure is gaining ground. It has been shown to be an
econometric improvement on uncorrelated attribute specifications through improved
model fit. Some researchers note that correlated attribute structures provide additional, policy-useful information regarding how individuals view groups of attributes
together. However, there have been conflicting results as to whether a correlated attributes structure results in more or less conservative central statistical moments of
the MWTP distribution. And there is a lack of consensus as to whether estimated
welfare effects from RPL models with correlated and uncorrelated attributes are statistically different.
Specifically, the water utility literature has primarily used studies that incorporated either multinomial logit models with classical heterogeneity or random parameters models that allow heterogeneity about the mean. Only a couple have used more
recent econometric methods. I estimate RPL models with and without correlated attributes in order to examine the impact on preference heterogeneity and the distribution of estimated MWTP.

5.2.2 Summary of major findings
The results of this chapter indicate that the majority of ratepayers are WTP for investments in drinking water distribution infrastructure that maintain their current
levels of service, in reuse pipe infrastructure that allows for increased irrigation of urban greenspace with reuse water, and in infrastructure that allows the water utility
to increase their use of renewable energy to treat and distribute water for consumption. Preference heterogeneity exists for all infrastructure attributes except for the
percentage of time the utility notifies ratepayers of a planned outage due to preventive
maintenance on pipes. Latent reasons for heterogeneity appear to cause the greatest
variation in preferences. However differences in income, education level, previous outage experience and water conservation attitudes are observable influences resulting in
heterogeneity about the mean.
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The best econometric fit occurs with a correlated attributes structure within an
RPL model that allows for both latent heterogeneity and heterogeneity about the
mean. The correlation matrices indicate that individuals who prefer high levels of
investment in reuse water infrastructure also prefer higher levels of investment in renewable energy infrastructure. Individuals who are willing to tolerate longer average
outages prefer lower costs, indicating perhaps that they are more price sensitive and
would prefer adaptive behavior to worsening service rather than higher rates.
However, the best fitting model has a more dispersed distribution of estimated
MWTP and a greater number of individuals with extreme, negative preferences. This
causes the more conservative mean and median MWTP estimates. Due to the wide
variance, we do not find that the MWTP estimates from correlated and uncorrelated
attribute specifications are not significantly different.

5.2.3 Contribution
This paper demonstrates the importance of looking at the whole distribution of MWTP
and not just the central statistical moments to understand the impact of a model. Often, more conservative estimates are considered an improvement without considering
what is driving them. Findings indicate that the correlated attributes structure may
be an improvement econometrically, but at the cost of a wider variance in MWTP distribution and more extreme MWTP values, especially at the negative end. This results
in the more conservative mean and median moments. Yet due to the large variance,
there is no statistical difference between the mean values between a correlated and
uncorrelated attributes model specification. Estimates from the correlated model are
up to 24% less than those from the uncorrelated model.
This paper also contributes WTP values for attributes described in the context of
needed infrastructure investments. Given the issues faced by water utilities, it is
important to frame the issue not just as maintaining or increasing service levels, but
the infrastructure required to achieve desired service levels. The attributes describing
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the percentage of urban greenspace watered by reuse water and the percentage of
energy used by the utility coming from renewable sources have not been used in many
prior studies and can be applied in the context of current renewable energy regulations
and the discussion about renewable water sources for non-potable water demand.

5.2.4 Policy implications
Water utility managers can use the results to support their rate increase requests to
their regulatory boards. My results indicate that individuals are willing-to-pay an
additional amount on their monthly bills for additional investments in pipe and renewable energy infrastructure. Several U.S. water agencies are re-examining their
water demand and conservation policies to be more responsive to increasing drought
conditions; Australia’s experience with their decade-long extreme drought provides an
example of the changing climate in water utilities. Regulatory boards in Australia and
England already require water utilities to provide evidence that they have included
their customers’ WTP in their cost-benefit analyses of investment projects. Economic
valuation surveys are useful in this regard.
ABCWUA acknowledges an investment gap between current investment levels in
capital and what is needed over the next century, especially in the next 50-60 years
when replacement levels will peak. They have considered various funding scenarios
to increase investment levels, however discarded the scenario that would most effectively remove the investment gap as not feasible economically for their ratepayers. In
examining a hypothetical infrastructure project, we show that utility customers have
a WTP of around $6.50 per month.

5.2.5 Directions for future research
Given the competing priorities currently faced by water utilities, choice experiment
surveys are an useful tool for examining ratepayers’ preferences across different poli-
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cies. The climate under which utilities operate has changed drastically in the past
decade in the face of climate change and infrastructure that is rapidly deteriorating.
Water utilities cannot completely rely on the results of studies done a decade ago under different circumstances. Issues of benefit transfer should be investigated as well
to understand how how well point estimates or the MWTP distribution transfers from
the original study. If the same choice experiment was done in a different utility then
benefit transfer values could be compared. More investigation into the correlated attributes model structure is also called for to improve understanding of the impact of
the variance covariance matrix on coefficients and preferences.

5.3 Chapter 3
5.3.1 Gaps in the literature
Chapter 3 uses the same dataset as in the previous chapter. I use another new approach to estimating WTP from discrete choice models and compare it to the standard
practice. The WTP-space model has been praised for reducing the extreme variances
and outliers present in the MWTP distribution when estimating standard mixed logit
models (referred to as estimating ‘preference-space’ models). The WTP-space model
re-parameterizes the coefficients in the standard preference-space mixed logit, separating the heterogeneity in willingness-to-pay values from heterogeneity in scale/price.
This is accomplished through mathematically rearranging the preference-space mixed
logit model so that estimated coefficients on non-cost attributes can be interpreted as
willingness-to-pay values while the coefficient on the cost attribute is interpreted in
the standard way as the heterogeneous marginal utility of income, still confounded
with a heterogeneous scale term. This allows the researcher to directly specify the
MWTP distribution. Studies have shown that this model specification leads to tighter
confidence intervals and more realistic MWTP distribution.
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The two models are referred to as functionally equivalent, however little attention
has been paid to if they are behaviorally equivalent or if the MWTP distribution in
the WTP-space conforms to theory. To my knowledge, there has not been any study
that looks at the effect on the MWTP distribution of separately estimating a heterogeneous MUI from the WTP coefficients. Early practitioners of environmental valuation
methods suggested using various validity tests on the distributional results from contingent valuation studies to assess if the results are theoretically sound. An example
is the income validity test; MWTP values should be increasing in income because of
the marginal utility of income in the denominator of the WTP ratio. This positive relationship has been shown in studies using choice experiment data and is one method
of assessing behavioral reliability of the WTP-space results.

5.3.2 Summary of major findings
My initial findings are consistent with other studies that find the results from the
mixed logit preference-space model fit the data better but the MWTP distribution from
the WTP-space model does have a tighter variance and fewer extreme outliers. However, the impact of the separate MUI is to reduce the heterogeneity of WTP across
income classes. The WTP-space estimates fail an income validity test. There is little difference between median MWTP estimates for low income individuals and high
income individuals.
Findings indicate that the WTP-space model and the preference-space model with
fixed cost have very similar distributions and MWTP estimates. With the preferencespace model, between 2 and 10% of MWTP estimates can be dropped to have a MWTP
distribution that does not have theoretically-incorrect negative estimates. These individuals tend to be the higher-income, price insensitive individuals whose MWTP is
thus disregarded. However, in this dataset negative MWTP values are interpreted as
adaptive behaviors, so there is no need to drop them. In this case, a preference-space
model with heterogeneous MUI might be preferable.
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5.3.3 Contribution
This paper contributes to the growing WTP-space literature by using a modified GMNL
method to estimate the WTP-space model and then examining the distribution of
MWTP across income groups. While estimated MWTP from WTP-space models are
an attractive alternative to preference-space methods, a clear understanding of the
impact of the income effect is needed. This paper is a first step. I briefly discuss a
weighting scheme to look at the benefits received by income class.

5.3.4 Policy implications
Aggregate social benefits are often estimated using WTP values and impact on socioeconomic groups can be studied. Federal policies often mandate impact studies to better understand how increasing costs affect the welfare of low-income or other affected
groups. In order to effectively use the results from WTP-space models, weighting the
MWTP estimates provides an income effect context that is otherwise lacking. Without
that, the benefits to the median high and low income individual appear to be about the
same, at least for this data.

5.3.5 Directions for future research
The smaller variance in the MWTP distribution is a promising aspect of the WTPspace mixed logit model because it reduces the incidence of the extreme outliers that
make the MWTP distribution from preference-space mixed logit less usable. It is a
newer method however and many small issues have not been investigated. There are
primarily two methods featured in the current literature that are used for estimating
a WTP-space model: a modified GMNL method and Bayesian methods directly programmed. Results from both have been compared to preference-space models, but not
too each other. This is an avenue of interest given the slight difference in allowing for
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partial or completely correlated scale cost terms. In addition, the impact of separately
estimating the scaled cost coefficient has implications that should be studied in more
depth in order to reliably use point estimates.

5.4 Chapter 4

5.4.1 Gaps in the literature

Water utilities have used both price and non-price conservation policies to encourage
efficient water use. Demand-side conservation policies encourage or require customers
to reduce their water consumption. Research has studied quantity restrictions are an
example of a non-price, demand-side policy, where households must reduce their water
consumption by a target percentage, but can make their own decisions about how to
achieve the reduction within their household. Evidence is mixed as to the impact and
effectiveness of quantity restrictions. Some economists argue that price conservation
policies that increase the price per unit of water at increasing block levels of use are
more efficient and reduce overall welfare loss to households while achieving maximum
flexibility of use. However equity issues between low- and high-income households can
result from pricing conservation policies.
Water budgets are a relatively recent long-term conservation policy that combine aspects of quantity restrictions and block rate pricing. To my knowledge, only
one paper examines the impact of water budgets in the context of residential customers. Chapter 4 focuses on the impact of a newly-designed water budget program
for irrigation-only customers of ABCWUA over a six-year time frame.
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5.4.2 Summary of major findings

Initially, the chapter examines differences in water consumption annually and over
time between account site categories as well as public and private sector accounts
with landscaped areas greater than and less than 100,000 feet2 . I find that private
sector accounts appear to respond to the water budget program better than public sector accounts. In the first year of my data, there is no statistical difference between the
average use of the two accounts. Each subsequent year, the average water consumption of private sector accounts is significantly less than public sector accounts. They
also have a greater percentage of accounts that never exceed their water budget and a
smaller percentage of accounts that consistently exceed their water budget.

Each account’s annual water consumption is categorized in relation to their unique
water budget by three levels: efficient, excess, and extreme. Results indicate that
accounts that had efficient or extreme water consumption the previous year have a
high probability of being in the same category of water consumption in the current
year. Accounts with excess water consumption are the most likely the change their
water consumption behavior. I find that elasticity of water demand is inelastic overall
(´0.845), however differences in price responsiveness exist between subgroups. Parks,
multi-family, and education accounts have the most inelastic demand of all site categories, while commercial, home owner associations, and govt accounts have elastic or
nearly elastic demand. The size of the landscaping is more influential with regards
to price responsiveness than public or private sector ownership. Large landscaped
lots (described as having more than 100,000 feet2 of area) are significantly more price
inelastic than smaller lots. Finally, accounts that are in the lowest percentiles of percentage of water budget use are the most price responsive, the accounts in the highest
percentiles are the least price responsive.
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5.4.3 Contribution of this research
This paper contributes to the overall conservation literature by examining water budgets, which are a relatively new conservation policy. By focusing on the irrigation-only
customer class I am able to examine the effects of the water budget program alone
because, unlike with residential customers, there are no competing conservation policies that affect this group. In addition, outdoor water use and elasticity of demand for
outdoor water use has been examined for residential customers, with outdoor water
use typically found to be less inelastic than indoor use. However it is being estimated
in the context of individuals who are simultaneously using both. Irrigation-only customers do not have indoor use, so estimated elasticities represent price responsiveness
for outdoor water demand only. I estimate an overall elasticity of demand, as well as
the elasticity of various subgroups based on site categories, ownership and landscape
size categories, and the percentile of water budget use. This has not been done in
previous studies.

5.4.4 Policy implications
This paper is the first analysis of the effectiveness of the water budget program for
irrigation-only customers. My results show that the average private sector account
has significantly lower water consumption in comparison to the average public sector
account. In addition, findings indicate that commercial, HOA, and govt accounts, accounts with landscapes under 100,000 feet2 and those who are in the lower percentiles
of water budget use are the most price responsive. The least price responsive are accounts with large landscapes, multi-family, parks and education accounts, and those
in the 85th percentile or higher of water budget use. ABCWUA might want to focus
on these groups to increase efficient irrigating and or increase the surcharge prices
to a level that these accounts find relevant. Accounts in the highest percentile of water budget users are the most extreme water consumers, so decreasing their water
consumption levels might have the most immediate response.
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A final area of focus for ABCWUA is accounts that had excess water consumption
the past year. These accounts have the greatest probability of behavior change in
comparison to accounts who already irrigate efficiently or those who are extreme water
consumers. If ABCWUA can get those accounts to reduce water consumption to an
efficient level, there is a high probability that the following year they will again be
efficient water consumers. Focusing on the surcharge, the utility probably needs to
increase the surcharge to cause a behavior change in the extreme water consumers.
The recently enacted third surcharge block for use above 200% is a step in the right
direction.

5.4.5 Directions for future research
This chapter indicates the importance of studying this type of conservation policy for
encouraging optimal outdoor water consumption. As the program continues with more
accounts are added and at least a third tier of surcharges, future research will have
the benefit of a longer time series panel with more price variation. Research can look
at the short-term and long-term responsiveness to the program, explicitly model differences between account categories, and examine the effect of multiple surcharge blocks.
For maximum effectiveness, ABCWUA needs to understand at what price signals each
account type responds so they can accordingly adjust their policy. Also, greater research into the movement of accounts between surcharge blocks is called for so the
utility has an improved understanding of the characteristics that impact reduced water consumption behavior over the long run.

5.5 Final remarks
In my dissertation, I have taken a look at two separate, but concurrent issues facing
water utilities today. Economists often look at the effect of a change in a variable, ceteris paribus, but water utilities do not have that luxury. Distribution infrastructure is
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constantly deteriorating, easily accessed water supplies are dwindling, and droughts
may occur more frequently. Water utilities must use both revenues and water resources optimally; greater consideration of their customers’ preferences for projects
could be valuable. In the absence of these actions by the water utility, it may be more
difficult to realistically argue in favor of rate increases to support needed investments
while at the same time encouraging conservation, which decreases revenues and, customers assume, leads to lower monthly bills. This series of papers has attempted to
look at some of these questions.
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Appendix A
Derivation of λn
In the WTP-space specification, the variable λn is the heterogeneous cost and scale
parameter. Both cost and scale are allowed to be heterogeneous. The coefficient must
be positive; to achieve this, λn “ pλ ` τ ωq is estimated in exponential form. Here λ is
the mean while the standard deviation, τ , is multiplied by a draw from the standard
normal distribution, ω „ N p0, 1q.

λn “ exppλ ` τ ωq

(A.1)

λn normalizes the other constants in the WTP-space equation. To ensure that this
condition is met, the expectation of λn is set equal to one and then the coefficients
inside the parentheses are solved for.

Epλn q “ Erexppλ ` τ ωqs

(A.2)

Epλn q “ Erexppλqexppτ ωqs

(A.3)
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Epλn q “ exppλqErexppτ ωqs

(A.4)

The only random variable is the ω. To calculate the expectation, use the moment
generating function for a random variable with a standard normal distribution. This
is the probability density function for the standard normal distribution:

ω2
1
f pωq “ N pω; 0, 1q “ ? e´ 2
2π

(A.5)

The moment generating function for a continuous distribution is:

τω

Mω pτ q “ Epe q “

τω

Epe q “

“

´8

ż8

´8

´8

eτ ω f pωqdω

ż8

ż8

“

ż8

ω2
1
eτ ω ? ep´ 2 q dω
2π
´8

ω2
1
? epτ ω´ 2 q dω
2π

1 ´ 1 p´2τ ω`ω2 q
? looooooomooooooon
dω
e 2
2π

(A.6)

(A.7)

(A.8)

(A.9)

Focusing on the exponentiated section with the underbracket:

1
“ ´ p´2τ ω ` ω 2 q
2

1
“ ´ rpω ´ τ qpω ´ τ qs
2
1
“ ´ rpω 2 ´ 2τ ω ` τ 2 q ´ τ 2 s
2
Substitute back into Equation A.9
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1
1
2 1 2
? er´ 2 pω´τ q ` 2 τ s dω
2π

(A.15)

1 2
1
1
2
? ep´ 2 pω´τ q q ep 2 τ q dω
2π

(A.16)
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p τ2 q

ż8

´8

1
1
2
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(A.17)

The integral is the pdf of a standard normal random variable with µ “ τ and σ 2 “ 1.
A pdf integrated equals one. Therefore,
Erexppτ ωqs “ e

τ2
2

(A.18)

and, substituting into Equation A.4:

Epλn q “ exppλqexpp

Epλn q “ exppλ `
Q.E.D.
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Table B.1: Descriptive statistics by annual household income category
Attribute

Description

Age

Age of respondent,
(years); continuous
Respondent is female;
1=yes, 0=no
Respondent is Hispanic;
1=yes, 0=no
Highest education is
HS diploma or GED;
1=yes, 0=no
Highest education: some
yrs college or an AA
degree; 1=yes, 0=no
Highest education: a B.A.
degree or higher;
1=yes, 0=no
Respondent had a home,
outage 2004-09;
1=yes, 0=no
Pipe breaks in Census tract
2004-09; continuous
0% pct watered in typical
summer month; 1=yes, 0=no
1-25% pct watered in typical
summer month; 1=yes, 0=no
51-100% pct watered in
typical summer month;
1=yes, 0=no
Children live in household;
1=yes, 0=no
Household has aytpical
water use; 1=yes, 0=no
Years lived in NM;
continuous
Years lived in current home;
continuous
Lives west of Rio Grande
River; 1=yes, 0=no
Lives in south Albuquerque;
1=yes, 0=no
Lives in north Albuquerque;
1=yes, 0=no

Female
Hispanic
HSDiploma

AA

BA

HomeOuta

TractOutb
Water0
Water50
Water100

Children
HHc
NM
Address
Westside
South
North
Total
a
b

Low income
Mean (S.d.)
58 (18)

Mid income
Mean (S.d.)
52 (15)

High income
Mean (S.d.)
52 (12)

0.65 (0.48)

0.52 (0.50)

0.44 (0.50)

0.45 (0.50)

0.34 (0.47)

0.17 (0.37)

0.33 (0.47)

0.10 (0.30)

0.02 (0.13)

0.40 (0.49)

0.31 (0.46)

0.16 (0.37)

0.27 (0.44)

0.59 (0.49)

0.82 (0.38)

0.35 (0.48)

0.32 (0.47)

0.29 (0.46)

15.2 (13.6)

13.3 (14.7)

11.3 (13.5)

0.04 (0.19)

0.05 (0.21)

0.01 (0.10)

0.87 (0.49)

0.82 (0.50)

0.78 (0.50)

0.09 (0.28)

0.13 (0.34)

0.21 (0.41)

0.22 (0.41)

0.32 (0.47)

0.41 (0.49)

0.48 (0.50)

0.34 (0.47)

0.34 (0.48)

37 (22)

32 (18)

28 (16)

19 (17)

13 (11)

13 (15)

0.30 (0.46)

0.31 (0.47)

0.13 (0.34)

0.30 (0.46)

0.21 (0.41)

0.22 (0.41)

0.40 (0.49)

0.47 (0.50)

0.65 (0.48)

227

356

187

Self reported at least one outage at home between 2004-2009
Pipe breaks reported by the water utility for time period 2004-2009, aggregated by Census Tract

c

Water outages at home may affect certain sub-populations differently, i.e. a stay-at-home
parent, a home business, or someone with a sensitive health issue.
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Percentage of water budget used
by site category
These figures indicate water budget use by site category.

Figure C.1: Percent water budget used by Commercial site category per year
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Figure C.2: Percent water budget used by Parks site category per year
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Figure C.3: Percent water budget used by HOA category per year
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Figure C.4: Percent water budget used by Street Medians category per year
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Figure C.5: Percent water budget used by Multi-family category per year
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Figure C.6: Percent water budget used by Education category per year
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Figure C.7: Percent water budget used by Government category per year
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Figure C.8: Percent water budget used by Church category per year
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Appendix D
Public and private sector
accounts, consumption
differences

Figure D.1: Monthly maximum temperatures in Albuquerque
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Appendix D. Public and private sector accounts, consumption differences

Table D.1: Descriptive statistics by ownership and irrigable square feet
PubSmall PubLarge
PrivSmall PrivLarge
2
2
Area, mean
38,214 ft 452,680 ft
25,355 ft2 398,360 ft2
Area, min
54 ft2
101,291 ft2
556 ft2
101,086 ft2
Area, max
99,748 ft2 6,516,926 ft2 99,598 ft2 7,435,090 ft2
Trees
4,588 ft2
17,618 ft2
3,021 ft2
14,317 ft2
Xeric
12,733 ft2 36,447 ft2
13,823 ft2 141,649 ft2
2
2
Turf
24,888 ft 257,497 ft
5,656 ft2
125,806 ft2
Athletic
7,448 ft2
149,459 ft2
0
0
Elevation5000
29%
18%
22%
11%
Elevation5300
66%
74%
27%
76%
Elevation5700
6%
8%
6%
13%
Percent IWB, mean 144%
103%
110%
106%
Percent IWB, min
11%
11%
11%
13%
Percent IWB, max
1,875%
263%
2,696%
424%
Surcharge, mean
$417
$1,858
$217
$2,139
Commercial
0
0
58% (314) 31% (26)
HOA
0
0
27% (147) 35% (30)
Park
36% (109) 75% (132)
0.2% (1)
4% (3)
StreetMedian
26% (80)
11% (19)
0
0
Multi
0
0
9% (51)
27% (23)
Education
12% (36)
11% (19)
1% (6)
0
Government
26% (80)
4% (7)
0
0
Church
0
0
4% (21)
4% (3)
Observations
311
177
540
85

Table D.2: X2 test for differences in water consumption level in a given year for
public and private sector accounts
Variable

All
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Priv/Pub
Priv/Pub Priv/Pub Priv/Pub Priv/Pub Priv/Pub
Improved
354/413
27/50
50/75
80/87
97/103
100/98
No change (0) 2,127/1,740 309/290
275/264
291/259
462/287
405/257
Worsened
427/400
60/53
76/63
66/75
82/85
143/124
X22 statistic
21.1621
7.8951
6.4391
2.4322
16.8017
9.3271
Pr(|T | ą |t|)
0.000
0.019
0.040
0.296
0.000
0.009
Observations 5,461
789
803
858
1,116
1,127
Unit of observation is one year of movement between tiers for one account. Accounts
must have at least 2 consecutive years of irrigation data to calculate tier movement.
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E.1 Chapter 1 code
E.1.1 Kernel density graphs
twoway

(kdensity

n2c grn,

lcolor(orange)

lwidth(thick))

(kdensity

n2u grn,

lcolor(black) lwidth(thick) lpattern(dash)),xline(0.134, lcolor(green) lwidth(thick))
yline(2, lcolor(gray) lwidth(medthick)) xtitle(Dist. of MWTP for an additional 1% of
green energy used by the utility, size(small)) ytitle(Density)

E.1.2 Kernel density with text box in graph
twoway (kdensity n1u reu, lcolor(black) lwidth(medthick) lpattern(longdash) legend(label(1 “RPL1 uncorr” ))) (kdensity n1c reu, lcolor(black) lwidth(thick) lpattern(tight dot) legend(label(2 “RPL1 corr” ))) (kdensity n3u reu,

lcolor(black)

lwidth(medthick) lpattern(dash 3dot) legend(label(3 “RPL2 uncorr” ))) (kdensity
n3c reu, lcolor(black) lwidth(medthick) lpattern(solid) legend(label(4 “RPL2 corr” ))),
text(3.5 -0.25 “Median MWTP Reuse: 0.17(MNL1), 0.07(1c), 0.08(2c)”, place(ne)box
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just(left) margin(l+4 t+1 b+1) width(90)) xlabel( -0.50 0 0.08 0.17 0.50 1) xtitle(MWTP
per month) ytitle(Density)

E.1.3 Mixed logit models, normal distribution
* uncorrelated model
mixlogit

choice

Notify sqpct

FreqLen cntr,

rand(Reuse sqpct

Green sqpct

Length sqpct Freq sqpct Cost) group(newid) id(userid2) nrep(500) robust

mixlbeta Notify sqpct FreqLen cntr Reuse sqpct Green sqpct Length sqpct
Freq sqpct Cost userid2, saving(N10unc basic beta500d)

* save vector of betas
matrix b = e(b)

* starting values for correlated model to speed things up
matrix start = b[1,1..8],0,0,0,0,b[1,9],0,0,0,b[1,10],0,0,b[1,11],0,b[1,12]

* Correlated model using starting values from uncorrelated model
mixlogit

choice

Notify sqpct

FreqLen cntr,

rand(Reuse sqpct

Green sqpct

Length sqpct Freq sqpct Cost) group(newid) from(start,copy) id(userid2) nrep(500)
robust corr

* obtain the covariance matrix
mixlcov

* calculate the standard deviations
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mixlcov, sd

* save conditional individual betas

mixlbeta Notify sqpct FreqLen cntr Reuse sqpct Green sqpct Length sqpct
Freq sqpct Cost userid2, saving(N10corr basic beta500d)

E.2 Chapter 2 code
E.2.1 Scatter plot graphs
Scatter plot F1, N1, L1, W1 models, minimum 30 MWTP values
* Code for ordered distribution of MWTP values at positive and negative endsd to
highlight outliers. Each model has unique symbols (i.e. smplus, or smtriangle hollow)

twoway (scatter negfreq n1u id negfreqn1u if id negfreqn1u ą 3 & id negfreqn1u
ď 30, mcolor(black) msymbol(smplus) legend(label(1 “N1 Cost normal” ))) (scatter
w1ns Freq id w1ns Freq if id w1ns Freq ą 0 & id w1ns Freq ď 30, mcolor(black)
msymbol(smtriangle hollow) legend(label(2 “W1 wtp-space” ))) (scatter negfreq c1u
id negfreqc1u if id negfreqc1u ą 0 & id negfreqc1u ď 30, mcolor(black) msymbol(smsquare hollow) legend(label(3 “C1 Cost lognormal” ))) (scatter negfreq f1u
id negfreqf1u if id negfreqf1u ą 0 & id negfreqf1u ď 30, mcolor(black) msymbol(smx)
legend(label (4 “F1 Cost fixed” ))),xtitle(Observations sort by MWTP, size(small))
ytitle(MWTP in dollars)
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* Scatter plot F1, N1, L1, W1 models, maximum 30 MWTP values

twoway (scatter negfreq n1u id negfreqn1u if id negfreqn1u ą 819 & id negfreqn1u
ď 847, mcolor(black) msymbol(smplus) legend(label(1 “N1 Cost normal” ))) (scatter
w1ns Freq id w1ns Freq if id w1ns Freq ą 819 & id w1ns Freq ď 850, mcolor(black)
msymbol(smtriangle hollow) legend(label(2 “W1 wtp-space” ))) (scatter negfreq c1u
id negfreqc1u if id negfreqc1u ą 819 & id negfreqc1u ď 850, mcolor(black) msymbol(smsquare hollow) legend(label(3 “C1 Cost lognormal” ))) (scatter negfreq f1u
id negfreqf1u if id negfreqf1u ą 819 & id negfreqf1u ď 850, mcolor(black) msymbol(smx) legend(label (4 “F1 Cost fixed” ))),xtitle(Observations sort by MWTP,
size(small)) ytitle(MWTP in dollars)

* Scatter plot F1 and W1 models, minimum and maximum 60 MWTP values

twoway (scatter w1ns Freq id w1ns Freq if id w1ns Freq ą 0 & id w1nsF reqď 60,
mcolor(black) msymbol(smtriangle hollow) legend(label(1 “W1 wtp-space” ))) (scatter
negfreq f1u id negfreqf1u if id negfreqf1u ą 0 & id negfreqf1u ď 60, mcolor(black)
msymbol(smx) legend(label (2 “F1 Cost fixed” ))),xtitle(Observations sort by MWTP,
size(small)) ytitle(MWTP in dollars)

twoway (scatter w1ns Freq id w1ns Freq if id w1ns Freq ą 789 & id w1ns Freq
ď 850, mcolor(black) msymbol(smtriangle hollow) legend(label(1 “W1 wtp-space” )))
(scatter negfreq f1u id negfreqf1u if id negfreqf1u ą 789 & id negfreqf1u ď 850,
mcolor(black) msymbol(smx) legend(label (2 “F1 Cost fixed” ))),xtitle(Observations
sort by MWTP, size(small)) ytitle(MWTP in dollars)
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E.2.2 Graphs comparing distributions of MWTP by binary
characteristics

twoway (kdensity w1un l if HM0409 high==0, lcolor(red) lwidth(thick) legend(label(1
“15 or fewer outages” )))(kdensity w1un l if HM0409 high==1,

lcolor(black)

lwidth(thick) legend(label(2 “16-64 outages” ))),xtitle(MWTP to avoid one hour
longer average outage by ABCWUA outages w/i 0.5 miles of home, size(small))
ytitle(Density)

* box-and-whisker graph

graph box w1un f, over(HM0409 high) ytitle(MWTP Frequency) title(MWTP to
avoid 1 additional outages by ABCWUA outages) xla(1 “15 or fewer” “outages w/i 0.5
miles” 2 “16-64 outages” “w/i 0.5 miles, 2004-09”)

* box-and-whisker graph of all obs by income category

graph

box

f1u wtpr

n1u wtpr

c11u wtpr

w1un r,

over(inc cat,

relabel(1”39, 999orless”2”40,000 to 99, 999”3”100,000 or more”)) box(1,fcolor(gs1)
lcolor(gs1)) box(2,fcolor(gs3) lcolor(gs3)) box(3,fcolor(gs6) lcolor(gs6)) box(4,fcolor(gs2)
lcolor(gs2)) ytitle(MWTP in dollars) noout legend(col(1) label(1 “Model F1 (cost fixed)”)
label(2 “Model N1 (cost normal)”) label(3 “Model C1 (cost lognormal)”) label(4 “Model
W1 (wtp-space)”))
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E.2.3 WTP-space model
* fixed coefficients, following presentation by A. Hole

gen const = 1

constraint 1 [Mean]negCost = 1

constraint 2 [tau] cons = 0

matrix start = 1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0

gmnl

choice

negCost

FreqLen cntr

Notify sqpct

Reuse sqpct

Green sqpct

Length sqpct Freq sqpct , group(newid) id(userid2) het(const) constraint(1 2)
from(start,copy) nrep(300)

nlcom (price: -exp([Het]const))

* with random coefficients

matrix b = e(b)
matrix start2 = b,0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1

gmnl choice negCost FreqLen cntr Notify sqpct,

group(newid) id(userid2)

rand(Reuse sqpct Green sqpct Length sqpct Freq sqpct) het(const) constraint(1 )
from(start2,copy) nrep(100) gamma(0)
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nlcom (price mean: [Het]const - [tau] cons2 {2)

gmnlbeta Notify sqpct FreqLen cntr Reuse sqpct Green sqpct Length sqpct
Freq sqpct negCost userid2, saving(w1betasn oscaleqnoscale

* correlated

matrix start2 = b[1,1..9],0,0,0,b[1,10],0,0,b[1,11],0,b[1,12..13]

gmnl choice negCost FreqLen cntr Notify sqpct,

group(newid) id(userid2)

rand(Reuse sqpct Green sqpct Length sqpct Freq sqpct) het(const) constraint(1 )
from(start,copy) nrep(100) corr gamma(0)

E.3 Chapter 3 code
E.3.1 Graphs
* Histograms of water consumption behavior over time. Divides them by different
variables and includes the entire population graph as the very last one.

histogram status if last==1, discrete fraction addlabels ylabel(0(.15).90) xlabel(0(1)4, valuelabel) ylabel(0(0.25)0.75) by(site cat3, total legend(off) style(compact)
note(“”)) addlabopts(yvarformat(%4.2f))
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histogram status if last==1, discrete fraction addlabels ylabel(0(.15).90) xlabel(0(1)4, valuelabel) ylabel(0(0.15)0.6) by(pp size, total legend(off) style(compact)
note(“”)) addlabopts(yvarformat(%4.2f))

* bar graph of water budget consumption levels by surcharge tier and year, levels
are stacked

graph bar T0 T1 T2, percent bar(1, color(navy)) bar(2, color(forest green)) bar(3,
color(maroon)) ytitle(“Percent”) legend( label(1 “Efficient, ¡=100% of IWB”) label (2
“Excess, 101-150% of IWB”) label (3 “Extreme, ¿150% of IWB”)) over(year) stack
blabel(bar, position(inside) format(%9.1f) color(white))

* line graph of mean and median water budget used for each year
line pctbud meanall year, lwidth(thick) sort k line pctbud medianall year, lwidth(thick)
sort k, title(“Percent of water budget used by year”) xtitle(“Year”) ytitle(“Percent of
water budget”) legend(label(1 “Mean”) label(2 “Median”))

* bar graph with side by side bars, slightly overlapping
graph bar tier yr1 tier yrlast if yrsdata 1213==1, over(site cat3, label(alt)) bargap(-30)
legend( label(1 ”Tier, First Year”) label (2 ”Tier, Last Year”))

* Line graph of mean maximum temperatures each year

line maymmxt year, lwidth(thick) sort k line junemmxt year, lwidth(thick) sort
k line julymmxt year, lwidth(thick) sort k line augmmxt year, lwidth(thick) sort k
line septmmxt year, lwidth(thick) sort k , title(”Mean maximum temperatures by
month/year”) xtitle(”Years”) ytitle(”Degrees Fahrenheit”) legend(label(1 ”May”) label(2
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”June”) label(3 ”July”) label(4 ”August”) label(5 ”September”))
* Graph of percent water budget for each account (all dataset or by category) each
year stacked vertically using hollow circles and then the median percent budget use
connected by a red line from year to year

* first generate the median variable for each year
bysort pp size year: egen pb medppsize = median(pctbud adj)
label var pb medppsize ”Median pct budget used by pp size variable”

twoway scatter pctbud adj year if pp size==0, msymbol(circle hollow) } connected
pb medppsize year if pp size==0 , msymbol(diamond) sort } , title(Percent budget
used by year and median for Public ownership under 100000 sq ft.,size(small))
ytitle(“Percent of budget used”, size(small)) xtitle(“Year”)

* graphs all accounts pct bud use plus median for pp size across years twoway scatter pctbud adj year if pp size==0, msymbol(circle hollow) k connected pb medppsize
year if pp size==0 , msymbol(diamond) sort k , title(Public sector small landscape accts,size(medium)) ytitle(“Percent of budget used”, size(medium)) xtitle(“Year”)
twoway scatter pctbud adj year if pp size==1, msymbol(circle hollow) k connected
pb medppsize year if pp size==1 , msymbol(diamond) sort k , title(Public sector large
landscape,size(medium)) ytitle(“Percent of budget used”, size(medium)) xtitle(“Year”)
twoway scatter pctbud adj year if pp size==2, msymbol(circle hollow) k connected
pb medppsize year if pp size==2 , msymbol(diamond) sort k , title(Private sector
small landscape accts,size(medium)) ytitle(“Percent of budget used”, size(medium)) xtitle(“Year”)
twoway scatter pctbud adj year if pp size==3, msymbol(circle hollow) k connected
pb medppsize year if pp size==3 , msymbol(diamond) sort k , title(Private sector large
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landscape,size(medium)) ytitle(“Percent of budget used”, size(medium)) xtitle(“Year”)
* example graph all accounts pct bud use plus median for each site category across
years
twoway scatter pctbud adj year if site cat3==4, msymbol(circle hollow) k connected pctbud median3 year if site cat3==4, msymbol(diamond) sort k , title(MultiFamily/Hotel/Motel/Apartment,size(medium)) ytitle(“Percent of budget used”,
size(medium)) xtitle(“Year”)

E.3.2 Models
E.3.3 Ordered logit
* null is that there is no difference in coefficients between models (that is Tier2 vs.
Tier1tier0 or Tier0 vs. Tier1Tier2)
data4 variable just means this model was run with accounts that had at least 4 years
of data

omodel logit tieradj tieradjL1 elevation5700 elevation5000 soil water ownsize2
ownsize3 ownsize4 daa mayaug days90 firlst if data4==1

brant, detail

* if brant test rejects null, use partial proportional odds model
gologit2 tieradj tieradjL1 elevation5700 elevation5000 soil water i.pp size daa mayaug
days90 firlst, autofit lrforce
to calculate marginal effects for each observation, preferred by Greene (2003)
predict p0 p1 p2 if e(sample)
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E.3.4 Model analyzing percentage of budget used
* random effects analysis of percentage of budget used
dependent variable: pctbud adj
let Stata know it is panel data set
xtset acct id year

Test for autocorrelation
* Test 1 for autocorrelation using procedure in Beck’s presentation

xtreg res lagres soil water elevation5000 elevation5700 drought see moddrght
daa mayaug i.pp size if data4==1, re

xtreg pctbud adj soil water elevation5000 elevation5700 days90 firlst daa mayaug
i.pp size if data4==1, re

predict res, e
gen lagres = L1.res

xtreg res lagres soil water elevation5000 elevation5700 days90 firlst daa mayaug
i.pp size if data4==1, re

xtreg

pctbud adj

L1.pctbud adj

soil water

200

elevation5000

elevation5700

Appendix E. Stata Code
days90 firlst daa mayaug i.pp size if data4==1, re

Durbin’s alternative statistic for autocorrelation, manual

xtreg pctbud adj L1.pctbud adj soil water elevation5000 elevation5700 days90 firlst
daa mayaug i.pp size if data4==1, re

Step 1. calculate r
predict res, e
gen lagres = L1.res
gen elage = res*lagres
gen e2 = res^ 2
egen sum elage = sum(elage)
egen sum e2 = sum(e2)
gen rho = sum elage / sum e2
di rho

Step 2. calculate square root portion of h-statistic
gen T = 6
matrix V = e(V)
matrix list V
gen varL1pbud = .00018604

Step 3. calculate h
gen h = rho * sqrt(T(1-T*varL1pbud))
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E.3.5 Hausman test, fixed or random effects
xtreg pctbud adj L1.pctbud adj soil water elevation5000 elevation5700 days90 firlst
daa mayaug i.pp size if data4==1, fe

estimates store fixed

xtreg

pctbud adj

L1.pctbud adj

soil water

elevation5000

elevation5700

days90 firlst daa mayaug i.pp size if data4==1, re

estimates store random
hausman fixed random

E.3.6 2SLS-IV model
Generate instruments
Marginal price per 1000 gallons for next unit of water, (Wichman et al., 2014)

gen mprice200 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą200
replace mprice200 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă200 & budg150 ą 200
replace mprice200 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď 200
label var mprice200 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 200 units, acct j”

gen mprice400 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą400
replace mprice400 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă400 & budg150 ą 400
replace mprice400 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď400
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label var mprice400 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 400 units, acct j”

gen mprice600 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą600
replace mprice600 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă600 & budg150 ą 600
replace mprice600 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď600
label var mprice600 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 600 units, acct j”

gen mprice800 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą800
replace mprice800 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă800 & budg150 ą 800
replace mprice800 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď800
label var mprice800 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 800 units, acct j”

gen mprice1000 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą1000
replace mprice1000 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă1000 & budg150 ą 1000
replace mprice1000 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď1000
label var mprice1000 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 1000 units, acct j”

gen mprice1250 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą1250
replace mprice1250 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă1250 & budg150 ą 1250
replace mprice1250 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď1250
label var mprice1250 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 1250 units, acct j”

gen mprice1500 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą1500
replace mprice1500 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă1500 & budg150 ą 1500
replace mprice1500 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď1500
label var mprice1500 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 1500 units, acct j”
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gen mprice1800 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą1800
replace mprice1800 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă1800 & budg150 ą 1800
replace mprice1800 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď1800
label var mprice1800 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 1800 units, acct j”

gen mprice2100 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą2100
replace mprice2100 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă2100 & budg150 ą 2100
replace mprice2100 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď2100
label var mprice2100 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 2100 units, acct j”

gen mprice2400 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą2400
replace mprice2400 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă2400 & budg150 ą 2400
replace mprice2400 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď2400
label var mprice2400 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 2400 units, acct j”

gen mprice2700 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą2700
replace mprice2700 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă2700 & budg150 ą 2700
replace mprice2700 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď2700
label var mprice2700 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 2700 units, acct j”

gen mprice3000 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą3000
replace mprice3000 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă3000 & budg150 ą 3000
replace mprice3000 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď3000
label var mprice3000 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 3000 units, acct j”

gen mprice3400 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą3400
replace mprice3400 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă3400 & budg150 ą 3400
replace mprice3400 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď3400
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label var mprice3400 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 3400 units, acct j”

gen mprice3800 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą3800
replace mprice3800 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă3800 & budg150 ą 3800
replace mprice3800 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď3800
label var mprice3800 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 3800 units, acct j”

gen mprice4500 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą4500
replace mprice4500 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă4500 & budg150 ą 4500
replace mprice4500 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď4500
label var mprice4500 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 4500 units, acct j”

gen mprice5000 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą5000
replace mprice5000 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă5000 & budg150 ą 5000
replace mprice5000 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď5000
label var mprice5000 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 5000 units, acct j”

gen mprice6000 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą6000
replace mprice6000 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă6000 & budg150 ą 6000
replace mprice6000 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď6000
label var mprice6000 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 6000 units, acct j”

gen mprice7000 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą7000
replace mprice7000 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă7000 & budg150 ą 7000
replace mprice7000 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď7000
label var mprice7000 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 7000 units, acct j”
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gen mprice8000 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą8000
replace mprice8000 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă8000 & budg150 ą 8000
replace mprice8000 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď8000
label var mprice8000 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 8000 units, acct j”

gen mprice9000 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą9000
replace mprice9000 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă9000 & budg150 ą 9000
replace mprice9000 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď9000
label var mprice9000 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 9000 units, acct j”

gen mprice10000 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą10000
replace mprice10000 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă10000 & budg150 ą 10000
replace mprice10000 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď10000
label var mprice10000 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 10000 units, acct j”

gen mprice11000 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą11000
replace mprice11000 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă11000 & budg150 ą 11000
replace mprice11000 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď11000
label var mprice11000 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 11000 units, acct j”

gen mprice12000 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą12000
replace mprice12000 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă12000 & budg150 ą 12000
replace mprice12000 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď12000
label var mprice12000 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 12000 units, acct j”

gen mprice13000 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą13000
replace mprice13000 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă13000 & budg150 ą 13000
replace mprice13000 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď13000
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label var mprice13000 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 13000 units, acct j”

gen mprice15000 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą15000
replace mprice15000 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă15000 & budg150 ą 15000
replace mprice15000 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď15000
label var mprice15000 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 15000 units, acct j”

gen mprice18000 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą18000
replace mprice18000 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă18000 & budg150 ą 18000
replace mprice18000 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď18000
label var mprice18000 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 18000 units, acct j”

gen mprice21000 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą21000
replace mprice21000 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă21000 & budg150 ą 21000
replace mprice21000 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď21000
label var mprice21000 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 21000 units, acct j”

gen mprice25000 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą25000
replace mprice25000 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă25000 & budg150 ą 25000
replace mprice25000 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď25000
label var mprice25000 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 25000 units, acct j”

gen mprice30000 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą30000
replace mprice30000 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă30000 & budg150 ą 30000
replace mprice30000 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď30000
label var mprice30000 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 30000 units, acct j”
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gen mprice35000 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą35000
replace mprice35000 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă35000 & budg150 ą 35000
replace mprice35000 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď35000
label var mprice35000 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 35000 units, acct j”

gen mprice40000 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą40000
replace mprice40000 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă40000 & budg150 ą 40000
replace mprice40000 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď40000
label var mprice40000 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 40000 units, acct j”

gen mprice50000 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą50000
replace mprice50000 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă50000 & budg150 ą 50000
replace mprice50000 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď50000
label var mprice50000 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 50000 units, acct j”

gen mprice60000 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą60000
replace mprice60000 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă60000 & budg150 ą 60000
replace mprice60000 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď60000
label var mprice60000 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 60000 units, acct j”

gen mprice70000 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą70000
replace mprice70000 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă70000 & budg150 ą 70000
replace mprice70000 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď70000
label var mprice70000 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 70000 units, acct j”

gen mprice80000 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą80000
replace mprice80000 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă80000 & budg150 ą 80000
replace mprice80000 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď80000
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label var mprice80000 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 80000 units, acct j”

gen mprice100000 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą100000
replace mprice100000 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă100000 & budg150 ą 100000
replace mprice100000 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď100000
label var mprice100000 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 100000 units, acct
j”

gen mprice120000 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą120000
replace mprice120000 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă120000 & budg150 ą 120000
replace mprice120000 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď120000
label var mprice120000 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 120000 units, acct
j”

gen mprice140000 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą140000
replace mprice140000 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă140000 & budg150 ą 140000
replace mprice140000 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď140000
label var mprice140000 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 140000 units, acct
j”

gen mprice160000 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą160000
replace mprice160000 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă160000 & budg150 ą 160000
replace mprice160000 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď160000
label var mprice160000 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 160000 units, acct
j”

gen mprice180000 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą180000
replace mprice180000 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă180000 & budg150 ą 180000
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replace mprice180000 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď180000
label var mprice180000 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 180000 units, acct
j”

gen mprice200000 = ppu tier0 if budg100 ą200000
replace mprice200000 = ppu tier1 if budg100 ă200000 & budg150 ą 200000
replace mprice200000 = ppu tier2 if budg150 ď200000
label var mprice200000 “Marginal price for next unit of water after 200000 units, acct
j”

gen lnmp200 = ln(mprice200)
gen lnmp400 = ln(mprice400)
gen lnmp600 = ln(mprice600)
gen lnmp800 = ln(mprice800)
gen lnmp1000 = ln(mprice1000)

gen lnmp1250 = ln(mprice1250)
gen lnmp1500 = ln(mprice1500)
gen lnmp1800 = ln(mprice1800)
gen lnmp2100 = ln(mprice2100)
gen lnmp2400 = ln(mprice2400)
gen lnmp2700 = ln(mprice2700)
gen lnmp3000 = ln(mprice3000)
gen lnmp3400 = ln(mprice3400)

gen lnmp3800 = ln(mprice3800)
gen lnmp4500 = ln(mprice4500)
gen lnmp5000 = ln(mprice5000)
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gen lnmp6000 = ln(mprice6000)
gen lnmp7000 = ln(mprice7000)
gen lnmp8000 = ln(mprice8000)
gen lnmp9000 = ln(mprice9000)
gen lnmp10000 = ln(mprice10000)
gen lnmp11000 = ln(mprice11000)

gen lnmp12000 = ln(mprice12000)
gen lnmp13000 = ln(mprice13000)
gen lnmp15000 = ln(mprice15000)
gen lnmp18000 = ln(mprice18000)
gen lnmp21000 = ln(mprice21000)
gen lnmp25000 = ln(mprice25000)
gen lnmp30000 = ln(mprice30000)

gen lnmp35000 = ln(mprice35000)
gen lnmp40000 = ln(mprice40000)
gen lnmp50000 = ln(mprice50000)
gen lnmp60000 = ln(mprice60000)
gen lnmp70000 = ln(mprice70000)
gen lnmp80000 = ln(mprice80000)

gen lnmp100000 = ln(mprice100000)
gen lnmp120000 = ln(mprice120000)
gen lnmp140000 = ln(mprice140000)
gen lnmp160000 = ln(mprice160000)
gen lnmp180000 = ln(mprice180000)
gen lnmp200000 = ln(mprice200000)
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2SLS final basic model
xtivreg lnuse2 daa mayaug days90 firlst ownsize2 ownsize3 ownsize4 (lnavgprice
= mprice200 mprice400 mprice600 mprice800 mprice1000 mprice1250 mprice1500
mprice1800 mprice2100 mprice2400 mprice2700 mprice3000 mprice3400 mprice3800
mprice4500 mprice5000 mprice6000 mprice7000 mprice8000 mprice9000 mprice10000
mprice11000 mprice12000 mprice13000 mprice15000 mprice18000 mprice21000
mprice25000 mprice30000 mprice35000 mprice40000 mprice50000 mprice60000
mprice70000 mprice80000 mprice100000 mprice120000 mprice140000 mprice160000
mprice180000 mprice200000 site1 site2 site3 site4 site5 site6 site7 site8 lntrees lnturf
lnathletic lnxeric elevation5000 elevation5700), re
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